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ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN COMMUNIST SYSTEMS

By ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN*

I. Introduction

IN the field of comparative Communist studies theory seems to have lagged behind reality. Until a few years ago we tended to think of Communist polities in terms of uniformities oriented around the concept of a totalitarian model that permeated all Communist systems more or less the same way and to the same degree. Although it was recognized that there were cultural differences and variations in the levels of development, these factors were not assigned great weight in modifying and transforming Communist polities. On the contrary, the very possibility of a transformation was assigned a low probability.

In contrast with that view, the central hypothesis advanced in this paper is that the stage of economic development imposes certain imperatives of its own on any economic, political, and social system, including Communist ones. Moreover, the stage of development is one of the crucial variables contributing to the process of differentiation among Communist systems.

The basic thesis of this paper is predicated on the premise that there is a significant degree of correlation between economic and political change. This is not intended to suggest that political structures and changes are determined only by economic factors. On the contrary, I fully recognize that a host of other variables impinge on the polity (e.g., historical factors, political culture, the character of the international system, etc.) but this examination of the relationships between the economy and the polity will leave them out of consideration. It would be erroneous to read into this omission an argument that economic changes are *bound* to produce political changes. Obviously, Communist and other regimes can consciously or unconsciously decide

* This paper was originally delivered before the Conference of Communist Studies at the American Political Science Association meetings in September 1968. A preliminary version was presented at the Comparative Communism Workshop in Palo Alto. I am greatly indebted to the members of that workshop for their criticism. In revising the original draft I have also greatly benefited by the most helpful comments of Professors Abram Bergson, Robert Cole, Karl Deutsch, Alexander Gerschenkron, Gregory Grossman, Simon Kuznets, and Richard Solomon.

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to maintain certain political arrangements and practices even if they are dysfunctional from an economic point of view and even if they entail growing economic costs. Thus in the case of Czechoslovakia, for instance, a highly centralized command system could be maintained in a complex, highly industrialized, and strongly foreign-trade-oriented economy only at a serious sacrifice in efficiency and growth. This sacrifice in turn contributed very significantly to the pressures for economic reform, which then became an important factor in producing political change. Following the Russian invasion, the *status quo ante* is being re-established more or less consciously at the expense of economic efficiency and growth.

II. The Analytical Framework

The stage of economic development circumscribes the technological, the production, the supply capacities or possibilities of the economic system. It also circumscribes the set of economic institutions and arrangements that are compatible with the prevailing state of technology. This does not mean that economic institutions are uniquely predetermined by a particular type of technology; rather it defines a circumscribed range of possibilities. For instance, it is most improbable that food production by traditional methods, i.e., based on labor-intensive techniques and relying on nonindustrial inputs, will be carried on by large business corporations. Similarly it is difficult to envisage corporate forms of organization for handicraft methods of manufacture.

The level of technology applied will (*ceteris paribus*) necessarily affect the processes and methods of production in agriculture and industry and the level of labor productivity in these sectors. With low levels of labor productivity, the preponderant share of the labor force will remain tied to agriculture and the rural way of life. Similarly, methods of production in industry may be expected to be quite labor-intensive in an underdeveloped economy with the handicraft sector looming large. Thus technological backwardness, in the sense of reliance on pre-industrial methods of production, necessarily implies economic backwardness, which in turn finds its expression in the structure of the economy.[1] Economic backwardness is characterized by large labor and GNP shares in agriculture and correspondingly

[1] Economic backwardness can of course be described or defined in terms of a number of interrelated criteria such as GNP per head, share of labor force in agriculture, average product per worker, etc. For internationally comparable measures of structural change associated with economic growth, see Simon Kuznets, *Modern Economic Growth, Rate, Structure and Spread* (New Haven and London 1966), particularly chap. 3.

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small shares in industry. Technical backwardness and low productivity in agriculture under most circumstances are also associated with a low degree of commercialization and monetization. This necessarily affects the character of trade and trading institutions as it does of banks and other monetary institutions. The scope of internal trade and banking will necessarily be restricted in an economy based on small-scale methods of production on the one hand and pre-modern methods of transport on the other.[2] The character of commercial and banking organization will also necessarily be affected by the prevailing level of communications technology. Thus, the rise of large national trading enterprises and of national banking institutions was greatly facilitated by the development of the telephone and the telegraph.

There is, then, a close functional relation between low productivity, high labor and GNP shares in agriculture, local agricultural self-sufficiency, low degrees of commercialization, low degree of monetization, and low degree of urbanization. All of these elements tend to be further reinforced by poor transport and communication.

Economic institutions associated with technical backwardness necessarily affect the character of political institutions and arrangements. At the same time, technical backwardness affects political structure and political capabilities directly as well. For example, there is a close association between rural self-sufficiency, low degree of commercialization and monetization, underdeveloped transport and communications, and economic fragmentation, on the one hand, and the distances over which a government can exercise centralized control in considerable depth.[3] *Ceteris paribus*, technical backwardness similarly limits not only the production capacities of an economy but its mobilization capabilities as well. At the same time it also limits the mobilization capacities of the political system.[4] It can thus be shown that there is a strong association between levels of technology used, stages of economic development, and stages of political development, on the one

[2] There are various ways in which the scope and extent of internal trade could be measured. In this context I am thinking of the share of output entering marketing channels, and within this share the proportion sold in local as compared to regional or national markets.

[3] Thus a premodern polity such as that of Imperial China, embedded in a premodern economy based on traditional techniques of production, could exert far-reaching control over a vast area but minimal penetration at the sub-*hsien* level.

[4] In this context the *ceteris paribus* assumption must be strongly underlined. Therefore it would be erroneous to jump to the conclusion that economic and political mobilization would be impossible. In fact, as both Soviet and Chinese examples illustrate, ideology and organization can, at least up to a point, compensate for technical backwardness.

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hand, and the economic and political capabilities of a system to meet the demands placed upon it, on the other.

The demands placed upon a political system are fostered at least in part by the external environment. An international environment of nation-states that surrounds each state-based political system provides one of the sources of external pressure and stimuli. These pressures are reinforced by a cross-cultural and transnational demonstration effect based on standards of living, standards of power, and other attributes perceived as characterizing the most developed countries. The demands thus generated require the encouragement, development, and/or maintenance of tasks that could be categorized in several alternative ways. The following represents one possible approach to defining these tasks.[5]

1. *National Integration*, most particularly the pursuit of national unity, identity, and legitimacy.

2. *National Security and Power*, that is, protection of the country's territorial integrity, its boundaries, and its sovereignty; in some cases there must be added to this, in part as a natural extension of the foregoing, a pursuit of external and internal power goals.

3. *Improvement in the Levels of Material Welfare* in the country.

4. *Industrialization* or, more broadly, economic modernization. However, the two necessarily go hand in hand.

5. *Resource Mobilization*, which in turn requires political and economic control, penetration, and participation.[6]

These different tasks are closely interrelated, in some cases complementary but in some competitive and mutually contradictory. At the same time they can be viewed as representing either final or intermediate demands. Thus from one vantage point the first three categories represent ends (final demand) while the last two can be considered as inputs (intermediate demand) necessary for the attainment of these ends. However, from some points of view, improvements in standard of living could be considered not only as a consequence

[5] In thinking through these definitions of needs and demands I have been greatly influenced by, and have profited from, studying the burgeoning literature in the field of political development. I am referring to the first five symposia sponsored by the Committee on Comparative Politics and published by the Princeton University Press, to David Apter's *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago 1965) and to *Comparative Politics, A Developmental Approach* by Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr. (Boston 1966). In working on this paper I have particularly benefited from reading Lucian Pye's most stimulating essay, *Aspects of Political Development* (Boston 1966).

[6] Mobilization is of course very closely associated with industrialization. I am treating it here as a separate concept since mobilization may be directed toward not only economic growth but political development as well. Moreover, it may go beyond that and serve as a means of sustaining a permanent revolution.

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but as a necessary prerequisite to industrialization and mobilization, on the ground that such improvements would be required as incentives for the attainment of the latter.

It could be said that the character of the polity in a state is a function of this continuing interplay between the capabilities of the system as constrained by the stage of development and the technology associated therewith, on the one hand, and the demand mix and demand intensity placed upon it, on the other. These capacities and demands may be mutually adjusted or adjusting, i.e., in a state of equilibrium or tending toward equilibrium, or they may be diverging and tending toward a sharp imbalance, a serious disequilibrium. The equilibrium in this context refers to the relationship between the technological capabilities of the system and the demands placed upon it such that it is compatible with a more or less stable political system. Up to a point this disequilibrium may be self-liquidating as a result of mutual adjustments between capacity variables and demand variables, but beyond a certain point the disequilibrium may become eruptive in the sense that it leads to a sharp discontinuity, a revolutionary transformation, in the character of the polity.

At the same time there is not only a functional relation between the polity on the one hand and capacities and demands on the other, but the latter two are themselves interrelated. Thus the priorities assigned to the different tasks and the methods used to pursue them will to a large extent be a function of technological capabilities (stage of development) and the particular character of the polity. Although the five categories of tasks outlined above may be said to face all states, the priority mix chosen and the degree to which it will be pursued (i.e., the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the goal structure) will depend on whether the nation-state is new or old, Communist or non-Communist, economically developed or underdeveloped. Correspondingly, the speed with which the various demands are being pursued will affect the capabilities of the system. For instance, industrialization and economic mobilization measures, if carried out successfully, will necessarily alter the capabilities of the system to fulfill the demands placed upon it.

Within this general framework I shall try to explore two particular aspects in the complex of relations linking stage of economic development to Communist polity: 1) the impact of ideology, and 2) the impact of technological and economic changes on political style and practice.

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III. Stage of Development and Communist Ideology

In the analytical framework outlined above, the political system in a particular country is viewed as the product of certain capabilities and demands, capacities and aspirations. The continuing interaction between these two sets of variables provides the basic engine of change in the system. The capacity side of the system is critically dependent upon the level of technology prevailing in the country and the stage of economic development. This is not the sole determinant of capacities but defines their range and limits.

One of the hypotheses of this paper is that the greater the disequilibrium—the sharper the imbalance between the capacities and the demands—the greater will tend to be the *tension* in the system. This *tension* is largely born of frustration, for the most part articulated by the intelligentsia. It is the intelligentsia that demands an explanation for and a rapid resolution of the sharp imbalances and disproportionalities in the system. These demands for explanation and rapid resolution, born of frustration, create a set of needs and predispositions to adopt an ideology that serves indeed the functions of a *Weltanschauung*, of a total, all-embracing explanation and a radical, revolutionary solution. Therefore it could be said that the more acute the state of *tension* in the system, the more total, radical, and revolutionary will ideology tend to be. At the same time it could be hypothesized that the more economically and technically backward a country is, the more *potent* will have to be the force of ideology to overcome the accumulated dead weight of stagnation and inertia. As Professor Gerschenkron put it so aptly: "To break through the barriers of stagnation in a backward country, to ignite the imaginations of men, and to place their energies in the service of economic development, a stronger medicine is needed than the promise of better allocation of resources or even the lower price of bread. Under such conditions even the businessman, even the classical daring and innovating entrepreneur, needs a more powerful stimulus than the prospect of high profits. What is needed to remove the mounting routine and prejudice is *faith*."[7]

The character of the ideology will also condition the character of the demands imposed on the system, which, depending on its capabilities to meet these demands, then contributes to aggravating the tensions through a continuous back-and-forth feedback mechanism. The character of the ideology can, however, also affect the capacities of

[7] Alexander Gerschenkron, *Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, A Book of Essays* (Cambridge, Mass. 1962), 24. (Italics added.)

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the system, particularly through the relations between ideology, political mobilization, and economic resource mobilization.

Economic development in general and output growth in particular may be considered a function of (a) the quantity of inputs (factors of production) applied, (b) the quality of these inputs, and (c) the input combinations used and the technology associated therewith. Both (a) and (b) can in turn be called forth either through coercion and/or through economic—i.e., material—or psychic incentives. Psychic incentives, however, are largely a function of ideology and organization. In this context, the function of ideology and organization is to foster input mobilization, with ideology providing the rationale and the sanction, and organization supplying implementation capacity or administrative inputs for this mobilization task. At the same time the organization itself must be strongly imbued by ideology if it is to perform its mobilization task adequately. In effect, then, ideology must motivate the organization and, both through the organization and directly as well, motivate the masses for mobilization.[8]

Ideology and organization can foster rising input mobilization and/or rising input productivity to the extent that it can evoke spontaneous adherence, conscious or unconscious, and internalization of the ideologically imbued values of the human actors in the system. More specifically, mobilization is facilitated to the extent that ideology can evoke a genuinely voluntary spirit of self-sacrifice, self-abnegation, and subordination of personal strivings to the attainment of collective goals. Put in Freudian terms, mobilization is facilitated to the extent that "the individual gives up his ego ideal and substitutes for it the group ideal as embodied in the leader."[9]

The direct relationships between ideology and input mobilization are somewhat clearer than those between ideology and input productivity. At any given level of input mobilization, ideology might supply the needed psychic incentives to boost labor productivity up to a point. If labor productivity is defined in net marginal terms, i.e., marginal increments in productivity attributable to the labor factor itself at given

[8] For instance, this was most apparent in Communist China during the Great Leap Forward (1958-59) when the whole state and economic management apparatus became highly politicized, with numerous tasks and responsibilities transferred to direct Party control. At the same time, ideological exhortation and indoctrination was greatly stepped up and the Party, with its cadres, was mobilized to a fever pitch. In turn, it was the task of the cadres thus imbued to mobilize the masses. See Franz Schurmann, *Ideology and Organization in Communist China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1966), *xlii* and *xlv*, and 1-9.

[9] Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego* (New York 1967), 61.

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skill levels, its rise could be due to "harder" work and/or increased efficiency, both resulting from improved incentives, in our case psychic incentives. "Harder" work could imply longer hours and more days worked per month and per year. Strictly speaking, this should be considered as increased input application, rather than rising productivity. Alternatively, "harder" work might imply greater diligence during the hours worked. Increased efficiency of labor inputs could therefore be due to greater diligence per unit of time worked, greater care exercised during the hours worked, and/or greater interest of the laborer in his work.

Looked at in these terms, rising input mobilization and input productivity may be complementary and mutually reinforcing up to a certain point. However, beyond that point they become competitive. For instance, ideologically imbued mobilization may increase labor-participation rates by drawing more women, children, and old people into the labor force. To the extent that the productivity of these elements may be expected to be lower than that of the working-age males, their increasing participation will tend to lower the productivity of the labor force, but still increase the output of the population as a whole. Alternatively, ideology may induce workers to extend their hours voluntarily and without any elements of coercion. Yet even with such a positive attitude, longer hours of work might be at the expense of man-hour productivity because of fatigue, for instance. At the extreme limit, similar considerations may apply to the mobilization of savings. Thus, theoretically at least, we could envisage that under certain circumstances ideology might be so successful in inculcating attitudes of abstinence and self-denial that households would voluntarily cut their consumption to the point that it may be nutritionally debilitating, thus interfering with the physical capacity to work and thereby lowering labor productivity. Admittedly this is not very probable.

Beyond a certain point mobilization may be expected to yield diminishing returns for other reasons as well. The leaders, carriers, and implementors of input mobilization in Communist systems tend to be the "reds" rather than the "experts." This lack or downgrading of technical know-how and technical considerations may be expected to reduce even further the efficiency with which the mobilized resources are utilized.[10]

[10] I am indebted to Professor Gregory Grossman for calling this to my attention. In considering this problem it may be important to bear in mind that the leaders' ideal is a Communist man who is both *red* and *expert*. However, particularly in underdeveloped Communist countries such as China, where technical and skilled manpower is very

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All of these potentially negative labor productivity effects will tend to be aggravated to the extent that ideologically induced mobilization shades over from purely spontaneous adherence into pressured or coercive adherence. Thus, coercive or semi-coercive measures of both savings and/or labor mobilization may be expected to yield negative productivity effects even if they do augment the quantity of inputs supplied. In these terms, then, the *potency* of an ideology may be assessed by the extent to which it contributes to evoking spontaneous rather than coercive adherence, as reflected in increasing input mobilization and/or rising input productivity.[11]

What is the relevance of these concepts and this line of reasoning for Communist systems? I have suggested that the greater the disequilibrium between capacities and demands, the greater will tend to be the *tension* in the system. The greater *tension* will find its expression in a more totalistic, radical, all-embracing, and *potent* ideology, which will infuse the actors in the system with a sense of purpose and commitment such as to provide the basis for a far-reaching mobilization designed to alleviate the disequilibrium by boosting system capacity. Under this hypothesis, there should be some correlation between stage of development and the particular character of Communist ideology. More specifically, with a given demand mix and intensity, the lower the capacity of the system to satisfy these demands the more *potent* will the prevailing variant of Communist ideology tend to be.

There is a clearly discernible central tendency in Marxist thought—even if we grant that it is peppered with ambiguities, inconsistencies, and qualifications in part traceable to an evolution of Marx's views in the light of changing conditions during his lifetime. This central thrust of Marx's system is perhaps most clearly expressed by the following quotation: "In the social production which men carry on they

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scarce and where technical backwardness itself severely limits the technical learning opportunities, such an ideal may be unattainable.

[11] In introducing this notion of degree of "potency," I of course recognize the obstacles to translating it into measurable magnitudes. Theoretically, i.e., provided that the data are available, rising input applications and input productivities can be measured. If more intensive ideological indoctrination were the only instrument to be used in inducing input changes, the measurement problem would be fairly simple. However if, as is more probable, ideology is used in combination with other instruments, it may be extremely difficult—if not impossible—to separate the effects of the former from those of the latter. This difficulty arises both because ideological and other inputs may be intercorrelated and because applications of ideology can hardly be quantified. We can of course count the number of workers engaged in indoctrination (i.e., party cadres engaged in ideological work), but this can not serve as an adequate measure of the factor mobilization or factor productivity effects of ideology. It would be even more difficult to measure the degree to which input mobilization and productivity effects are traceable to spontaneous rather than to coercive adherence.

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enter into definite relations that are indispensable and *independent of their will*; these *relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material forces of production.* The sum total of these relations of production constitutes *the economic structure of society*—the real *foundation on which rise legal and political superstructure* and to which definite forms of social consciousness correspond."[12]

Crucial for the problems considered in this paper is Marx's concept of the material foundations, the economic base, the substructure juxtaposed to the superstructure of the legal order, the polity, culture, and social consciousness. The relation between the material base and the superstructure in Marx's thought lends itself to varying interpretations. Certainly one of the possible and historically most frequent interpretations follows logically from the above-quoted statement. This is a fully deterministic interpretation clearly implying that the superstructure, including the polity, is a function of the base, i.e., of the mode and relations of production. Moreover, these relations of production have to correspond to a definite stage of development independent of men's will.

It is of course perfectly true that Marx allowed for the possibility that under certain circumstances the superstructure can shape the base.[13] In some of their writings Marx and Engels attached great importance to ideas and to will as levers of social change. Unfortunately Marx and Engels did not face up to this problem in any systematic fashion; they did not spell out the conditions under which in their view the base or the superstructure would be determinant.[14] This ambiguity opened the way to numerous disputations and scholastic arguments among different schools of Marxism.

For the purposes of this paper, the validity of these various interpretations of Marx is of no particular significance. Our focus instead is on what interpretations and emphases have been adopted by socialist

[12] Karl Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (Chicago 1911), 11. (Italics added.)

[13] For instance, in discussing the role of primitive accumulation in the development or rise of early capitalism, Marx states that "*Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.*" (Italics added.) *Capital* (Chicago 1921), 824.

[14] This ambiguity was clearly recognized by Engels in his much-referred-to four letters written after Marx's death in response to the critics of Marxist theory. In these letters he reiterates the role that ideology, religion, and philosophy may play in a society's economic development. At the same time he re-emphasizes that the interaction between cultural elements and production forces is "on the basis of economic necessity, which *ultimately* always asserts itself." Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Correspondence, 1846-1895*, translated by Dona Torr (New York 1942), 475-518.

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movements in different countries, using the term socialist in its broadest meaning (i.e., encompassing Communist movements as well). In these terms then, it would seem that in the Western European movements—particularly prior to World War I—great stress was placed on the type of interpretation that logically follows from Marx's statement quoted above. Closely associated with this is the notion that since the superstructure, including the polity and social consciousness (including class consciousness), is a function of the base, socialist movements would grow and socialism would triumph in the more highly industrialized countries. Implicit, and at times explicit, in this approach is an evolutionary rather than a revolutionary view of history. After all, the forces of history are propelled by industrialization and by the changing mode of production and relations of production associated with it. Therefore the role of socialist movements is merely to assist the historical forces as they are unfolding.

This view of Marxism and this type of ideological flavor were clearly not suited to the conditions of Tsarist Russia. Under the circumstances of Russia's backwardness, a more *potent* ideology was required to overcome the dead weight of stagnation, engineer a revolution, and break the *tension*. It is therefore not surprising to find that Leninism placed a much greater emphasis on the importance of will and consciousness. Struggling in an underdeveloped economy, the Leninist version of Marxism became much more activist, much more concerned about shaping the forces of history rather than waiting for industrialization to take its inexorable course—in short, much more revolutionary. It now fell to the dictatorship of the proletariat to foster industrialization and to create the conditions for the advent of socialism, rather than the other way around. Ultimately the revolution had to be engineered, had to be willed. Accordingly ideology had to be shaped and transformed so as to infuse it with a spirit of radicalism, zeal, and commitment sufficient to break the barriers of stagnation.

This strain of *voluntarism* and radicalism, with the consequent upgrading in the importance of the superstructure as compared to the base, is even more pronounced in Chinese Communist ideological interpretations. This is perhaps most clearly evidenced by Mao's repeated stress on man as the most precious thing. This spirit is also reflected in the marked emphasis placed by the Chinese Communists on "men over machines" and "men over weapons." In effect, quite central to the Maoist belief system is the presupposition that will, spontaneity, consciousness infused by and reflected in ideology and organization can serve as substitutes for technology, equipment, and material forces

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in general, at least within certain ranges.[15] Or, put in another way, ideology and organization can provide the sanction, the rationale, and the wherewithal for far-reaching mobilization of labor and capital (savings), which then through *primitive accumulation* can develop the material forces, launch the industrialization drive, and thus develop the base.

Because of China's backwardness as compared to that of Tsarist Russia and nineteenth-century Europe, classical Marxism as a revolutionary ideology was much too weak for and of limited applicability to mainland conditions. Amid these conditions of even greater relative backwardness, the importance of ideology had to be upgraded significantly since it was called upon to perform a host of functions in the system. The radical flavor of the ideology is, at least in part, a function of the growing disequilibrium between capabilities and demands characterizing Chinese polity in the twentieth century.[16] Thus Communist ideology in China can be viewed as a product of *tension* as well as an instrument designed to alleviate it.

The radical flavor of Communist ideology in China combined with the enormous emphasis placed on indoctrination, thought reform, and remolding of thought is again, at least in part, traceable to China's backwardness. Mass indoctrination and mobilization are required to break the inertia of the masses, the inertia built into the very fabric of society and the structure of the economy, and to break the dead weight of tradition. At the same time, the enormous gap between the technical and production capacities of the system on the one hand and the vast aspirations of the Chinese Communists on the other requires very strong faith, on the part of both the leaders and the masses, in the objectives formulated for the society. Thus ideology serves as a secular religion *par excellence*, much more so than seems to have been the case at any stage in Soviet history.

However, this very emphasis on mass indoctrination, mass mobilization, and mass participation so characteristic of the Communist sys-

[15] "Of all things in the world, *people are the most precious*," Mao Tse-tung, *Selected Works*, vol. 4 (Peking 1961), 454. (Italics added.)

[16] In Lifton's words, there are certain psychological assumptions long prominent in Mao's thought but never so overtly insisted upon as during the Cultural Revolution. One of these assumptions is an image of the human mind as infinitely malleable, capable of being reformed, transformed, and rectified without limit. Another is a related vision of the will as all-powerful, even to the extent that in Mao's own words, "*the subjective creates the objective*." That is, man's capacity for both undergoing change and changing his environment is unlimited; once he makes the decision for change, the entire universe can be bent to his will. Robert J. Lifton, *Revolutionary Immortality: Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese Cultural Revolution* (New York 1968), 70-71.

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tem in China seems to have produced certain built-in contradictions and tensions of its own. Thus mass mobilization, mass participation, mass involvement is really seen by Mao as the only possible path to modernization at this stage of China's development. Maintenance of this mass mobilization base requires tremendous ideological and organizational zeal, which can be buttressed over time only by a commitment to a state of permanent revolution. However, as the experience of China and other underdeveloped countries has shown, the mobilization and the technocratic paths to industrialization are to a greater or lesser extent incompatible. Although a certain measure of ideologically induced resource mobilization may be a requisite for modernization, such mobilization cannot serve as a substitute for technical and material inputs.[17] Furthermore, extreme mobilization efforts are bound to take place at the expense of input productivity and may greatly complicate the application of the technical and material inputs so vitally needed for modernization and industrialization.

Maoism in effect opts for mass mobilization and a strategy of permanent revolution—of which the cultural revolution is but an extreme manifestation—because it considers the technocratic path to modernization too slow. Moreover, this path would in any case be ruled out on ideological grounds as leading to bureaucratization and an atrophy of the revolution. It is these sets of dilemmas that seem to push Maoism more and more in the direction of what may be termed *totalitarian populism*. It is populist from several points of view. The concept of the "people" and the "enemies of the people" is quite central to Chinese Communist doctrine and mass mobilization practice. But it can be considered as populist in a more important sense. Maoism can be considered as a movement committed to industrialization and modernization, yet unwilling to countenance the consequences of industrialization. While the Russian populists of the nineteenth century, strongly wedded to a rural value-orientation, resisted the consequences of industrialization, Mao resists the application of modern inputs to the industrialization process because he too fears the consequences. He is concerned that technocratically based industrialism will create elitism, shut out the masses, or increase their consumption propensities and undermine the revolution. Thus, just as Russian populism was a peasant-welfare-oriented ideology born in a backward, agrarian, and autocratic state, so is Maoism a people-using doctrine of an even more backward, agrarian, Communist state.

[17] This point was most dramatically driven home during the Great Leap of 1958-59.

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IV. Economic Development and Political Change in Communist Systems

Stage of development, command economy, and command polity

If we consider the social system as operating through an interplay of capacities and demands, and assume that it functions in an underdeveloped Communist economy placed in a world environment populated by Communist, non-Communist, and anti-Communist states, we see that certain consequences follow. Such a system will tend to be committed at one and the same time to rapid industrialization, a high rate of defense expenditure, and a high rate of resource mobilization—of both capital and labor—needed to sustain these high rates of nonconsumption.

The pursuit of these industrialization and defense objectives requires that they be translated into operational programs. This in turn suggests the need to draft economic plans and to devise instruments for implementing them. In Communist systems such plans have in the past been based on highly specific targets reflecting an explicitly or implicitly formulated order of priorities. These, in turn, were then translated into more or less detailed resource allocation bundles with a very high degree of commitment to their attainment.

The implementation of these plans and programs requires the use of certain instruments and appeals. These might be normative, coercive, or remunerative; that is, ideology- and value-based appeals as contrasted with appeals based on force and compulsion or on material incentives and inducements.[18] The more successful the normative appeals are in motivating the actors in the system to behave in certain ways and implement the objectives as postulated by the planners and the policy-makers, the less will be the need to use coercive or remunerative appeals. From the standpoint of the policy-makers, the normative appeals are preferred. If successful, they will lead to goal congruence and goal compliance at minimal resource cost. This goal congruence would, of course, be attained if and when the values of the policy-makers were internalized by the population at large.

If normative appeals fail in producing goal congruence, Communist leaders will tend to favor reliance on coercive power as a means of closing the gap between planners' and household preference scales. From the point of view of economic development, the divergence in

[18] See Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York 1961), 66.

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time-preference scales and in the tradeoffs between work and leisure is of particular importance and affects the rates of savings and labor mobilization. Should coercive power fail to yield the expected or desired rate of mobilization, or if this mobilization rate can be obtained only at the cost of sharp declines in labor productivity, planners and policy-makers will be forced to rely on remunerative appeals—material incentives—as a means of increasing the supply of labor and other inputs. This would mean raising prices, wages, and interest rates. From the standpoint of the classical kind of Communist leadership this last type of appeal is the least to be preferred, for several reasons. Interest rates may turn out to be a very weak instrument for raising the savings level; these rates may need to be increased very much in order to yield the targeted savings rate, and even then there is no assurance that the desired rate will in fact be attained. Moreover, reliance on wage-increases as a means of increasing labor supply runs the danger of boosting household consumption well beyond the levels postulated by the planners. Reliance on material incentives is almost certainly bound to yield a commodity-and-service output bundle quite different from that desired or planned by the policy-makers. Finally, reliance on remunerative appeals tends to endanger the very control structure and value system on which the Communist system is based. Material incentives might encourage spontaneous development in pursuit of individual advantage and thus independent of the state's will, a phenomenon profoundly disturbing to the regime.[19]

In fact, it is most improbable that at a particular point in time any one of these appeals would be used in its pure form. It is much more likely that Communist regimes will use appeal mixes, the composition of which would be expected to shift according to changing circumstances and the extent to which the prevailing mix succeeds in evoking the desired response.[20] However this may be, to the extent that coercive power is used to institutionalize a high rate of saving, a high rate of mobilization, and the attainment of specific but ambitious production targets of high priority, a centralized command polity will need to be erected to provide the muscle and the backbone for the centralized command economy. Of course, a command polity may and

[19] I am indebted to Professor Richard Lowenthal for this particular way of formulating the problem.

[20] Professor Skinner goes well beyond this in his most suggestive cyclical policy theory based on shift patterns of this appeals mix in different phases of the cycle. See G. W. Skinner and E. A. Winckler, "Compliance Succession in Rural Communist China: A Cyclical Theory," in Amitai Etzioni, ed., *Complex Organizations* (New York 1969), 410-38.

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in fact probably would be constructed for the attainment of non-economic goals as well.

In the early stages of economic development such a command economy and polity may be quite functional as a model for rapid industrialization. At these stages a large part of economic growth can be based on input mobilization, i.e., the mobilization of latent surpluses of labor and capital, even if it occurs at the expense of input productivity. Moreover, economies in the early phases of development are less complex and less sensitive instruments. There is also less refined division of labor, less functional differentiation, and less skill differentiation than characterize more highly developed economies. Also, such economies necessarily borrow their technology from abroad rather than operate at or near the technological frontiers. For all of these reasons, a mobilization strategy of economic growth may serve reasonably well at this stage of "primitive accumulation." Moreover, at this same mobilization and "primitive accumulation" stage, terror—either physical or psychological—may serve as a reasonably functional means of applying coercive power for the support of a command polity and economy.

CHANGES IN THE COMMAND ECONOMY AND POLITY UNDER THE IMPACT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

One of the hallmarks of the development process is growing complexity, roundaboutness, and interdependence in the production of goods and services. Closely associated with this growing complexity is a rapidly rising demand for technical and scientific skills. At the same time, such latent labor surpluses as are present tend to be absorbed during the process of economic growth so that labor becomes increasingly scarce. As labor shortages develop and skill-level requirements increase, standard mobilization techniques will no longer suffice in increasing the supply of labor and particularly in improving the quality and productivity of labor inputs.

As long as there are more or less readily available pools of surplus labor and as long as the preponderance of demand is for unskilled labor, the growing demand for labor can be met through coercive mobilization or through the use of negative incentives, even if these techniques lead to declines in labor productivity. Under these conditions, the negative output effects resulting from losses in labor productivity can be made up for by stepping up the rate of mobilization.

Once these surpluses are more or less exhausted, it may become very difficult to call forth incremental increases in labor supply by coercive

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methods. Moreover, these incremental increases may be too small to counteract the losses in labor productivity, so that under these conditions coercive mobilization may be expected to yield decreases in output.

Normative appeals, by their very character, are difficult to sustain over long periods. They can be used for marshalling an all-out mobilization effort, but they may be much less well suited to maintaining the level of mobilization attained. Moreover, they are blunt instruments that do not lend themselves well to inducing incremental increases in supply of labor or of particular forms of skilled labor.

For all these reasons, mobilization appeals—coercive and normative—will tend to be more functional in underdeveloped countries at early stages of industrialization. Correspondingly, as industrialization progresses, remunerative appeals—material incentives—will necessarily assume growing importance.

The industrialization process and the rising complexity, roundaboutness, and interdependence of the economy associated therewith bring with them also an increasing division of labor and a growing functional differentiation of occupations, occupational roles, and social roles. Closely interrelated with this process is the rise of managerial bureaucracies in enterprises, in government bureaus, in the party, and in social organizations. These bureaucracies and these processes, in turn, produce a technical, professional, and managerial elite.

These patterns of change are reinforced by urbanization accompanying industrialization and the corresponding relative, and eventually absolute, decline in the economic importance of agriculture, in the share of the rural population, and in the numbers living in villages. These phenomena then produce an urban way of life with a rising demand for a more intimate and more systematic linking of effort with reward. All of these factors in combination then contribute to rising personal aspirations of the population at large, and of the more educated portions of it in particular. This, in turn, is then reflected in growing consumer demand and mounting pressures for sharing in the material benefits of economic advance. These economic and social transformations necessarily create mounting pressures for change in the character of Communist regimes.

A command economy with its centralized network of direct controls becomes more and more difficult to manage as industrialization proceeds and as the economy becomes more complex. Thus, the system can be retained only at an increasing economic cost and a loss in efficiency. This may be said to be at least the case at our present state of computer and economic management technology.

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The management and operation of a complex economy requires a vast quantity of highly reliable information speedily obtained. It also demands rapid processing of this information and quick decisions in the light of changing circumstances. This places an enormous information and decision-making burden on a highly centralized system of economic administration. The problem is compounded by the fact that in a complex and interdependent economy errors and disequilibria originating at one point in the system might proliferate and reverberate throughout it. In one sense, the information and decision problem is but a symptom of bounded rationality on the part of the human actors in the system. Theoretically, alternative paths might be pursued in attempts to resolve this problem: one would lead in the direction of decentralization and the other to "computopia."[21]

In considering decentralization it is essential to distinguish between bureaucratic and market decentralization. Under the first, decision-making powers are retained by the governmental authorities but are decentralized within the governmental apparatus. That is, many decision-making powers are delegated by the center to lower-level governmental organs, on either a functional or a territorial basis. In contrast, under the second type of decentralization, decision-making powers are taken out of the hands of the government, taken away from the polity, and transferred to the market. The difficulty with bureaucratic decentralization is that, at least judging by the experience of Communist regimes thus far, they solve very few of the problems of a large system and create many new ones. The dilemma from the standpoint of Communist regimes is how to retain full political control of the system and at the same time gain economic rationality and efficiency. In this quest continuing attempts are made to design decision-making systems that combine centralized control with decentralized administration.

However, decentralized administration and the delegation of powers built into it necessarily leads to goal bifurcation.[22] It is very difficult, if not impossible, to design a system of incentives for a bureaucracy that will assure spontaneous adherence of lower-level organs and micro-units to system goals. Quite apart from this, as economic development proceeds and an economic system becomes more complex, bureaucratic decentralization might, at best, alleviate rather than resolve the information problem.

[21] See Egon Neuberger: "Libermanism, Computopia, and Visible Hand," *American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings* (May 1966), 131-44.

[22] See Philip Selznick, *TVA and the Grass Roots* (Berkeley 1949).

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All of these considerations then may push Communist regimes into various forms of experimentation with market decentralization. This, however, runs into political resistance because of the surrender of control entailed in pursuit of this path. The way out of these dilemmas could be provided by a "computopia," if it were feasible. Some tendencies in this direction can be detected in Soviet planning practices in recent years. The hope here would be that central planners could retain complete control while simulating the behavior of a decentralized market system. Moreover, those designing such a "computopia" would attempt to improve upon the market by internalizing, i.e., by taking into account and solving for, the externalities in the system. If this strategy were technically and conceptually feasible, its choice could assure retention of centralized political control without loss of economic efficiency. Fortunately or unfortunately, at the present state of our theory and computer technology this is not a feasible or practicable solution.

The difficulties in the way of pursuing "computopia" tend to create new pressures for market decentralization and for placing increasing reliance on material incentives. There are definite limits on the degree to which coercive power can be stepped up. Resort to terror in an advanced, highly industrialized economy may perhaps even involve higher economic, social, and political costs than would be true at earlier stages of development. In a complex industrial and urban economy, managers must have a reasonable degree of security, predictability, and regularity in order to perform their jobs effectively and efficiently. The aforementioned considerations are reinforced by the fact that as an economy advances and catches up with highly industrialized countries it can rely less and less on technological borrowing. Correspondingly, if it wants to maintain its pace of progress it must rely increasingly on its own innovative efforts. Innovation and the risk-taking entailed in it may, however, be very seriously hindered in an atmosphere and environment permeated by terror.

However, if under the impact of these economic pressures Communist regimes do tolerate, permit, or encourage market decentralization there are bound to be political consequences. These political consequences may be expected to be the more far-reaching the further market decentralization is carried. If it progresses so far as to leave the implementation of economic decisions to the market—with government policy-makers and planners making only macro-decisions—a vast economic bureaucracy becomes displaced. In effect, the polity is removed from a large area of administration as direct controls are replaced by in-

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direct controls exercised through the market. Market decentralization, moreover, tends to foster the growth of functional autonomy and helps the development of autonomous centers of power in the economy. Thus market decentralization undermines the position of many power-holders in the system and *pari passu* creates new foci of power. The problem is further complicated for Communist regimes because once certain positions of autonomy develop and spread in the system they are very difficult to contain, since they generate pressures for a further spread of autonomy.[23]

All of these tendencies combined will necessarily also have some resource allocative effects. With rising demands for increasing consumption, investment and/or defense expenditure rates will be subjected to growing pressure, with possible consequences for the country's defense posture and foreign policy conduct. The cessation of terror with the resulting removal of fear, combined with growing autonomy in some sectors, may encourage some people to begin speaking up and even to express some unpopular thoughts, thus further undermining the totalitarian character of the Communist system.

In conclusion, the general thesis of this paper can be summed up as follows: in an approach to the analysis of the social system from the standpoint of economic capabilities in relation to elite goals, it becomes the function of the political system to implement these goals. The capacities of the economic and political system are constrained by the stage of development, and at the same time the attainment of elite goals in a modern state requires mass participation and involvement. The forms of mass participation and the methods and appeals used to evoke them are themselves a function of the stage of development. Moreover, it is through the various forms of mass participation that the capabilities of the economic system are developed.

However, as the process of economic growth alleviates some of the disequilibria between system capabilities and demands, it gives rise to some new contradictions in all societies, including Communist ones, where they to a large extent revolve around the contradictory demands of centralized political control on the one hand and economic efficiency on the other. These contradictions are also aggravated by rising literacy of the masses, increasing levels of mass education, growing mass consumption demands, and a greater urge for more intimate linkings of effort with reward.

All of these changes, combined with structural transformations in the

[23] Something like this seems to have taken place in Czechoslovakia between January and August, 1968.

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economy associated with the development process, render certain types of economic institutions and political practices less functional at more advanced stages of development. More specifically, a centralized command economy based largely on normative and/or coercive power, most particularly terror, tends to become less and less functional. With the removal of terror, the upgrading of remunerative appeals, and the growing pressure for market decentralization, the polity becomes more circumscribed in scope, less pervasive. At the same time, and in fact as a result, more rationality, predictability, and autonomy is demanded by both the elites and the masses. Under these circumstances there also tend to arise growing pressures and opportunities for interest-group articulation and individual self-expression. Consequently, the totalitarian features of Communist systems may become transformed and alleviated in the process of economic growth. This need not imply the advent of democracy nor the withering away of Communist dictatorships, but rather a change in their form.[24]

[24] In no sense does this, however, imply a unilinear pattern of devolopment or an inevitable line of progression. Clearly, at any one point the process is reversible provided the Communist leadership is prepared to pay the price for such reversals.

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THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY
Nonviolent Separatism and Theories of Violence

By JOHN E. SCHWARZ*

THERE is a sizeable number of separatist movements in contemporary political life.[1] Some of them have attracted widespread support, others have not; some are surrounded by violence, others are not. It is the combination of the size and tactics of separatist movements that we wish to examine. Our purpose is to inquire into the conditions that enable regional separatism to attract widespread support without also eliciting violence. Our conclusions will be based on one separatist movement that managed to accomplish this feat, the Scottish National Party.[2]

The Scottish National Party is dedicated to the withdrawal of Scotland from the United Kingdom and the simultaneous establishment of a sovereign Scottish state. It is manned by local (constituency) leaders who are fairly young[3] and who have had little prior experience in the practice of politics. Few were at all active either in other political parties or in the S.N.P. before they assumed leadership positions.[4]

Moreover, conditions have been such as to stimulate a rapid surge

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[1] Many of the contemporary separatist movements are covered in Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," *World Politics*, XX (October 1967), 30-54; more detailed descriptions of separatist movements in Wales, Brittany, and Quebec may be found in E. Hudson Davies, "Welsh Nationalism," *Political Quarterly*, XXXIX (July-September 1968), 322-32; J.E.S. Hayward, "From Functional Regionalism to Functional Representation in France: The Battle of Brittany," *Political Studies* XVII (March 1969), 48-75; and Frank L. Wilson, "French-Canadian Separatism," *Western Political Quarterly* XX (March 1967), 116-32.

[2] A history of Scottish nationalism may be found in Sir R. Coupland, *Welsh and Scottish Nationalism* (London 1954). This is brought up to date in James G. Kellas, *Modern Scotland: The Nation Since 1870* (New York 1968), 201-206.

[3] Whereas 79 percent of the local Labour and Conservative leaders interviewed in this study were above the age of 37, only 43 percent of the S.N.P. leaders were above this age.

[4] Only 10 percent of the local S.N.P. leaders had previously been members of other political parties and an additional 7 percent had done limited door-step work. Forty percent of the S.N.P. local leaders had been members of the Party for less than 3 years and 68 percent had been members for less than 5 years. In addition, information sheets handed in to the Party headquarters by 122 S.N.P. candidates for council office indicate that only 8 percent of these candidates recalled any previous political activity, that approximately 62 percent had been members of the S.N.P. for 3 years or less, and that 78 percent had been members for 5 years or less.

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of support for the Party in the mid-1960's. Table I, for example, indicates the Party's rapid membership and organizational growth from 1962 through 1968.

TABLE 1. THE GROWTH OF THE ORGANIZATION AND MEMBERSHIP OF THE S.N.P., 1962-1968

	Numbers of Organized Constituencies	*Numbers of Organized Branches*	*Membership*
1962	0	21	2,000
1966	16	110	42,000
1967	33	263	55,000
1968	62	472	120,000

The S.N.P. has also been able recently to attract larger percentages of the regional vote. It has approximately doubled its vote in each national election since 1959, reaching 128,000 votes in the most recent election, in 1966. Although its vote in 1966 still represented only 5 percent of the total Scottish vote, there is every indication that the Party has gained considerably since that time. This is implied, of course, in the Party's rapid increase in membership since 1966. It is also indicated by the 1968 municipal elections held in Scotland. In these elections the S.N.P. became the largest of five electoral parties in Scotland, with approximately 35 percent of the vote. Public-opinion polls carried out in the spring of 1968 indicated that the Party could count on the support of approximately 20 percent of the Scottish electorate in a parliamentary fight.[5] By 1968, then, the S.N.P. had become a formidable separatist movement.

The S.N.P. local leaders were youthful and were newcomers to the political game; they were devoted to regional withdrawal from the established political system; and they were operating under a set of conditions that were apparently wearing even to the wider public. In the light of these facts, it would not have been surprising had the development of this movement been accompanied by a rather high

[5] BBC-1, "The Disunited Kingdom? An Enquiry into the Forces of Nationalism in Scotland and Wales," transmitted on June 12, 1968, reported a public opinion poll in which 17 percent of the Scottish sample desired complete Scottish independence and an additional 46 percent wanted a regional Scottish government. The figures can be found on BBC-1, 5318/5610, Section h, p.ii. Polls carried out in both Glasgow and Dundee in the spring of 1968 indicated that from 20 to 30 percent of the public intended to vote S.N.P. in general elections. See, for example, *The Scotsman*, July 8, 1968.

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incidence of violence. But the Party was not one that advocated violence to achieve its goal. Its leaders used democratic methods in regard to both the internal organization of the Party and the use of the ballot box as the sole focus for their struggle.[6] Very few of the local Party leaders either advocated or condoned the use of violence; most felt that any member who did use violence ought to be expelled from the Party.[7] Although there have been a few unsponsored acts of violence by individual members, even these have been atypical.[8]

If conditions were such as to engender the rapid growth of a separatist movement, why did they not also elicit violence? We shall attempt to answer this question by the use of theories of violence. We based our decision to use these theories on the notion that many of the independent variables they employ are potentially continuous ones. Their continuous nature opens the possibility that they could be present at moderate levels sufficient to produce growing support of a nonviolent kind for Scottish separatism but not present at levels sufficiently extreme to elicit violence. In this way, theories of violence might help to account for *both* the rapid surge of the movement and its nonviolent character. We shall therefore focus our attention on the levels at which variables included in theories of violence were present in the Scottish case and, in effect, use these theories not only as theories of violence but also as theories pertaining to nonviolent political change.

II

Theories of violence often focus on psychological factors as instigators of violence.[9] The psychological variables central to these theories may be grouped into the following categories (there is, to be sure, some overlap): (1) intra-personal tension; (2) feelings of isolation or separation from the body politic; (3) feelings of deprivation; and (4)

[6] The importance S.N.P. local leaders attach to democratic methods is indicated by their answers to the following question: "Is there anything essentially different about the S.N.P. from the other parties to which you attach great importance besides the policy of Scottish independence?" Although it is an open-ended question, 63 percent of the respondents said the S.N.P. was more democratically organized and more responsive to local demands and pressures. A second indication of the importance most S.N.P. local leaders attach to democratic methods is that 83 percent of them said that no political party (not even a unionist party) should be outlawed if Scotland becomes independent.

[7] Of 40 S.N.P. local leaders interviewed, 36 said that any member who used violence ought to be immediately expelled from the Party, regardless of circumstances.

[8] "Now's the Day, Now's the Hour," *The Economist* (May 11, 1968), 9.

[9] The centrality of psychological variables to most theories of violence is argued in Ted Gurr, "Psychological Factors in Civil Violence," *World Politics*, XX (January 1968), 245-79.

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participation in a prospering culture perceived to be distinct from the dominant culture.

We have made certain assumptions in dealing with these variables. First, we have assumed that these variables, if taken together, would account for a high percentage of cases of violent movements. Thus, the likelihood of violence is reduced to the extent that any of these variables is not present to a high degree and becomes minimal if none of these variables is present to a high degree. This assumption is plausible in the light of recent findings.[10] A second assumption was also required. Upon occasion it was possible to apply a variable or an aspect of a variable solely to the local leadership, without benefit of aggregate or interview data for other Party members or for the wider public. Therefore, it was necessary to assume that in such a case observation of the local leadership constituted an adequate test of the variable in question.

Most of the psychological variables employed in the study are difficult to measure. Their use in theories of violence is rarely accompanied by precise guidelines by which we may select the appropriate indicators or judge the values that indicators must reach in order to be considered sufficiently critical to produce either violent or nonviolent support. A case study cannot be expected to resolve this kind of problem; moreover, a case study tends to require some indicators that may not have been considered in the theories.[11] In the areas for which this was a problem, therefore, we have utilized indicators or sets of indicators that we thought appropriate to the concepts involved. We made judgments regarding the level of the variable—i.e., critical values—solely on the basis of data forthcoming from these indicators. We shall defend the appropriateness of such judgments in the study.

Theories of violence have been developed on the basis of both aggregate and interview data and we shall also make use of both kinds of data. Very helpful sources for obtaining aggregate data were *The Annual Abstract of Statistics*[12] and secondary sources such as *Why Growth Rates Differ*.[13]

[10] Ted Gurr, in "A Causal Model of Civil Strife: A Comparative Analysis Using New Indices," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), found that "relative deprivation is a necessary precondition for strife" (1122) and that, as a necessary precondition, relative deprivation accounted for 47 percent of the total magnitude of civil strife (1120-21). These findings pertain to only two of the four major psychological variables used in this study.

[11] This is the case especially because regional data for some indicators is not available, so that the researcher is forced to turn to other indicators.

[12] Central Statistical Office, *Annual Abstract of Statistics*, HMSO, No. 105, 1968.

[13] Edward F. Denison, *Why Growth Rates Differ: Post-War Experience in Nine Western Countries* (Washington 1967).

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Interview data were forthcoming from a random sample of approximately 20 percent of the most active S.N.P., Conservative, and Labour local party leaders.[14] We interviewed 40 S.N.P. constituency chairmen or secretaries and 46 constituency secretaries or agents of the Conservative and Labour parties at their places of business or in their homes, at prearranged times. Each interview was approximately three hours long and allowed for a great deal of probing. We made a check for interview error by re-interviewing 14 respondents after a lapse of two months, under completely different conditions. Instead of making a personal appointment at his home or office, we questioned each respondent without notice over the telephone. Out of the approximately fifty original questions, we selected seven for which we felt there lay the greatest likelihood of error (superficial answers, coding errors due to misinterpretation or fatigue on the interviewer's part, etc.). The error discovered was not high (12 percent) and it was random. The results of the study thus seem largely unaffected by error in the interviewing or coding procedures.

We have supplemented our data on local leadership with some data pertaining to the wider population, about both public behavior and public attitudes. Public behavior was indicated by documented surges of public activity on behalf of Scottish nationalism since 1945 (1948-52, 1966-68). It was possible to obtain indicators regarding public attitudes for some of the psychological variables by use of public-opinion polls.

III

We wish now to place the Scottish movement within the context of existing theories of violence. We shall find that these theories help explain the nonviolent character of the S.N.P. None of the conditions they specify appears to have been present at levels sufficiently critical to elicit violence. On the other hand, we shall attempt to demonstrate that some of the variables, while not present to an extreme degree, were present at levels adequate to help motivate support of a nonviolent nature for the movement. Both aggregate and interview data

[14] The population of local party officials was calculated on the basis of two active local (constituency) officials per party per constituency. Given 71 Scottish constituencies, this produces a total of 436 active local party officials for the Conservative, Labour, and Scottish National parties. A random order of 55 constituencies was taken. One S.N.P. local official, who the central party thought was very active, and either one Conservative or one Labourite, was interviewed in 40 constituencies. Again, the central party provided information on the officials it thought were very active. If either the S.N.P. or Conservative or Labour Party local leader could not be interviewed (vacations, no time, etc.), the next constituency on the list of 55 was taken. The total sample of 86 represents approximately 20 percent of the population of 436.

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will indicate the presence of these variables in moderate degrees and suggest the importance of their presence to the devolopment of non-violent support for Scottish separatism on the part of both the S.N.P. local leaders and the wider public. We shall pay particular attention in the end to the combination of regional and extra-regional perceptions that provided the underpinning for the movement.

A first set of theories of violence focuses on intra-personal tension and strain as a significant instigator of violence.[15] We shall use Eckstein's theory as an example. Eckstein postulates that persons who are acutely anomic are susceptible to mass movements of a highly fanatic and presumably violent character. Acute anomie occurs when incongruent social authority patterns obtain. Congruence can be defined as a situation in which "(1) social authority patterns are identical with the governmental pattern, or (2) they constitute a gradual pattern in a proper segmentation of society, or (3) a high degree of resemblance exists in patterns adjacent to government (parties, interest groups) and one finds throughout the more distant segments (schools, families) a marked departure from functionally appropriate patterns for the sake of imitating the governmental pattern."[16]

By definition, incongruent social authority patterns are present if none of these three conditions exists. Such incongruency requires "the coexistence of different, perhaps even contradictory, norms of conduct in regard to a particular set of actions or an individual's actions in general."[17] That is, incongruency leads to intra-personal strain that, in turn, produces anomie. An example Eckstein provides is that of the incongruent political and social systems of Weimar Germany, which, by giving rise to a fanatical and violent movement, disintegrated only fifteen years after its inception. He compares this to the political and social systems of Britain, which, he argues, have been essentially congruent and free from fanatical or violent movements.

The immediate determining variable for Eckstein is intra-personal strain. Therefore, movements that do not exhibit fanaticism or violence are not likely to include a high percentage of persons suffering from strain. That is, we should not expect such persons to characterize the local leadership of the S.N.P., since the S.N.P. has not been an essentially violent movement.

[15] See, for example, "A Theory of Stable Democracy," in Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway* (Princeton 1966); Neil J. Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior* (New York 1963); and Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change* (Boston 1966).

[16] Eckstein, 239-40 (parentheses added).

[17] *Ibid.*, 255.

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Eckstein and others who use the same variable give us few guidelines by which we can test this prediction.[18] Our decision was to use the "Sixteen Personality Factor Test" of the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing,[19] which we administered to each of the eighty-six respondents. One of the factors, Factor C, covered personality characteristics that would appear to be relevant to the matter at hand. Those scoring high on Factor C are considered to be emotionally stable, calm, mature, and realistic about life, with an absence of neurotic fatigue. An opposite description is of course appropriate for those scoring low on Factor C.[20] The six questions involved in the factor were accompanied by a number of other questions in order to disguise them. The questions of the factor admit a total maximum score of 12 and a total minimum score of 0.

TABLE II. SCORES OBTAINED BY LOCAL LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND LABOUR PARTIES ON FACTOR C OF THE "16 P.F. TEST" (N)

Total Score on Factor C	*S.N.P.*	*Conservative*	*Labour*
11-12	1	3	0
9-10	3	1	4
7-8	19	10	8
5-6	15	8	7
3-4	2	0	5
1-2	0	0	0
0	0	0	0

We can see from the above table that the distribution of scores is similar, although not exactly identical, for the three parties. It is of particular importance that only two of the forty S.N.P. local leaders are found at the lower end of the scale.

A second factor, Factor Q4, was also utilized. Those scoring high on

[18] This is not meant to be critical of Eckstein, for his test focuses on the structural variables rather than on the more immediate psychological variable. Nevertheless, since is is the psychological variable common to these theories, our test focuses on this variable.

[19] Institute for Personality and Ability Testing, *Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire* (Champaign, Illinois 1962), 12, by permission of the Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. It is, of course, impossible to know how much the S.N.P. local leaders have changed since they became members of the Party. But there is no significant correlation between the scores and the length of membership in the Party. The distribution of those who have been in the Party less than 2 years is the same as of those who have been in the Party longer than 2 years.

[20] *Ibid.*, 12.

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Factor Q4 are considered to be "tense, irritable, anxious, and in turmoil"; those scoring low are phlegmatic and composed.[21]

TABLE III. SCORES OBTAINED BY LOCAL LEADERS OF THE SCOTTISH NATIONAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND LABOUR PARTIES ON FACTOR Q4 OF THE "16 P.F. TEST" (N)

Total Score on Factor Q4	*S.N.P.*	*Conservative*	*Labour*
12-11	0	0	0
10-9	0	0	1
8-7	4	3	4
6-5	5	8	5
4-3	19	5	9
2-1	12	6	5
0	0	0	0

The similarity in distribution is less for this factor than it was for Factor C. Yet it is the S.N.P. local leaders who fall lower on the scale—i.e., in the direction away from turmoil and anxiety. No S.N.P. local leader placed at the upper extreme of the scale.

While tests in science can corroborate, they cannot prove, for the next test may always yield disconfirming evidence. The two tests employed in this study do corroborate our expectation that abnormally high levels of intra-personal strain would not characterize the local leaders of the S.N.P. The tests yield no data to indicate the existence of high degrees of this variable, either on an absolute scale or on a scale relative to the other political parties.

But there are other psychological conditions that also might give rise to violence. A second set of theories focuses on forms of isolation as prominent instigators of violence. Kornhauser, for example, suggests that violence is rooted in mass behavior (direct response to remote objects), which, in turn, is rooted in atomization.[22] Atomization may result from a variety of conditions. One condition is the relation between the individuals and the political system: must individuals make their demands to the political system directly or can they mediate their interests through intermediary groups? A second is the relation be-

[21] *Ibid.*, 19.

[22] William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society* (Glencoe 1963). Allied sociological and political theories are noted, 21-25. The close relationship between mass behavior and violence is made clear by Kornhauser when he quotes Selznick: "Mass behavior is associated . . . with increasing reliance on force to resolve social conflict," 45.

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tween individuals and the wider society: are they integrated with the "opposition" by belonging to and participating in intermediary groups, including the "opposition"? A third is the relation between individuals and the economy: do they perceive their personal economic positions to be deteriorating? A fourth condition is the relation between a region and the wider economy: is the regional economy declining in relationship to the wider economy and, in this sense, becoming isolated from the wider economic system?

Since the S.N.P. is a movement in which violence is neither advocated nor condoned, we must expect that none of these conditions operated at high levels. This appears to have been the case.

The first two conditions leading to individual isolation focus on the intermediary group structure. The British system is one in which strong and effective intermediary groups are present.[23] Scotland is little different along this line,[24] and many of the Scottish intermediary groups are inclusive (in the sense that they have combined with English and Welsh groups to form peak organizations).[25] In addition, most of the local S.N.P. leaders had participated actively in the intermediary group structure before membership in the Party. To be more precise, 84 percent of the local leaders were members of intermediary groups before joining the Party, 58 percent had held either appointive or elective offices in these groups, and 61 percent of the S.N.P. candidates for town-council offices were members of professional, trade, or technical associations.[26] Thus, it would not appear to be the case that intermediary group structures and participation were deficient.

Deteriorating economic positions may also produce feelings of isolation and thereby contribute to mass behavior. Presumably this will be to some extent checked if the intermediary group structure is favorable. Nevertheless, we should note that the type of persons who were drawn into the Poujadist movement, including the leaders, "were tired, discouraged, without hope, without anything . . . who worked harder and longer than before the war and than their parents did but who lost ground rather than advanced."[27]

It is apparent from interview data that the local leaders of the S.N.P. were considerably more positive in their outlooks regarding their

[23] For the variety of groups, see Allen Potter, *Organized Groups in British National Politics* (London 1961); for a case study of their influence, see Harry Eckstein, *Pressure Group Politics: The Case of The British Medical Association* (Stanford 1960).

[24] Kellas, 206-209.

[25] *Ibid.*, 207-208.

[26] The figure pertaining to council candidates is based on the information sheets that 122 S.N.P. council candidates filed at the Party's central headquarters.

[27] Stanley Hoffmann, *Le mouvement Poujade*, quoted in Kornhauser, 204-205.

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personal economic positions. Asked whether or not they felt their jobs were secure and their present income and future prospects reasonably satisfying, only 28 percent of the S.N.P. local leaders answered negatively to either part. That is, 72 percent found both their jobs secure and their present income and future prospects reasonably satisfying.

Finally, feelings of isolation may result from perceptions of community discontinuity—in the case of the Scots, perceptions of regional discontinuity. We shall present here only the aggregate data relating to this point, waiting until Section IV to present attitudinal data.

The question we are addressing is whether and to what extent the Scottish economy was declining in relation to the British economy. An indicator that might be most suggestive of community discontinuity is the rate of net emigration. During the 1950's and the 1960's, the rate of net emigration from Scotland was about 28,000 persons per year. Although this may appear to be substantial for a population of just over five million, this degree of emigration is not unusual for Scotland. Indeed, the 1950's and 1960's cannot be distinguished from earlier periods in the twentieth century on this basis, for the rate of net emigration from Scotland between 1900 and 1940 was about the same.[28]

Nor could it be argued that the Scottish economy was particularly backward or that it was losing strength in comparison to the English economy. Those industries thought to be relatively weak (agriculture, mining, shipbuilding, and textiles) accounted for less than 15 percent of the Scottish male working population in 1966, including those who were unemployed.[29] Somewhat more than 33 percent of the Scottish male working population, on the other hand, worked in the relatively prosperous fields of engineering and electrical goods, vehicles, construction, and professional and scientific services.[30] This would not appear to be the picture of a stagnant regional economy. It is, in any case, little different from the English-Welsh economies.[31] Indeed, per capita income rose more rapidly from 1960 to 1966 in Scotland than it did in

[28] Figures on net emigration from Scotland are found in Central Statistical Office, 16.

[29] Figures for 1966 may be found in *The Scotsman's Diary*, 1968, frontispiece; figures for 1961 may be found in the 1961 *Census*, Occupation and Industry, and are reported in Kellas, 244-45.

[30] *The Scotsman's Diary*, 1968, frontispiece; figures for 1961 are found in the 1961 *Census*, and are reported in Kellas, 244-45.

[31] Figures found in Kellas, 244-45 show that the Scottish and English-Welsh economies were fairly similar in 1961. At that time, the somewhat outmoded industries accounted for 12.4 percent of the English and Welsh working populations and 17 percent of the Scottish working population. The prosperous industries accounted for 30.2 percent of the English and Welsh working populations and 25.4 percent of the Scottish working populations.

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the United Kingdom as a whole. The following table appeared in *The Scotsman*, a newspaper that associates itself with devolution of power to regional centers.

TABLE IV. PER CAPITA INCOME FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SCOTLAND, 1960 AND 1966 (1958 PRICES IN £)*

	1960	*1966*	*Percent Rise*
United Kingdom	425	465	09
Scotland (estimate)	385	445	15

* *The Scotsman*, July 4, 1968. Percent Rise added by author.

These results reveal that there were few detectable problems of deficient intermediary group participation or declining economic positions in regard to the local S.N.P. leaders. Moreover, aggregate data indicate that regional discontinuity was not present at a high level. The growth of the Scottish economy was higher on a per capita basis than that of the United Kingdom, and at the base of the Scottish economy were quite prosperous industries rather than outmoded industries. Still, the rate of net emigration from Scotland leaves little doubt that regional discontinuity, of this sort at least, could be perceived and that it might have entered into calculations of whether to give the Party active support. This suggests the possibility that regional discontinuity provided one basis for the development of a separatist movement but that its level was not sufficiently critical to elicit violence.

A third approach to political instability focuses on feelings of deprivation. The empirical research done by Gurr is representative of this approach.[32] He found that a necessary condition for regional violence was a relatively high degree of persisting regional deprivation and that next in importance was short-term regional deprivation.[33] The existence of certain institutional factors may help to deter civil violence when fairly high degrees of deprivation prevail. But, without deprivation, violence tended not to occur.

Gurr deals with a variety of forms of persistent and short-term deprivation. An analysis of the Scottish situation indicates that the most

[32] Ted Gurr, "A Causal Model." The relation between his approach and other frustration-aggression approaches is found in Gurr, "Psychological Factors."

[33] Although Gurr does not direct his argument to regional movements, its application to them may be deduced from the argument.

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important of these, persistent deprivation, did not exist. Short-term forms of deprivation did exist, although it is particularly important to note that some of them were not solely regional in character but extended throughout the United Kingdom.

Let us take up some of the persistent forms of deprivation. The first of these is what Gurr terms "economic discrimination." By this he means that higher or medium economic positions or specific classes of economic activity are closed to the deprived group. In our research, we did not find any indication of discrimination of this kind or that the S.N.P. local leaders felt that either they or the Scottish people were discriminated against in this way. A second factor, "political discrimination," refers to the closure of the political elite to the deprived group. Again, there is little indication that this kind of discrimination existed or that the S.N.P. local leaders felt that it existed. Since 1900, for example, four of the fifteen British Prime Ministers have been Scottish and a fifth (Churchill) sat for a Scottish seat for fourteen years.

A third kind of persistent deprivation involves the way in which a separatist region was unionized. Mutual agreement is accorded the lowest degree of deprivation; force is accorded the highest degree of deprivation. In a formal sense, the Scottish state underwent union with England by mutual consent. Ninety-eight percent of the local Labour and Conservative leaders surveyed believed that mutual agreement in every sense of the term was the method by which union was accomplished. Forty-six percent of the local S.N.P. leaders agreed with this view. The remaining 54 percent thought that mutual agreement was the formal method of accomplishing union but that many of the Scots who consented to union did so out of private interest rather than out of national interest. The importance of bribery was accented by the respondents who gave this answer. Yet only two respondents felt that their questioning of the propriety of the agreement was at all instrumental in their joining the S.N.P. We can thus conclude that persistent deprivation due to the method of political unification was only a weakly operative factor in the rise of the S.N.P.

A fourth kind of persistent deprivation is relative lack of educational opportunities for a regional population. As we shall see, central government expenditure on education was considerably higher per capita in Scotland in 1966 than it was in England and Wales (Table VII). Moreover, in the academic year 1966-1967, the number of Scottish students "entering British universities was 8.3 percent of the total population of 18-year-olds in Scotland. The corresponding figure for England and

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Wales was 5.3 percent."[34] Under this circumstance, a case that substantial educational deprivation existed is understandably difficult to make. In fact, Scottish educational backgrounds have produced approximately 9 percent of the British Prime Ministers, Chancellors of the Exchequer, and Foreign Secretaries since 1900.[35]

Factors relevant to short-term deprivation include new restrictions on political participation and representation and trends in international trade, inflation, and gross national products (GNP). No new restrictions have been placed on Scottish political participation or representation. It is well known, however, that the British have faced substantial problems in international trade during the past decade. The balance of trade, favorable throughout much of the 1950's, slumped to deficits totaling £1,694,000,000 in the 1959-1967 period.[36] This slump was accompanied by a rather sharp increase in inflation. During the years 1963-1967, the rate of inflation was approximately 4.7 percent annually, compared to approximately 2.6 percent during the preceding eight years.[37] Moreover, there were also growing restrictions on consumer expenditure of other sorts. General taxes and luxury taxes have been increased almost yearly since 1961 and limitations have been placed on credit purchase. The government has also sought and received statutory powers to negate certain pay raises. Finally, although rising, the growth of the British economy was perceptibly slower than that of any of the other Western European economies during the 1950's and 1960's. This comparison can be seen in Tables V and VI.

These short-term trends were apparently perceptible to the entire British population. Gallup polls show that neither Heath nor Wilson was able to inspire the confidence of 30 percent of the British public in mid-1968, whereas each gained the confidence of more than 50 percent of the public in mid-1965.[38]

Yet we should not overestimate the degree of economic deprivation produced in the 1960's. After all, the British G.N.P. was growing and not declining; the increase in inflation, while sharp, was not extraordinary; and consumer expenditure, even after taxes and inflation, was rising slightly and not falling. We could not accurately describe this as a period of severe deprivation. It was, at most, a period of moderate deprivation.

[34] S.N.P., *Scotland v. Whitehall*, No. 1, 14, from a Parliamentary answer by Mrs. Shirley Williams.
[35] David Butler and Jennie Freeman, *British Political Facts 1900-1967* (London 1968), 59-65.
[36] Central Statistical Office, 247.
[37] *Ibid.*, 336.
[38] *The Times*, July 22, 1968.

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TABLE V. GROWTH RATES OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME, 1955-1964, AND REAL GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT, 1950-1964*

	1955-1964 rate	*1950-1964 rate*
Germany	5.6	7.1
Italy	5.4	5.6
France	5.0	4.9
Denmark	4.8	3.6
Netherlands	4.3	4.9
Norway	3.9	3.8
Belgium	3.5	3.4
United Kingdom	2.8	2.6

* Edward F. Denison, *Why Growth Rates Differ: Postwar Experience in Nine Western Countries*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967, p. 17.

TABLE VI. GROWTH RATES OF REAL NATIONAL INCOME PER CAPITA, 1950-1964*

	1950-1964	*1955-1964*
N.W. Europe	3.9	3.3
Germany	5.9	4.3
France	3.8	3.7
Netherlands	3.5	2.9
Denmark	2.9	4.1
Norway	2.9	3.0
Belgium	2.8	2.9
United Kingdom	2.2	2.1

* Same as above, p. 18.

Moreover, these short-term economic deprivations were, as suggested by the Gallup polls, general to the nation as a whole. They were not particularly regional and did not require a regional framework to inspire protest. Of course, this does not exclude the possibility that regional economic deprivations were also present. Did such deprivations exist and, if so, what was their degree and what was their cause?

It is apparent that regional economic deprivations were present during and even before the period under consideration.[39] Per capita income in Scotland, about 10 percent lower than for the United Kingdom as a whole in 1960, has historically been lower in Scotland than in the

[39] Although these economic deprivations have been present for some time and are in this sense persistent, they do not involve discrimination in the sense implied in our discussion of persistent deprivation.

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United Kingdom.[40] Unemployment has also been of somewhat greater significance in Scotland than in the rest of Great Britain. The unemployed in Great Britain averaged 1.8 percent between 1965-1967 as compared to 3.2 percent in Scotland.[41] It is little different for comparisons for the 1920-1960 period.[42]

Although regional economic deprivation was perceptible during the 1960's, these indicators also reveal that it was relatively mild in degree.[43] Nor is it easy to interpret the causes of even this degree of deprivation as having been the result of contemporary decisions made in Westminster or Whitehall.

Those who believe that regional deprivation was the result of decisions taken in London cite a number of contemporary cases. Favorite examples are toll charges applied on certain Scottish bridges, naming the new British liner "Queen Elizabeth II," and putting anti-inflationary restrictions on the British economy before the Scottish economy had a full opportunity to expand (there are few data to corroborate or refute the last point).[44]

An opposing view can also find support. Take, for example, the only figures available on contemporary central governmental budgetary expenditure in Scotland. Brought forth as a result of an S.N.P. parliamentary question, the figures are found in a handbook published by the S.N.P. under the heading, "Fiddling Scotland's Money:"

Table VII shows that Scotland received more central government expenditure per capita in 1966 than did England and Wales.[45] In addition, it suggests that central governmental expenditure on matters re-

[40] See Table IV. See also Kellas, 246. [41] Kellas, 243. [42] *Ibid.*

[43] It should be noted that income per head in Scotland is higher than it is in either Wales or Northern Ireland. See *Report of the Commissioners of H. M. Inland Revenue*, 109, Cmnd. 3200. Moreover, per capita family income (based on median) is about 20 percent lower in the American south than it is in the northeast and 23 percent less than it is in the west. See *Encyclopaedia Britannica, Book of the Year, 1969*, "Developments in the States, 1968," 24. These figures can be compared to the figure of 10 percent for Scotland in relation to the United Kingdom.

[44] These people believe that deprivation occurs because Scottish parliamentarians can be easily outvoted. In any case, the loyalty of Scottish parliamentarians tends to be more to party than to Scotland. Since the major parties are based in London, and since the British economy depends so heavily on the health of the English economy, party policies are defined by English interests. Perceptions of party discipline helped elicit this view. Also of importance may be the quite low degree of regularized contact many MP's have with their constituencies. See Robert E. Dowse, "The MP and his Surgery," *Political Studies*, XI (October 1963), 333-41 and *The Times*, July 6, 1968.

[45] It is reasonable to assume, on the basis of incremental budgeting processes, that Scotland has been favored for some time. On incrementalism, see Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston 1964). The incremental process is based on pragmatic bargaining. An analysis of pragmatism in British politics may be found in James Christoph, "Consensus and Cleavage in British Political Ideology," *American Political Science Review*, LIX (September 1965), 629-43.

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TABLE VII. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE PER HEAD OF POPULATION, 1966-67*

	Scotland			*England and Wales*		
	£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*
Roads	6	6	0	4	8	2
Agricultural Support	6	6	0	4	0	7
Promotion of Local Employment	3	12	1		9	3
Housing	4	12	1	1	18	4
Education	10	13	6	5	2	5
Health and Welfare	27	3	3	23	2	0
Children's Services	6	6	0	5	11	5
Benefits and Assistance	47	13	11	44	14	6

* The Scottish National Party, *Scotland v. Whitehall*, No. 1, p. 9.

lating to the placement of industry was probably higher per capita in Scotland than in England and Wales. It was also higher on matters relating to education.

However, it is important to note that these figures are not conclusive. They exclude defense expenditures, which, some believe, highly overrepresented England. They also exclude major nonbudgetary policies such as those dealing with anti-inflation, which could have prematurely depressed regional economies but for which few regional data are available. It thus remains quite possible that contemporary policies of the central political institutions have contributed to the regional deprivations that face Scotland, but at least some conjecture is required to defend this case. Thus, we must speculate about where defense expenditures were placed, or the regional effects of British anti-inflationary policies, in order to overcome concrete data that known governmental expenditures favored Scotland.

Our examination of deprivation has indicated the presence of both regional and extra-regional forms of economic deprivation. But those regional deprivations that were present (higher rates of unemployment and lower per capita income) were moderate in degree and were unaccompanied by the most significant forms of deprivation related to violence (discriminations such as closure of political elites, economic elites, and of education; forced union). Furthermore, the causes of this regional deprivation were uncertain. Given these findings, we can hypothesize that regional economic deprivation was sufficiently

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present to provide one basis for the development of a separatist movement, but that its level was not sufficient to produce violence.

Finally, violence might be the product of emotion engendered by a prosperous and distinct regional culture. We will see below that feelings of Scottish identity were widespread in Scotland. The question raised here, however, is whether these feelings could have been heightened and made more vehement by the coexistence of a prosperous regional culture.

Scholars have argued that the Scottish culture over the past 200 years has been largely assimilated into the English culture and that a separate and distinct Scottish culture has not prospered for some time.[46] This view is consistent with our findings regarding linguistic differentiation. Only 10 percent of the S.N.P. local leaders responded that either their parents or grandparents spoke Gaelic. Only 7 percent of the local leaders themselves said they spoke Gaelic, and only an additional 14 percent said they even intended to learn Gaelic.

In the absence of cultural distinctiveness or prosperity, Scottish identity was not vehemently felt by most of the S.N.P. local leaders (see Table VIII). The fact that Scottish identity was not strongly felt suggests that it was unlikely, in itself, to inspire S.N.P. local leaders to advocate violence. Yet Table VIII also shows that feelings of regional identity were clearly present. Their presence opens the possibility that they could have served as motivating forces, especially for persons who were not already politically engaged. This condition appears to have held for the local S.N.P. leaders. We noted previously that 83 percent of these leaders had never been members of other parties or done work on their behalf before joining the S.N.P. Indeed, 70 percent of the local S.N.P. leaders either had abstained from voting in at least one-third of the general elections or had not consistently voted for the same party before they joined the S.N.P.

TABLE VIII. FEELING OF SCOTTISH IDENTITY AMONG SCOTTISH NATIONAL, CONSERVATIVE, AND LABOUR LOCAL PARTY LEADERS (IN PERCENT)

	Vehement	*Strong*	*Moderate*	*Mild, Not at All*
S.N.P.	17	83	0	0
Conservative	5	95	0	0
Labour	0	79	17	4

[46] Walker Connor, 39.

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IV

Of the many psychological variables theorists have found related to violence, the preceding analysis discovered only four that were operating at a detectable level in the Scottish case. Three of these were regional in nature—regional discontinuity, regional economic deprivation, and regional identity. The fourth was extra-regional economic deprivation.

But the levels of the regional variables were far from being excessive or severe. Aggregate data indicated that regional discontinuity and deprivation were present only to a moderate degree, and interview data indicated that regional identities were not felt vehemently. Indeed, the levels of these regional variables, even taken together, were low enough that they were generally insufficient by themselves to motivate the S.N.P. local leaders to undertake action.

On the basis of answers as to why they joined the S.N.P., we attempted to distinguish those respondents for whom regional considerations or perceptions were sufficient reasons from those for whom they were insufficient. Solely regional considerations were defined as (a) perceptions of regional deprivation or discontinuity as a sufficient reason; (b) affective commitment to nationhood as a sufficient reason; or (c) a combination of instrumental and affective regional perceptions as sufficient reasons. Considerations other than solely regional were defined as (a) perceptions of extra-regional deprivation (i.e., inflation, higher taxes, loss of empire, and the like) or other extra-regional considerations as a sufficient reason, or (b) perceptions of extra-regional considerations as a necessary condition for joining the Party. Whatever feelings these recruits held toward regional nationhood, deprivation, or discontinuity, the point is that they were not sufficiently intense, by themselves, to act as motivating forces. One S.N.P. local leader said that he felt that Scotland was a nation and had a right to nationhood "just like the ex-colonial countries. But I joined mainly out of protest. The British economy was sick and we seemed to be going no place." Another respondent said, "I joined the Party out of dissatisfaction with things in general—higher taxes, a higher cost of living."

Table IX reveals that feelings of regional discontinuity, deprivation, and nation were not unimportant as motivating forces. They played a part in the decisions to join the Party of 76 percent of the local S.N.P. leaders. Still, only 38 percent of the leadership found such regional considerations alone *sufficient* to motivate them to join the Party. For the

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remaining 62 percent, perceptions of regional factors were not sufficiently strong that, by themselves, they were able to inspire action.

TABLE IX. REGIONAL AND EXTRA-REGIONAL CONSIDERATIONS AS REASONS FOR WHICH LOCAL S.N.P. LEADERS JOINED THE PARTY

	Percent	*Total Percent*
Regional Considerations Sufficient:		
Regional deprivation or discontinuity	0	
Affective commitment to nationhood	10	
Both instrumental and affective regional perceptions	28	
		38
Regional Considerations Insufficient:		
Extra-regional deprivation (or other extra-regional considerations) sufficient	24	
Extra-regional deprivation not sufficient, but necessary (along with regional considerations)	38	
		62
		100

It thus appears to be the case that without perceptions of regional discontinuity, deprivation, and nation the S.N.P. would not have been able to recruit most of its local leaders. On the other hand, the fact that these perceptions, even if taken together, were generally insufficient to produce motivation lends credibility to the notion that they were not sufficient to inspire violence. Instead, such motivations had to be sparked by perception of deprivations that were also affecting the English.

It is probably the case that regionally focused perceptions were important to the wider public, as well. For example, public opinion polls revealed that 66 percent of the Scottish public believed that there would be less unemployment if Scotland were responsible for its own internal affairs; and 52 percent thought that the standard of living would improve under Scottish control.[47] Responses such as these indicate that the wider public perceived the presence of regional economic deprivation.

[47] BBC-1, Section *1c, iii* and *v*.

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Moreover, widespread feelings of regional (national) identity existed in Scotland even without the coexistence of a prosperous regional culture. A study of public attitudes in two Scottish constituencies (Craigton and Govanhill) found that 92 percent of the respondents spontaneously thought of themselves as belonging to the Scottish national group. Over a majority in Woodside and Kelvingrove answered similarly. In addition, the Craigton-Govanhill surveys found that regional identity was almost as important as class identity.[48]

It is possible to argue, along with Leonard Doob,[49] that widespread support for a separatist movement cannot develop in the absence of widespread perceptions of regional identity. Nevertheless, we should note that feelings of Scottish identity within the wider public were probably not intense. This is indicated by the Craighton-Govanhill findings that region had to vie with class as important sources of identity.[50]

Although regional factors were obviously present, an additional input of extra-regional economic deprivation was apparently also required to spark widespread public support. Since World War II, at least, public activity on behalf of Scottish nationalism has tended to surge and decline depending on the state of the British economy. During the 1945-1950 period, for example, British economic problems were such that informal prices and wages rules were established by the government and the pound was devalued by over 25 percent. During the same period Scottish nationalism surged, reaching its zenith in the 1950's. The culminating event was the presentation of the Scottish covenant to Parliament, a petition that had received over two million signatures. Thereafter, however, the British economy gained strength. International trade balances were generally favorable; inflation was relatively low. This improvement was accompanied by a rapid decline in nationalist fervor. The strength of Scottish nationalism, as we have seen, reappeared only in the mid-1960's. But by that time the British economy was once again facing difficult problems, with a relatively

[48] Ian Budge and Derek W. Urwin, *Scottish Political Behaviour* (London 1966), 112-20. The significance of class perceptions in British and Scottish politics may be found in Robert Alford, *Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies* (Chicago 1963), 123-71.

[49] Leonard Doob, *Patriotism and Nationalism: Their Psychological Foundations* (New Haven 1964).

[50] It is possible that regionalism became politically salient as an identity not only because of its own strength but also because the competing source of identity (class) was declining. Considering the recent changes in British class structure, this possibility is not out of the question. A good assessment of the tenor of class change is found in Ralf Dahrendorf, "Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies," *Daedalus*, XCIII (Winter 1964) 225-70.

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sharp rise in inflation, rises in taxes, and unfavorable balances in international trade. Thus, since World War II, the appearance and disappearance of widespread nationalist support has consistently followed upon the changing state of the British economy.

V

Results from our local S.N.P. leadership interviews and from data pertaining to the wider public suggest similar conclusions. This is especially the case when these results are combined with the results of aggregate and interview data presented in Section III. All these data converge in a remarkably consistent fashion.[51]

Two salient features in the Scottish case were that relatively long-term regional factors were at play and that these regional factors were not operating at high levels. Regional identities in Scotland have surely existed for quite some time. We have seen that regional discontinuity, in the form of net emigration, has operated at least since the beginning of this century. Regional economic deprivations, such as higher unemployment and lower per capita income, also have historical roots. These regional conditions have been continuously present, generally lying dormant, but with the potential to provide the underpinning for a separatist movement.

They have been generally dormant because they were not sufficiently strong to motivate action by themselves. The fact is that feelings of Scottish identity did not exist within the context of a prospering and distinct Scottish culture. According to both interview and public-opinion data, feelings of Scottish identity were not held vehemently by either the local S.N.P. leaders or the wider public. Nor, on the basis of aggregate data, were either regional discontinuity or regional economic deprivation more than moderate in degree. There was, in particular, little political, economic, or educational discrimination applied against the region.

Thus, while present to provide the underpinning for a separatist movement, these regional deprivations were not present in sufficient degree to elicit violence. In order to be activated at all, they required additional inputs. We might presume that had the additional inputs been substantially of a regional nature (i.e., increased regional deprivation, discontinuity, or cultural prosperity), the likelihood of violence would have increased. But both interview data regarding the local S.N.P. leaders and an analysis of wider public support indicated

[51] This leads us to the notion that, when we are dealing with certain variables in studies of violence, we may find that aggregate data are appropriate substitutes for attitudinal data.

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that the additional inputs in the Scottish case were deprivations of an extra-regional sort. The difference between this type of input and a regional input in the context of a separatist movement should be obvious. It is a type of input from which the opposing actor is also suffering. Therefore, it did not enable Scottish nationalists to focus on the English with the degree of intensity that additional regional inputs might have caused.[52]

Even so, one other consideration was probably also salient. The extra-regional inputs were moderate and not severe in the Scottish case. This was demonstrated earlier on the basis of aggregate data. Because they were present, they were able to spark support for a separatist movement in combination with the underlying and more permanent regional conditions. But because they were only moderate in degree, they were unlikely to inspire violence.

Our purpose in this study was to discover how a separatist movement could flourish without eliciting violence. Such a study, we hoped, would not only lead to a deeper understanding of conditions underlying the Scottish movement; it was also to provide suggestions for approaching the analysis of other separatist movements. The findings of the Scottish case point out in particular the relevance of theories of violence to the study of separatist movements. It should be recalled that these theories not only accounted for the nonviolent character of Scottish separatism during the 1960's; in addition, they offered variables whose presence at moderate levels also helped account for the growth and size of the Scottish movement, thus suggesting that theories of violence can be pertinent even to the study of nonviolent forms of separatist dissent and protest.

On the basis of these theories, the study prompts us to raise the following general questions in analyses of the size and violent tendencies of separatist movements. (1) Can the movement draw upon widespread regional perceptions that are the result of fairly persistent regional conditions (i.e., regional identity, discontinuity, deprivation)? (2) Are these perceptions of such a moderate degree that they are insufficient to motivate political action? (3) If additional motivational forces are required, are they present? (4) If they are present, are they both extra-regional in kind and moderate in degree? The Scottish case indicates that positive findings for each of these questions will produce a situation in which a separatist movement will burgeon without leading to violence.

[52] Indeed, approximately half of the S.N.P. local leaders spontaneously asserted that they did not dislike the English. According to *The Economist*, moreover, "Mrs. Ewing is careful to stress the natural friendship of the Scots and English, on and off the platform." *The Economist*, May 11, 1968, 9.

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GROWTH, DEVELOPMENT, AND POLITICAL MODERNIZATION

By KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR.*

IN the already vast, and rapidly expanding, literature of political modernization, it is rather surprising that little use has been made of the concept of growth, while development, with all its ambiguities, has become a fixture.[1] This perhaps reflects the selective methodological influence of economics, where development is a fairly well-defined research field concerned with problems of countries with low per capita income. What needs to be underscored, however, is that in economic usage development is intimately related to growth. In this paper I propose to discuss the distinction between growth and development in economics and then attempt to draw a similar distinction for politics, emphasizing throughout the implications of the historical sequence and timing of these processes for modernization.

I

Economics is a pre-eminently quantitative discipline because individuals interacting in markets generate numbers—prices, wages, production rates, sales rate—that are the record of their behavior. Because these numbers can be aggregated into measures of economic activity—gross national product, national income, and so on—it has been fairly easy for economists to agree on what economic development is about, i.e., the growth over time, either absolute or per capita, of these indices. Yet it is not quite that easy, for development and growth do not mean exactly the same thing, and there has come to be accepted in economics a distinction between the two. As Douglas F. Dowd has put it, "growth is a quantitative process, involving principally the extension of an already established structure, whereas development suggests qualitative changes, the creation of new economic and non-economic structures."[2]

* I am indebted to Professors John H. Kautsky and Dankwart A. Rustow for valuable criticisms of a previous draft of this paper.

[1] When it has been used in the literature, political growth seems to have been less an analytical concept than a stylistic variation of political development. See, for example, Chong-Do Hal and Jeanne Schneider, "A Critique of Current Studies in Political Development and Modernization," *Social Research*, xxxv (Spring 1968), 143; Ali A. Mazrui, "From Social Darwinism to Current Theories of Modernization: A Tradition of Analysis," *World Politics*, xxi (October 1968), 75; Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington 1967), 131.

[2] Douglas F. Dowd, "Some Issues of Economic Development and of Development Economics," *Journal of Economic Issues*, i (September 1967), 153.

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Or in Charles P. Kindleberger's analogy with the human being, "to stress growth involves focusing on height or weight, while to emphasize development draws attention to the change in functional capacity —in physical coordination, for example, or learning capacity."[3]

Economic growth occurs because an economic system transforms additional inputs, conventionally land, labor, or capital, into more output or because it increases the efficiency with which given inputs are used, i.e., it develops the capacity of inputs to expand existing output or produce new output. For the greater part of world history, domestic economic growth, if it took place at all, was largely the consequence of unplanned increases in inputs. A succession of years with good climate led to bountiful harvests, windfall profits in commercial activity augmented the supply of capital, or the fortuitous discovery of natural resources increased the stock of raw materials. Externally, countries have preyed on one another, with the result that land and population have been seized or deployed in the interests, among other things, of increasing valued outputs. Eighteenth-century Europe enjoyed a growing supply of sugar and tobacco because of the land and slaves added to the Caribbean and North American economies. And the supplies of tea, silk, spices, rubber, palm oil, teak, as well as of a wide array of mineral resources, increased because Western imperialists mobilized the labor of Asian peasants for the European market.

Not until the industrial revolution began to transform the European economy toward the close of the eighteenth century did those qualitative changes take place in the relationship among inputs that ever since has lent to the growing economies of the world their characteristic motivating force—capital formation and technological change. Of course, there had always been isolated acts of invention—someone did contrive the wheel centuries before the industrial revolution—that increased efficiency, but the hallmark of the new industrial age was the conscious application of scientific knowledge and technological know-how to the solution of production problems that inhered in a given constellation of input relationships. The England of James Watt, Josiah Wedgwood, Richard Arkwright, and Samuel Crompton was keenly alert to economic opportunity and painfully aware that traditional productive methods were inhibiting the expansion of output. The flowering of inventions and their adaptation in the British economy during the second half of the eighteenth century is still our most dramatic example of economic development. The qualitative changes in the structure of production marked by the perfection of steam

[3] Charles P. Kindleberger, *Economic Development* (New York 1965), 3.

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power, the use of coke in the processing of iron, the movement of cotton-spinning into the factory, and the improvement of roads and the construction of canals gave such an impetus to the growth of output that thereafter it never again declined to a subsistence equilibrium with population.

With the advent of the industrial revolution in Britain and Europe it became clear, at least in retrospect, that economic growth, viewed in the context of a world system, was a spatially differentiated, sequential process. Some economies grew first, others followed, and still others did not grow at all. Economies were separated from one another by geographical barriers, political frontiers, and economic restrictions, all of which reduced mobility so that each economic system possessed a unique natural resource endowment and population. From the point of view of economic growth, some natural endowments and populations were better than others, but the developmental process increased the advantages of the early-comers to growth because capital formation and technological change raised the productivity of the original factors of production. To make the point another way, if the world had not consisted of discrete economic systems, economic growth would not have had so pronounced a sequential character. The mobility of resources, population, and techniques would have compensated for much of the spatial disadvantage in the distribution of the earth's bounty.

Because economic analysis focuses on individual economies in a world order, we can separate internal from external influences on those demand-and-supply conditions that interact to determine the rate of economic growth. An economy may produce output for a domestic market or for foreign markets; it may increase the supply of capital by raising the domestic rate of saving or by borrowing in the world capital market; it may train skilled technicians or import them. The sequential nature of economic growth, however, means that the relative importance of external and internal influences depends very much on when in history a country starts the process. Consider, again, the original first-comer, Britain. The world economy played an important role in its industrial transformation. The growth of the cotton textile industry was facilitated by the cutting off from the British market of Indian calicoes, for which the British had developed a taste, as well as by the readily expandable supply of raw cotton in North America. In time the factory-made cotton products coming out of Manchester were as fine as the hand-made cotton goods of Madras and could be produced more cheaply. High income and price elasticity of demand in both domestic and foreign markets created a persistently favorable

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environment for the expansion of the industry. Yet the industrialization of cotton manufacturing in Britain clearly is to be understood primarily in terms of internal influences. It could hardly be otherwise for the country that invented the techniques that made industrialization possible. The mechanization of spinning and weaving was attributable to Englishmen like Arkwright, Crompton, and Cartwright who invented the spinning jenny, spinning mule, and power loom and adapted them in the production process. So it was throughout the economy; the motivation and commercial and technical perception of indigenous entrepreneurs were responsible in one sector of the economy after another for the ingenious altering of supply conditions that allowed the system to respond to external stimuli and then for a period of a hundred years, to the middle of the nineteenth century, to mold the international economic environment to its own needs.

If we come forward a century to Japan at the time of its economic modernization following the Meiji Restoration of 1868, we note a different relationship between external and internal influences. It was the demonstration effect of Western technology transmitted to the Meiji leaders through the international system that provided such a powerful goad to change, an effect that was, of course, all the stronger because of the sequential process of growth that placed Japan behind the West. Indeed, the conditions surrounding the opening up of Japan to the outside world after 250 years of seclusion were a manifestation of the obdurate international environment that the technological and economic gap created for it. The treaties that brought Japan into the family of nations not only limited its jurisdiction over foreign residents domiciled in Japan, but prevented it from imposing more than nominal tariffs on imports.

Although the international environment was more inflexible for Japan than it had been for Britain a century earlier, it nonetheless provided stimuli for growth, some of which depended upon the particular historical period at which Japan entered the world growth process. For the first twenty years of the Meiji era it was the growth of the traditional sectors of the economy that was the source of Japanese accumulation. Foreign demand for tea, silk, and silkworms created a vigorous market for which output in rural Japan could be expanded without much change in time-honored productive techniques. The market for these products was strong because the process of world economic growth had not yet gone on long enough to provide a wide range of substitutes for them. Subsequently, when the Japanese leaders used the resources accumulated in the traditional sector for the de-

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velopment of a modern industrial sector their efforts were made easier by the existence in the international system of technologies for every output they wished to produce, which were not so advanced that they could not be accommodated to the unique characteristics of Japan's natural resources and population. Furthermore, the technical characteristics of international communications muted the demonstration effect on consumers so that wants remained traditional and could be satisfied within the domestic economy. That is, with the opening of Japan to the outside world in the second half of the nineteenth century there was no great surge of demand seeking the material standards of the West and consequently imposing strain on the balance of payments while dissipating personal savings.

As in the case of Britain, however, the economic success of Japan in the years following 1868 must be understood in terms of its internal state of developedness that allowed it to respond so vigorously to the external stimuli emanating from the international environment. The commercial abilities, the motivations, and entrepreneurial capacities nurtured in Tokugawa Japan were carried over into Meiji Japan and in a new setting blossomed into an industrial economic order.[4] Economic growth was the product of the development of new labor skills, new techniques for producing and marketing commodities, and new methods for raising capital and managing money. However much the models for these changes came from the outside, their successful adaptation was a function of internal economic development.

If now we come forward still another century to the contemporary era, we note that the problems of countries attempting to enter the initial stages of economic growth are compounded by their latecomer status. In some respects the international environment is too dominant and transmits stimuli to the poor economies that overwhelm their developmental capacities. That they are latecomers reflects the fact, of course, that the latter are weak to begin with, that they have not been able to respond creatively and independently to the impulses toward industrialization that were let loose in the world two centuries ago. In the meantime, however, two centuries of world economic growth have created an international economic environment that no

[4] It is a mistake to think of Japan in mid-nineteenth century as we think of the less developed economies today. Its state of economic developedness was then closer to the European level than to the present Asian level. Cf. G. C. Allen, *A Short Economic History of Modern Japan* (London 1962), 13-29; E. Sydney Crawcour, "The Tokugawa Heritage," in W. W. Lockwood, ed., *The State and Economic Enterprise in Japan* (Princeton 1965), 17-44; W. W. Lockwood, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868-1938* (Princeton 1954), 3-37.

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longer can be used as Britain used it during her transition to industrial maturity. It has filled up with population and is honeycombed with restrictions on the movement of capital and labor. Moreover, it has become increasingly institutionalized as the early-comers have in concert established organizations whose purpose of ordering economic relationships among themselves does not necessarily redound to the benefit of the latecomers.[5] And now with the ever accelerating speed of transportation and communication the mere existence of a large gap between the more and the less developed economies may have a perverse influence on the latter so far as economic growth is concerned. On the one hand, the consciousness of the output gap is heightened so that more people in poor societies can aspire to higher material standards whether or not they have the developmental capacities to attain them. There is less chance now than there was in Japan a century ago that traditional wants will restrain consumption and protect the external balance of payments. On the other hand, the gap in the rewards to inputs can draw badly needed capital and skilled labor from the poor to the rich economies. Arabian sheiks or South American landowners can do better by holding their assets as shares in General Motors or Xerox than by risking them in indigenous productive enterprises. Afghanistan engineers or economists, trained in Western universities, can find better employment opportunities and higher salaries in the West than at home.[6]

Moreover, technological change in the advanced economies has created a variety of new commodities, some of which are competitive with the primary outputs in which the less developed economies might be expected to have a comparative advantage. Manufactured fibers divert demand from cotton, wool, and silk products. Synthetic rubber reduces the rate at which the market for natural rubber expands. And as income continues to rise in the wealthy economies, the inexorable force of Engels' law insures that the demand for food rises in smaller proportion, further attenuating the effectiveness of the international economy as a market for the agrarian output of the latecomer.[7]

[5] The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) is a salutary reminder that the poor economies of the world did not view the trade policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) as being in their interests before or after the Kennedy Round negotiations were concluded.

[6] In the literature of economic development these are referred to as polarization effects—Albert O. Hirschman, *The Strategy of Economic Development* (New Haven 1958), 187-90—or backwash effects—G. Myrdal, *Rich Lands and Poor* (New York 1957), 23-38.

[7] It is Ragnar Nurkse who has done the most to point up the differences between

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The point to be made here is not that economic growth is impossible for the late latecomers, but rather that growth and development tend to be out of phase. People want the payoffs from growth now, but do not have sufficient skills, motivation, or capital to make the necessary transformation in their economy by themselves. The evidence of economic growth may be very close at hand and not just acquired through the international communication system. Modern export sectors, servicing the logistic needs—oil and iron ore, for example—of the advanced industrial economies, may have intruded themselves into traditional economies without triggering a developmental response. Indeed, it is entirely possible that the presence of these economic enclaves will give the latecomers a respectable statistical rate of economic growth. It is in this sense that we may speak of growth without development, whereas at the dawn of the industrial age self-sustaining growth could take place only as a consequence of development.[8]

II

If we follow the distinctions drawn above, we may define political growth as increasing output of political goods, and political development as qualitative changes in the structure of inputs that increase the efficiency with which political output is produced.[9] Since political output is the linchpin of these definitions it is important to be clear about what we mean by it. Political goods are public goods in the economic sense.[10] They have the characteristic that they are consumed by every-

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the trade positions of the underdeveloped economies today and of the developed economies in the nineteenth century. See his essays collected in, Gottfried Haberler and Robert M. Stern, eds., *Equilibrium and Growth in the World Economy* (Cambridge, Mass. 1961).

[8] The distinction between growth and development has been made vivid for me by my colleagues who worked on the Northwestern University AID project in Liberia during 1961 and 1962. See Robert W. Clower, George Dalton, Mitchell Harwitz, A. A. Walters, *Growth Without Development* (Evanston 1966).

[9] It should be clear that my understanding of input and output, constrained as it is by economic usage, differs from Professor Almond's usage as he analyzed his understanding of it in the introductory chapter of Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 3-64; my definitions are narrower than his, focusing more on government and less on society, though it also should be clear in the text that I am very much aware of the relevance of his input functions for political development.

[10] On public goods see Mancur Olson, Jr., "Economics, Sociology, and the Best of all Possible Worlds," *Public Interest*, No. 12 (Summer 1968), 96-118; Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965), 5-52; Richard Musgrave, *The Theory of Public Finance* (New York 1959), 8; Paul A. Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XXXVI (November 1954), 387-90; Samuelson, "Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories," *Review of Economics and Statistics*, XL (November 1958), 332-38.

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one jointly. In contrast to private goods, of which my consumption precludes your consumption, with political goods my consumption has no effect on your consumption. By the same token, however, everyone must consume political goods. Although I can choose to consume cigarettes, automobiles, or transistor radios, I have no choice but to consume the armed forces of the United States, the space program of NASA, the judicial system, the FBI, the Federal Reserve Authority, or the National Labor Relations Board.[11]

As these examples suggest, political goods involve individuals critically in a coercive relation with the community. On the output side, we must consume NASA's space program whether or not it has a place in our individual utility functions. On the input side, we know that our contribution, in the form of taxes or personal services, to the provision of political goods is quite unrelated to our consumption of them. Whether we do or do not pay taxes or join the armed forces, the services those inputs make possible will be forthcoming. Individuals who maximize their own utility, unconstrained by the collective needs of the polity, will voluntarily neither pay taxes nor join the armed forces. Consequently, society must use its collective authority to compel individuals to contribute the inputs necessary for producing political goods. Thus, unlike economic goods, they can be provided only by government, because there is no other agency that can legitimately use the collective powers of the community to coerce its individual members. Since economic goods are distinguished by the absorption in production of scarce resources with alternative uses, they may be produced by private firms or by government.

Returning now to political growth and development, it is apparent that the motivations underlying them differ markedly from those of economic growth and development. The latter have occurred because it has been possible to relate individual drives and systemic performance rather widely throughout society. That is to say, the requirements of a growing economy have not necessarily been inconsistent with the preferences of individuals. Workers may be willing to work longer and harder for more wages; capitalists to increase saving for a greater future income; entrepreneurs to change production functions in antic-

[11] My definition of political goods is thus more restricted than Professor Pennock's, which makes them synonymous with those political goals whose fulfillment makes the polity essential: security, welfare, justice, liberty. J. Roland Pennock, "Political Development, Political Systems, and Political Goods," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1966), 415-34. In being more restricted, the definition suggests an approach to the formidable task of measuring political activity. See my "On Measuring Political Performance," *Comparative Political Studies*, II (January 1970), 503-11.

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ipation of higher profits; engineers or scientists to contrive new techniques in return for the receipt of royalties. Economic systems have grown because individuals have tried to increase the magnitude of micro-economic variables, in which they have had a personal stake, that have a macro-economic payoff.[12] Political growth does not have the same type of relation to individual preferences because the element of coercion is so much more important in the ordering of individuals within the system. Although conceivably everyone might want more security, order, space assaults, national parks, international policing, etc., the input costs of increased political output, unrelated as the former is to the individual consumption of the latter, sharply constrain preferences for political growth. Indeed, it may be asserted that political growth is as widely disliked as economic growth is liked, that there is something to the Rousseauian notion that the small political community, where there is more likely to be an identity between input contributions to, and consumption of, political output, is "natural."[13] Certainly the modern state is always confronted by centrifugal forces—states' rights, home rule, and so on—that try to counteract the force of political growth.

Yet nothing is more obvious than that political growth has occurred throughout the world. Whether we observe cross-sectional data at a given moment of time or historical data over time in a given society, we can hardly escape the view that "modern" states generate more political output than do "traditional" states. The reasons that political growth has taken place in circumstances where we might expect most people to be opposed to it are, obviously, complex, but one thing stands out clearly—the preferences of a leadership elite, a ruling class that wields the collective power of society, are not the same as those of the ruled; and therein lies an important element of the explanation. The ruling elite identify with state interest, which they are in a position to determine, or at any rate direct. State interest is not the same as the sum of household interests. Because the state may be assumed to have perpetual life and, in some sense, is charged with the care, if

[12] I do not want to give the impression that economic growth is a process devoid of coercion. The historical evidence on this point is all too clear. See my "Economic Growth, Coercion, and Freedom," *World Politics*, IX (January 1957), 166-92 and "Accelerated Investment as a Force in Economic Development," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXXIII (August 1959), 499-502.

[13] John D. Montgomery has recently made the same observation, but perhaps more judiciously. "Nearly everyone would concede that economic growth, however measured, is good; wealth has its problems, but most people consider it desirable. Yet even if changes in the capacities of government to use power could be measured, not everyone would agree that this form of growth is inherently desirable." "The Quest for Political Development," *Comparative Politics*, I (January 1969), 289.

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not always the welfare, of future generations, those who act in its name have a different perspective from that of the household. To use again the jargon of economics, the utility function of the ruler is informed by a lower time-preference than is the utility function of the ruled. Moreover, the world environment in which the state lives presents threats to its survival that may be perceived quite differently by the rulers and the ruled. For both these reasons, political growth is likely to be a highly valued goal of the political leaders of the state.

The history of the world, biased as it is by being recorded by a literate class that more often than not has been the handmaiden of ruling political elites, has, until quite recently, been the history of the state and those who act in its name. Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that it has been the history of rulers who have sought to aggrandize their own power and have thus affected the fortunes of the state. At any rate, we are extremely conscious of the military campaigns, peace treaties, alliances, annexations, and aggressions that have always marked the conduct of states towards one another. Whether we view fifth-century Greece, medieval Europe, sixteenth-century South Asia, or twentieth-century East Asia, we see states in flux, waxing and waning as a consequence of their interactions. If we may assume that the acquisition of territory and people is a form of political growth—more territory and people presumably require greater use of inputs by the state to maintain order and provide other authoritative services[14]—then we may say that historically it has had this peculiar characteristic: it has been a zero-sum game. State A has grown by imposing losses on state B. Just as economies prior to the industrial revolution grew largely on extensive increases in the supply of original inputs, so it was with polities in the pre-modern age. And just as economic growth of this kind becomes more difficult as the world system fills up with population and becomes reticulated by frontiers and boundaries that have legal or quasi-legal status in the international community, so too is it more difficult for polities to grow through the aggressive absorption of inputs.

[14] This statement does not lend itself readily to historical refutation. The territory and people controlled by Ashoka in the Maurya dynasty of ancient India, for example, were apparently greater than the territory and people controlled by his grandfather Chandragupta. But it would be a bold man indeed who could claim access to convincing evidence about the authoritative services provided by the state in the two regimes. It is difficult enough to get a quantitative sense of these issues in the contemporary world, with all of its commitment to the technology of quantification, let alone the quantification of social experience in a pre-modern world that kept few records and had only the most rudimentary empirical sense. The statement therefore must rest on its *a priori* plausibility.

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The likelihood that the preferences of the ruled and the rulers with respect to political growth are in conflict suggests two ways of looking at the forces making for political development. On the one hand, rulers may initiate efforts to increase the efficiency with which they produce political output. This may involve them in attempts to reduce the conflict by making their determination of the menu of political goods legitimate in the minds of the ruled. Somehow they may devise means that convert power into authority by making the collective political goals of the state an explicit variable constraining individual utility functions.[15] The more individuals accept the legitimacy of the decisions affecting the output of political goods, the more they will submit to the input demands that these impose on them. Taxes may seldom be paid voluntarily, but it makes a good deal of difference to the efficiency of the revenue system how far people will exert themselves to minimize their tax liability. Similarly, the draft is a more effective method of filling up the ranks in the military services, the more society accepts the legitimacy of the uses to which they are put. Or rulers may attempt to increase the technical efficiency of administration so that, whatever the preferences of the ruled, the priorities of the rulers for political output may be attained more expeditiously.

On the other hand, the ruled may attempt to impose some kind of limit on the discretion of political rulers so that the latter, in pursuing state interest, will not impose on the former too great a coercive burden. Or the ruled may influence the menu of political goods that government produces so that they more nearly reflect their preferences. In these ways the ruled may be able to attach to the political process conditions for its legitimacy that increase the efficiency with which rulers generate political output.

This brief schematic view of political development has the virtue of being free of ethnocentric value judgments. Political development may take place any time, anywhere, and through any number of institutional variants. It may evolve from the judicious leadership of political elites or as a consequence of a revolution of the oppressed. In history it has manifested itself in the constitutional reforms of Solon in the Athenian city-state of the sixth century B.C. as well as in the development of the examination system for the civil service in the T'ang dynasty of ancient China. It also occurred in the organization

[15] Max Weber's ideal-type political orders—the traditional, the charismatic, and the rational-legal—are, of course, models for effecting this kind of conversion. In the light of the history of the twentieth century, especially the emergence of Communist states, we might well add a fourth ideal type—the secular-ideological.

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of the party system in Communist Russia in the years following the revolution of 1917. So ubiquitous are the examples of it in world history that it is presumptuous to try to restrict it to some particular governmental form.

Moreover, political development is neither a "good" nor a "bad."[16] It all depends upon how we evaluate the political goods whose output is affected. Not many people approved of the development of administrative efficiency in Hitler's state for carrying out the Final Solution. Similarly, economic development is neither good nor bad, contrary to the impression given by the widespread commitment to it as an objective of policy. As with political development, it all depends upon what society does with the increased potential for output or leisure.

Though political development has occurred throughout world history, it is the modern era that has witnessed its most persistent and widespread manifestation. The reasons for this are to be found in the extensive transformations that characterized social, economic, and intellectual life, especially in European cultures, in the years following 1500. Economic growth, for example, changed the conditions or, as is now fashionable to say, the parameters constraining the political process. By causing total population to increase and to concentrate in urban areas, as well as by expanding the resources available for the production of political goods, economic growth turned the locus of political growth inward. This is not to say that, after 1500, states no longer sought growth in aggressive claims on other states, but rather that the demands of managing the domestic order made political growth a general societal phenomenon independent of external relationships. Conflicts between rulers and ruled, for example, were exacerbated by autonomous economic forces, particularly with the advent of the industrial revolution, thus setting the stage for those administrative, constitutional, and party innovations in the political sphere that very gradually, and to different degrees in different countries, developed the efficiency of the state in producing political goods.

III

This brings me to the issue of sequence and historical timing in political growth and development, for, as I suggested in the previous

[16] Denis Goulet has put this somewhat differently. "However it be defined, development is a normative experience: it involves, for those who propose it as for those to whom it is proposed, central value choices about the meaning of life. Development is always experienced as good or bad, usually as both, but never as neutral." Denis A. Goulet, "Development for What?" *Comparative Political Studies*, 1 (July 1968), 301. Those who argue that development is desirable tend to have a model of development in mind that satisfies the ethical values to which they adhere.

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section, these processes occur at different rates in different places. We may wonder whether there are, in consequence, special difficulties for the latecomer, as there seem to be for the latecomer to economic development. This issue has been stressed recently by Professor Rustow in his conjectures about the relative merits of different historical sequences of authority, identity, and equality, his trinity of conditions for achieving political modernity.[17] What I shall say here is related to Professor Rustow's argument but is couched in terms consistent with the previous analysis.

Political scientists argue that a distinguishing feature of modern polities is their stress on the mobilization or participation of citizens in the political life of society. Pre-modern polities limited citizenship sharply, so that most people were objects of political rule who might be expected to provide essential inputs for political output, but who had no access to, or rights to influence, the decision processes that determined the composition of the latter. By contrast, modern states exhibit a high degree of real or symbolic participation in the political process. No one, ideally at least, is to be excluded, and the rationale of state action is the maximization of the welfare of the entire population. This holds equally for democratic and totalitarian systems.

What is interesting about this aspect of political modernization is that it may be inconsistent with political development. This point has been made by Samuel Huntington, but it has long been implied in the theoretical discussions of the voting paradox.[18] Kenneth Arrow's demonstration almost twenty years ago of the logical difficulties of deriving a social welfare function consistent with individual preferences, though addressed to economists, has profound significance for political analysis, especially for the problem of nation-building or state-building.[19]

[17] Dankwart A. Rustow, *A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization* (Washington 1967). The problem of timing in political development seems to be an issue that is particularly intriguing to scholars in the Japanese field. See Robert A. Scalapino, *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan: the Failure of the First Attempt* (Berkeley 1953), 397-98; Scalapino, "Ideology and Modernization: The Japanese Case," in David E. Apter, ed., *Ideology and Discontent* (New York 1964), 93-127; Robert E. Ward, ed., *Political Development in Modern Japan* (Princeton 1968), 577-92; Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, eds., *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey* (Princeton 1964), 440-41.

[18] Samuel P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," *World Politics*, XVII (April 1965), 386-430; Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven 1968).

[19] Kenneth J. Arrow, "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare," *Journal of Political Economy*, LVIII (August 1950), 328-46; Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values* (New York 1951). See, also, William H. Riker, "Voting and the Summation of Preferences: An Interpretive Bibliographical Review of Selected Developments during the Last Decade," *American Political Science Review*, LV (December 1961), 900-11.

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If, as Arrow showed, there is no reason to expect that the unconstrained choices of individuals can be aggregated into a coherent social, public, or collective choice, then it is not clear that mobilization or participation facilitates the decision-making process. The voting paradox shows rigorously what political philosophers have known for centuries, that the whole is not the sum of its parts and that in order to shape the former the latter must be in some degree molded. As I have put it previously, individual utility functions must be constrained by the social welfare function. Or to use the appropriate political terminology, individuals must be socialized to an acceptance of the legitimacy of the polity and those who determine or act in its interests. Participation or mobilization, depending upon how it is effected, may play a role in political socialization, but in itself it merely suggests additional individuals and interests that the political system must aggregate. Therein lies the source of potential conflict with political development, for more individuals articulating a wider range of interests exacerbates the voting paradox and may place too great a burden or load on the polity, reducing its efficiency in producing political output, or even bringing about its downfall.

This problem is related to historical sequence and timing as these, in turn, relate to preference formation. In discussing economic growth and development I indicated that the tasks of the late latecomer were rendered more difficult because of the possibility that rapidly growing preferences for the one might outstrip the essential capacities for the other. Here the demands for participation may inhibit the formation of a political community or nation with the cohesion necessary for expanding the output of political goods. Historical timing is important because preferences presumably are influenced by the accumulated knowledge of human experience and its communication, both as fact and as ideological norm. If the contemporary era places a premium on participation, it is because of the great political and social revolutions of the Western world that destroyed the sanctity of hierarchy and deprived the privileged few of their claim to a monopoly of political power. But the effect of these revolutions was felt only very slowly, and if we go back in time we come to a period when the concept of participatory rights in the political process, if understood at all, was anathema, at least for the ruling classes. Whatever the lower classes might have thought in eighteenth-century Britain, for example, there were precious few Whigs or Tories who entertained notions of the desirability of popular participation in the affairs at Westminster.

The older states of Europe, therefore, were formed during an his-

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torical period when the principle of political exclusivity still had normative validity. To that extent the conflict implicit in the voting paradox was minimized. Political communities were formed at the top of society among the elite, who did not have to concern themselves unduly with the demands or claims of the people at large. The authority relationships thus established became the focal point for political growth and development. That is to say, states, formed as personal instruments of monarchs to establish order among lords and vassals and, of course, to control the mob where necessary, in time became invested with a political identity that was grounded less in the person of the monarch than in the society he ruled. Because of the long, tortuous, and bloody history of the English monarchy, the common man in England had a national identity before he was a citizen. His struggle in the modern era to be included within the pale of the constitution was a struggle to get inside a going polity the origins of which were embedded in his historical consciousness as an Englishman. The same thing may be said of other European states, however much their history or institutions differed in detail from those of England. The French polity was contrived by the elite and, as it were, trickled downwards into the minds of Frenchmen.

Because of the historical lag in the West between the establishment of the polity and the demand for participation, there was opportunity for the kinds of institutional innovation that subsequently facilitated political growth and development. Political parties in Britain, for example, first emerged as instruments of small elites to articulate their interests against one another and the Crown in Parliament. But having been established by a privileged few, they later came to play an important role in reforming the House of Commons and the English Constitution in good time to accommodate and manage the complex demands the industrial masses imposed on the polity.

In the United States, while the formation of the polity was hurried in contrast to Britain's, we still note a similar sequence. The men who met in Philadelphia in 1787 were perhaps as brilliant a group of political developers as have ever gathered in one place. At the very outset they minimized their task by excluding from the Convention the slaves, artisans, and radicals who might have made it more difficult to reach a consensus about how the political community ought to have been organized. The Constitution was a "waspish" document but expressed transcendental values that people of diverse background could aspire to. Nonetheless, it was important to the eventual success of the new government that it had a long period of Anglo-American domina-

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tion that established the legitimacy of the system in the minds of the majority of the population. The democratization of the system then proceeded with the understanding that those who came to America from different societies with different traditions should acquire as best they could the values of the Anglo-American bourgeoisie.

Political parties and written constitutions have been important instruments of political development in the Western world. They have been part of the political technology that has transformed input relations and increased the efficiency with which political output is produced. And like economic technology—railroad systems or cotton textile mills—they are exportable to less developed societies. The transfer of political parties or constitutions, however, encounters environmental problems of a different order from those that stand in the way of the construction of a railroad line, for example. A railroad has to deal with a varied topography of mountains, valleys, deserts, rivers, lakes, and so on. Nonetheless it is possible to translate these environmental obstacles, through the use of engineering and economic data, into cost-benefit calculations. There may have to be adaptations in the technology to make it suitable for the peculiar features of a country's land forms. There may be severe manpower constraints, an inadequate supply of indigenous engineers and technicians for both the construction and the operation of the railroad. Moreover, it may not be easy to gain title to the land required for the right of way. And when the railroad is completed, its operating costs may be very much larger than anticipated because of poor predictions about the intensity with which it would be used. However formidable the obstacles that confront the promoters of a railroad, they can be evaluated in a means-ends context that affords at least some minimal assurance that the environmental alterations contemplated are coherently related to the objectives being sought.

The environment in which political technology must be adapted is very much less amenable to rational control, and here again we can see, from a slightly different point of view, the significance of sequence and historical timing in political development. A political party, for example, from the point of view of the people it represents, is a highly rational instrument. It aggregates interests and articulates them more effectively than could each person by himself. In so doing, it may be creating preferences that hitherto had been dormant. Whatever the precise relation between individual and party, however rational its performance in achieving the goals of the former, it may or may not be rational from the point of view of the system. If political parties

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facilitate the recruitment of political leaders who identify with the polity and build conduits between the rulers and the ruled, if they bring out into the open a range of problems that government can reasonably expect to handle, if they help socialize the ruled to the legitimate demands that the polity may impose on individuals, then they are systemically rational or consistent and, of course, instruments of political development. If, on the other hand, political parties articulate irreconcilable conflicts in society and widen the gulf between rulers and ruled, they may force upon the polity problems that it cannot manage and that consequently threaten its stability and even its existence.[20]

What is critical here is the condition of the social environment, or, to make the parallel with economics, what could be called the social endowment, with which the polity interacts. To what extent do the linguistic, religious, ethnic, economic, or class characteristics of the system create divisive or cohesive forces that render the task of the polity more or less difficult? We do not have to believe that political reality is somehow only a reflection or manifestation of a deeper reality that is embedded in the social environment to acknowledge that there are some qualities of the deeper reality that are more propitious for political development than others. Unlike the natural environment that the builders of a railroad must deal with, the social environment is not so responsive to rational management and planning. Indeed, there is a non-rational element in the construction of a social environment favorable for political organization that defies rational calculation.

[20] Professor Kautsky suggests that here I have perhaps revealed an American ideological bias in favor of stability and opposed to conflict, i.e., the one is a "good" and the other a "bad," and that I have implicitly equated stability with development. Suppose that conflict between political parties leads to a transformation of the political elite in revolution, which in turn leads to the creation of new structures and functional capacity in the polity. Is that not political development? The answer is yes. Professor Kautsky has hinted at a problem for which I do not pretend to have a solution, namely, the terminal points in time-series comparisons. Growth and development are processes that occur through time and we may perceive them by viewing a system at two different points in time. Our perception then may vary tremendously depending upon our choice of terminal dates. This, of course, is a familiar problem in economics; seasonal variations in income and employment data, for example, may distort our picture of annual economic performance unless they are somehow adjusted or taken into account. A similar problem arises in the making of political comparisons. It surely affects our sense of growth and development whether we compare the French polity in 1788 and 1792 or in 1788 and 1888. No doubt historians and political scientists use some kind of averaging method when they examine historical processes. This, I suppose, is manifest in the staging or periodizing of history—the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, Tokugawa Japan, Elizabethan England, and so on. While clearly this is necessary if we are to comprehend the opaque history of human behavior, it nonetheless is true that the use of time analytically in the literature of modernization is loose, vague, and highly subjective. So conflict may or may not generate political development, depending upon the vantage point from which it is viewed.

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How are individuals with strong familial, tribal, village, or class identities induced to identify with an abstract political community—the state —with which they may have little or no sensory contact? How do people with parochial loyalties come to be citizens who acknowledge the legitimacy of the state's claim to represent the commonweal and to apportion among them the burden of doing so? These are, of course, rhetorical questions, but they suggest that social cohesiveness and the political legitimacy that may be derived therefrom cannot be constructed with the ease with which engineers tunnel through mountains and build bridges over rivers and ravines.

Previously in this section I noted that the early-comers to political growth and development were aided by the acceptance of the principle of political exclusivity. The political community could be formed in one part of the social environment and then through the process of socialization other parts could be molded to accept its norms at some rate more or less consistent with the development of the system. This was not a conscious process, but what in economics would be called an externality arising from behavior that had quite different motivation.[21] If I may use the jargon of hippiedom, the English monarch and those in the tiny elite who competed with him for power did their thing and consequently created the behavioral record out of which the symbols of political community were culled. Elsewhere I have referred to these symbols as political monuments.[22] I do not know why the Battle of Crecy and the image it evokes of the stout English yeoman and his longbow triumphant over the French should affect the identities of landless peasants or destitute handloom weavers. Nor do I understand why the idiocy of the charge of the Light Brigade or the mass slaughter of the Battle of the Somme should make subsequent generations of Englishmen more English (if indeed they do). Nonetheless, it seems that the most compelling national symbols or monuments have been generated in mankind's most destructive ventures, perhaps because they dramatize the we-they dichotomy and are a fertile source of ex-

[21] For optimal resource allocation in a competitive economy the actions of producers and consumers must be independent of one another, i.e., there can be no external effects of market transactions on parties unrepresented in them. Logically there are two types of externalities—economies where third parties are affected positively and diseconomies where they are affected negatively. Needless to say, in an increasingly interdependent, urban, and industrial environment, the external diseconomies of individual market behavior are running rampant, as all Tom Lehrer fans know. Hence the critical demand for the output of more public goods or what in this essay we are calling political goods.

[22] Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., "Growth, Development, and Political Monuments," in Muzafer and Carolyn W. Sherif, eds., *Interdisciplinary Relationships in the Social Sciences* (Chicago 1969), 209-24.

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amples of what Kenneth Boulding has recently called the "heroic ethic."[23] Through them, as they are used in the socialization process in home, school, church, and other associations, individuals come to see themselves as political beings with concrete characteristics, real or imagined, that differentiate them from other human beings. And so as political beings they may come to accept the legitimacy of collective acts—the growth of the output of political goods—that as individual members of a smaller social entity they might otherwise oppose.

But let us now come forward in time to the contemporary era, when many new states have been formed or traditional states have acquired independence with the breakdown of Western colonial systems. The social environments contained within these newly drawn or redefined political boundaries are immensely varied, reflecting less a grouping of social qualities appropriate for political development than the fortuitous circumstances of the Western states' external growth. The imperialistic ventures of France, England, or Holland were successful—at least from the point of view of domination—because of the Promethean, commercializing, and proselytizing spirit of the West as well as the inchoate and undeveloped state of political organization in the non-Western world. The amenability of indigenous elites in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Western domination no doubt was a productive source of symbols that could be turned to good account in the creation of a sense of political community or in nation-building in the West.[24] Clive of India surely came through differently to eighteenth-century Englishmen than to the peasants of Bengal. When the Western imperialists receded from the non-Western world, not only did they leave behind a haphazardly drawn set of political frontiers, but activist, modernizing, participatory ideologies and a hardened international environment.

The newly independent states have been left, therefore, with more

[23] "This 'heroic' ethic takes three major forms—the military, the religious, and the sporting. The heroic ethic 'theirs not to reason why, theirs but to do or die' is so fundamental to the operation of the military that attempts to apply an economic ethic to it in the form of cost-benefit analysis or programmed budgeting, or even strategic science as practiced by Herman Kahn, T. C. Schelling, or even Robert McNamara, are deeply threatening to the morale and the legitimacy of the whole military stystem." Kenneth E. Boulding, "Economics as a Moral Science," *American Economic Review*, LIX (March 1969), 9.

[24] As in so many other matters, Japan is a notable exception to the pattern of Western imperialistic domination, partly because the rewards for domination did not seem so glittering to the West as did those in China and South and Southeast Asia, but partly, also, because of the highly developed sense of Japanese community and cultural uniqueness that motivated the political elite to do whatever was necessary to retain their independence in the face of Western technical and military superiority.

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difficult tasks of political organization than the old Western states faced in the early modern era. On the one hand, the need for political growth is profound. Whether we observe the economy or the polity, we are aware that the lack of authoritative services is inhibiting the growth of each. The weakness of governmental planning, as well as the ineffective use of macro-economic controls, creates inflation and balance-of-payments difficulties that are a consequence of the failure of the real sector to produce outputs with favorable demand elasticities in international markets. And these difficulties are compounded by the less than complete order that government is able to maintain among the varied groups contained within its political frontiers. On the other hand, the prospects for political development as a means of raising growth potential are hampered by the position of the new states in the historical sequence of change. Because modernizing ideologies are now extant that may be used for mobilizing the collective energies and power of any group in society, it is difficult for an elite in a new state to start from an island of exclusivity and establish norms to which the nonprivileged may be expected subsequently to adapt. And because the international environment has hardened through the growth of the older states, it is not easy to use it for the achievement of domestic purposes.

This last point perhaps is obvious, but nonetheless it needs to be stressed. Because of the disparity in power between the old established states and the newly independent states, it is not now possible for the latter to help establish their identities by aggressing against the former. There are, of course, international organizations that provide a forum where all states may interact and, it is to be hoped, achieve solutions to common problems. But we may doubt whether out of this controlled kind of international intercourse heroes arise who can become significant symbols of cohesion in a country's political development. What victories brought home from the international conference table can compare, in this respect, to the depredations of the Spanish conquistadors or the buccaneering exploits of Francis Drake? While the rule of law in the international order may not constrain the behavior of the strong, it does inhibit the weak and certainly confines their aggressive external behavior amongst themselves.

Furthermore, the international environment has hardened because, as I have noted in Section I, it is teeming with population and restrictions on population movements. No longer is it possible for a society to expel its dissident members or urge them to migrate, a means by which many societies in the Western world minimized the problems

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of political aggregation inherent in the voting paradox. For all of its alleged homogeneity of population, we may conjecture that the tasks of political development in Britain were less difficult by virtue of the transportation of fractious labor leaders to Australia and the migration of discontented artisans to America in the first half of the nineteenth century. And perhaps the task of maintaining order in the old traditional states of Asia was facilitated by the migration of Indians to Africa and of Chinese to southeast Asia. But now populations, with all their diversity, are bottled up within states that must somehow develop the capacity to manage conflicts inherent in the society as well as produce the other political outputs required by modern societies.

Faced by these demanding tasks, the latecomers to political modernization have made adaptations of political technology that frequently confound the norms that emerged with the experience of the early comers. Political parties are not so much autonomous institutions for articulating the demands of interest groups in society as instruments of the state designed to form the consensus needed to expand the output of political goods. Military juntas and dictatorships abound in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, making a mockery of the Western ideal of civilian control of the armed forces. Trade unions may be used to further the productionist interests of the state rather than the consumptionist interests of workers. The economic order itself may be exploited as a producer of political monuments that attest to the modernity of a new state in the making. Industrialization generally, and steel mills and automobile plants in particular, may be preferred to less visible uses of resources that have larger economic payoffs.[25] Moreover, ideology may be used militantly, as in the cultural revolution in China or in the nationalist revolution in Egypt, to repair the fissures that inhere in the social order.

What stands out in these political innovations is that they are deployed, in Almond's phrase, for manifest socialization, in contrast to latent socialization.[26] That is to say, a large proportion of the political goods produced by the latecomers to political modernization is directed to the creation of consensus and the validation of the authority of the state. So much output is used up in constructing the foundation of the polity that little seems to be left over for what to the early-comers to modernization may appear to be one of the most important func-

[25] Cf. Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., *Interdisciplinary Relationships*; Harry G. Johnson, "The Ideology of Economic Policy in the New States," in Harry G. Johnson, ed., *Economic Nationalism in Old and New States* (Chicago 1967), 124-41.

[26] Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., *The Politics of the Developing Areas* (Princeton 1960), 28.

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tions of the state—the protection of individual rights. But where the social environment contains strong divisive elements, the state seeks out symbols of unity that it hopes can be instrumental in the long run in creating new political identities, but in the short run it deals coercively and harshly with the conflicts, divisions, and differences that inhibit the achievement of its ends.

Can it be said that one-party systems, military dictatorships, cultural revolutions, and other consensus-seeking institutions of the latecomers really constitute political development? Or are they a manifestation of growth without development? The questions are not easy to answer, not least because political development is an evanescent phenomenon. Recently Sheldin Wolin and John Schaar, reporting on the crisis at the University of California at Berkeley, observed that:

> It is increasingly clear that legitimate authority is declining in the modern state. In a real sense, "law and order" *is* the basic question of our day. This crisis of legitimacy has been visible for some time in just about all of the non-political sectors of life—family, economy, religion, education—and is now spreading rapidly into the political realm. The gigantic and seemingly impregnable organizations that surround and dominate men in the modern states are seen by more and more to have at their center not a vital principle of authority, but a hollow space, a moral vacuum. Increasingly, among the young and the rejected, obedience is mainly a matter of lingering habit, or expediency, or necessity, but not a matter of conviction and deepest sentiment.[27]

To the extent that this observation is valid, it suggests that as strong a polity as the United States can experience political degeneration, if that is an appropriate phrase for negative political development.[28] But here we are concerned not with the dissipation of governmental authority within established polities, but rather with the development of the polity and its authority in the first instance. In view of the obstacles in the external and internal environment that stand in the way of the political leaders of the newly independent states, it seems inappropriate to try to measure political development, as does Martin C. Needler, by means of an index based on the number of years during

[27] Sheldin Wolin and John Schaar, "Berkeley: the Battle of People's Park," *New York Review of Books*, XII, June 19, 1969, 31.

[28] I do not like the phrase "political degeneration" any more than Samuel Huntington's "political decay," for they both imply a stronger value judgment than I think appropriate for the phenomenon being described. On the other hand, "negative political development" seems awkward.

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a given period a country has been ruled constitutionally.[29] One-party systems and cultural revolutions are not democratic processes, but they may not be inconsistent with political development if they have a hand in the creation of the kind of identity and perception of self in the political cosmology that increases the efficiency with which political goods are produced. We may not like the values or priorities symbolized by a country's composition of political output, but if over time it is produced with less dependence on techniques of manifest socialization, we must acknowledge that the capacity of its polity has developed.

In conclusion, let me draw the following contrast. If development precedes growth, political leaders have a margin of "political capital" to draw on in producing political goods.[30] If they must have more war, moon flights, or social security, they can mobilize the requisite inputs with minimum effort because of consensus in the society with regard to the value of these services. In such a situation, which may have been characteristic of the early-comers to modernization, the coercive element in the political process is hedged about by voluntaristic institutions that link the society and the polity. But if growth precedes development, the polity is trying to fashion the society rather than reflect its preferences. Accordingly its political institutions will be less voluntaristic. There is, of course, no assurance that growth will be successful in developing the polity. Failure is as much a part of the political as of the economic realm. Indeed, the probabilities of growth generating development are probably less than the probabilities of development generating growth. Yet we should not conclude from our observations of the early-comers to modernization that their political institutions are the *sine qua non* for the political development of the latecomers.

[29] Martin C. Needler, "Political Devolopment and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin America," *American Political Science Review*, LXII (September 1968), 889-97. Needler also includes as another dimension of political development the extent of participation in terms of equality.

[30] Cf. Gabriel A. Almond, "Political Devolopment," *Comparative Political Studies*, I (January 1968), 464.

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THE NATURE OF LEADERSHIP*
The Chinese Communists, 1930-1945

By HENRY G. SCHWARZ*

Introduction

THE twentieth anniversary of the assumption of state power by the Chinese Communists is a convenient occasion to take stock of the many dramatic events that have taken place since that first day in October of 1949, when Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the new People's Republic of China. The anniversary, however, is more than a fortuitous product of the Western calendar. It lies close to one of those convulsive periods that have jolted China from time to time and have caused major changes in the Chinese state and society. The creation of the People's Republic twenty years ago was one such period. The Great Leap Forward of the late fifties was another, and the recent Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution may have been a third. Each of these events has substantially reshaped the state or society or both. From a historical point of view, the next major event that may well come shortly after the twentieth anniversary is the death of Mao Tse-tung and other co-founders of the Communist state. This anniversary, therefore, offers an opportunity to reassess the record of the Chinese Communists since 1949 with a view toward understanding the setting and the problems that the post-Mao leadership will soon inherit.

Such a task cannot be complete, however, without a reassessment of the nature of leadership. Indeed, without studying the nature of leadership, we cannot understand much else of a totalitarian system where in theory and practice the Party leadership is both the originator and executor of changes in all major aspects of the world's most populous country.

Perhaps the most important among the leadership's many facets is the relations among the handful of men who until at least the cultural revolution have governed Communist China. Specifically, before we can understand China we must understand the relative influence of each of these men in the governing process. As to the identity of China's leadership, an almost limitless choice is open to the researcher, from the entire membership of the Communist Party to one man. This study designates the Political Bureau as the leadership although a

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study of the nature of leadership even of a highly structured political system such as Communist China may at times have to include leaders who are not members of the Political Bureau. Such methodological flexibility is even more necessary in any study of the Communist leadership before 1949, when it was less structured and more in flux.

Strange as it certainly is, after twenty years of state power and almost fifty years of existence of the Chinese Communist Party, not a single monograph has been written on this vitally important subject. The only book whose title promises to study the nature of leadership is John W. Lewis' *Leadership in Communist China*.[1] But the title is misleading because, instead of analyzing the actual nature of leadership, it ably and comprehensively presents certain *ideals* of leadership as expounded in the Party's guidelines. This is not to say that China specialists have ignored the nature of leadership. Quite on the contrary, virtually every study of the Party and many studies on other subjects manifest their authors' conceptions of the leadership. In most cases, however, these conceptions are not treated in their own right. They are but images applied to the treatment of some other subject. As Isaacs and others have shown, images are acquired subconsciously and are seldom reliable. They are formed out of a variety of haphazardly acquired experiences, such as personal recollections of life in China, bits and pieces of information acquired from scholarly and other works, seemingly relevant observations in other countries that are either Communist or Asian or economically underdeveloped or any combination thereof, and many others.

No two China specialists have an identical image, but while there are many minor differences, most China specialists share one general image. I call this image quasi-collective. It shows policy issues as being threshed out in a frank and no-holds-barred manner among the seven men in the Standing Committee, if not quite so freely in the larger Political Bureau. Such leadership is collective, but the prevailing image adds one important difference, in its depiction of Mao Tse-tung's influence as considerably greater than that of his co-leaders. Mao is envisaged as being more than first among equals in that his decision-making powers have presumably been relatively unencumbered by the actions and opinions of other leaders. By virtue of explicitly superior prerogatives and of his own persuasive powers, Mao is seen as being able to influence the outcome of policy deliberations. Moreover, he and only he can implement policies in ways somewhat divergent from the letter and the spirit

[1] Ithaca 1963.

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of these policies. In sum, the image projects a crossbreed between a collective and a fully hierarchical leadership.

One basic shortcoming of this image is that it handles the concept of power in an undifferentiating manner. An excellent major work of recent years opens with the flat assertion that "Mao Tse-tung's rise to power is a well-known fact."[2] By failing to dissect "power" and to subject its myriad interacting facets to analysis, many scholars have been led to believe, erroneously in my opinion, that "power" will inevitably and in all political systems gravitate to one person. An analysis of leadership, based on "power," helps to bring about an image that comes at times perilously close to an all-or-nothing view. I suspect that the concept of "power," taken as a whole, is too imposing to encourage dissection.

Professor Rue provides clear illustrations of this effect in relation to two cardinal aspects of leadership. On the problem of relations within the leadership, the focus of this study, Rue says that "the Seventh Congress [of April of 1945] was Mao's Congress of Victors. He had overcome all his enemies in the Chinese party."[3] Categorical concepts breed more categorical concepts; "power" begets "enemies" and "victors." Of the almost infinite variety of internal relationships, that of "enemy" is only one but, admittedly, the most sharply delineated of all relationships. "Victors," which in the context of the sentence refers not to national victors over the Japanese, whose defeat was certain in April of 1945, but to intra-Party victors, is equally categorical. It leaves no room for anything but its antithesis, the "vanquished."

The concept of undifferentiated "power" embedded in the quasi-collective image also affects the analysis of leadership control over the Party hierarchy. Rue states that "after the Seventh Congress, Mao's power rested on two closely related factors. One was control of the party apparatus; the other was the belief of other leaders of the Chinese party that his political line was correct and that his thought was the best representative of Marxist-Leninist ideology in China."[4] I shall elaborate later on the merits of this statement. For the time being, it will suffice to point out that Mao is portrayed, as in the description of intra-leadership relations, as being much more than first among equals. He, and only he, had "control of the party apparatus."

Another fundamental shortcoming of the quasi-collective image is its reliance on documentary evidence that is either skimpy or altogether

[2] John E. Rue, *Mao Tse-tung In Opposition, 1927-1935* (Stanford 1966), 1.
[3] *Ibid.*, 4. [4] *Ibid.*, 5.

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lacking. A representative sample of this shortcoming is supplied by Professor Lindbeck, who asserts that "for thirty years, Mao Tse-tung has firmly presided over the party and is its undisputed leader. Its key figures clearly are his men." This sweeping statement is supported by only one piece of "evidence," namely, the assertion that "almost all of the senior men and the majority of the Central Committee members shared the Long March of 1934-35 with him."[5] This view is untenable for two elementary reasons. First, the idea of a causal link between participation in the Long March and the nature of leadership in the mid-sixties is questionable. It places upon the Long March an importance Lindbeck fails to demonstrate. Second, the content of the quoted sentence is false. If we assume that "senior men" refers to the Political Bureau elected at the first and second sessions of the Eighth Party Congress, the record shows that only fifteen of the twenty-six members and alternate members shared the Long March with Mao. They could hardly be said to constitute "almost all" of the Political Bureau. Moreover, a look at any biographical dictionary such as *Who's Who in Communist China*[6] will inform the reader that only about forty-three of the ninety-seven members of the Eighth Central Committee marched with Mao in 1934-35.

Professor Lindbeck elevates Mao's position even further when he maintains, without offering any documentary evidence, that "it has been his authority, his statement of values and doctrines, and his men that have permeated the party and built it from a regional band of 40,000 members in 1937 to 17 million in 1962 and perhaps 20 million by 1965. Factionalism, regionalism, and competing loyalties have not been allowed to emerge or have been quickly suppressed by the determined and powerful group that runs the party."[7]

The image of a quasi-collective leadership has survived the onslaught of events that should at least have elicited its reassessment. During the height of the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in 1966 and 1967, the Mao group hurled countless accusations against virtually every member of the Party leadership. The most important implication common to almost all the accusations was that at no time during the last thirty years were the Party leaders united in their aims and motivations and that during most of those years Mao Tse-tung did not occupy the superior position assumed by many China specialists.

[5] J. M. H. Lindbeck, "Transformations in the Chinese Communist Party," in Donald W. Treadgold, ed., *Soviet and Chinese Communism: Similarities and Differences* (Seattle 1967), 78.

[6] Hong Kong 1966.

[7] Treadgold, 79.

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These revelations have so far failed to cause most China specialists to call into question their image of a quasi-collective leadership. While acknowledging acute disunity within the Party leadership since the outbreak of the cultural revolution, most scholars still seem to adhere to this image. Some explicitly reaffirm their view that since at least his assumption of state power in 1949, Mao Tse-tung has been the supreme decision-maker. Others dismiss recent charges of anti-Mao actions made by the Mao group against Liu Shao-ch'i and many other leaders as *ex post facto*. In essence, their argument runs as follows: the actions Liu Shao-ch'i is today accused of having perpetrated at various times of his career are, in so far as they had occurred at all, crimes by the current standards of the Mao group but were in line with Party policies at the time they are said to have been made. It does not seem to occur to many that while this argument is quite true as far as it goes, it begs the question of who had been chiefly responsible for formulating those policies.

Still others maintain that Mao Tse-tung is possibly understating his influence in the years prior to 1966 in order to strengthen his case against Liu Shao-ch'i and other leaders. Such argument, however, is both questionable and wholly incapable of verification at present. If Mao were actually planning to undercut his opponents in this manner, he must rationally have expected to gain support from the political, economic, and military professionals without whom state and society could not function. Yet, if this had indeed been Mao's motive, his very tactic would tend to support exactly the opposite of what has been assumed. Put differently, it would give credibility to his present claim that he had not been the undisputed leader and, therefore, would undermine the validity of the image of a quasi-collective leadership.

Finally, some argue that Mao Tse-tung is underplaying his allegedly superior decision-making powers in previous years in order to draw strength from his supposedly great esteem among the nonprofessional majority of the population. Leaving aside Mao's popularity, which is open to doubt, we are led to the conclusion that an appeal for mass support, *as in fact Mao made during the cultural revolution*, forces the proponents of this particular thesis into an untenable position. If Mao had indeed been the unchallengeable leader of the Party, he would not have had to rely on the overthrow of Party leaders through mob violence.

The image of a quasi-collective leadership has also successfully withstood contrary evidence for the period before 1949. Professor Lindbeck

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fairly represents the opinion of many China specialists that Mao has held the supreme position in the Party since the mid-thirties—since the Tsunyi Conference in January of 1935. Professor Lindbeck, as quoted earlier, said in 1965 that Mao had been the "undisputed leader" of the Party for thirty years. General Griffith, to cite a second representative sample, averred in 1967—that is, after the outbreak of the cultural revolution—that "at [the Tsunyi] conference, Mao mustered enough support to gain the unchallengeable position which is still his."[8]

There can, of course, be no doubt that the insurrectionary period was of unusual significance in the history of the Chinese Communist movement. Almost thirty years intervened between the founding of the Party in 1921 and its rise to supreme state power in Mainland China in 1949. This period was longer than the insurrectionary periods of all the other Communist parties that now rule states. The Chinese Party also distinguishes itself from all the others by its long experience in the techniques of government in its many base areas between 1928 and 1949.

It is clear, therefore, that the nature of leadership during the past twenty years was profoundly influenced by events during a period of roughly equal length before 1949. As the title of this study suggests, I shall reassess the relationships within the Party's leadership during that period. The study is actually limited to the period between 1930 and 1945 because the two dates are convenient bench-marks. In 1930, an important element, the Bolsheviks, was inserted into the Party and soon greatly altered the nature of leadership. In 1945, the Seventh Party Congress ratified the changes in the leadership that had taken place during the war against Japan, and it elected a new leadership that remained basically unchanged until long after its assumption of state power in 1949. At certain key points, I shall compare representative samples of statements by China specialists with the known facts and offer an alternative interpretation.

In the space available, it is impossible, of course, to present a full chronological treatment of all relevant events between 1930 and 1945. I restrict this study, therefore, to what I consider the *most* relevant events.

The Kiangsi Period

The Kiangsi period (1928-1934) marked the abandonment of the Party's almost decade-long attempt to start a revolution in the cities. The Central Soviet Area in Southern Kiangsi, which was built prin-

[8] Samuel B. Griffith II, *The Chinese People's Liberation Army* (New York 1967), 51.

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cipally by Chu Te and Mao Tse-tung, was the first major testing-ground for Communist land policies under the aegis of a fully developed government controlling several counties.

For this study's purposes, the Kiangsi period's chief importance was the acute struggle for supremacy in the Party between the group around Mao Tse-tung, Chu Te, and other leaders in the Central Soviet Area and the Central Committee in Shanghai, which became dominated by the so-called Twenty-eight Bolsheviks.[9] They had been students at the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow in the mid-twenties, and most of them returned to China in May of 1930, accompanied by Pavel Mif, who had been the rector of Sun Yat-sen University. Li Li-san, the then general secretary of the Party, was removed from his position at the Third Plenum of the Sixth Central Committee in September of 1930. His post was given to Hsiang Chung-fa, who was re-elected at the Fourth Plenum in January of 1931.[10] Reputedly a weak leader, he became surrounded by Bolsheviks and those who sided with them. Besides electing sixteen members and alternate members of the Political Bureau, this plenum also elected Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Chung-fa, and K'ang Sheng to the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau, the highest organization in the Party.[11] Ch'en and Ch'in were Bolsheviks, and the ever-adaptable Chou En-lai firmly supported them. The Bolsheviks' influence grew still stronger in September of 1931 after Hsiang Chung-fa was arrested and executed by the central government and Ch'en Shao-yü was recalled to Moscow to become the Chinese Communists' representative in the Comintern. Two Bolsheviks filled their positions, Chang Wen-t'ien and Wang Yün-ch'eng, and a third Bolshevik, Ch'in Pang-hsien, became the new general secretary of the Party.[12] Besides, Bolsheviks

[9] Wang Chien-min lists them as follows: Chang Ch'in-ch'iu, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Ch'ang-hao, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'en Yüan-tao, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chu A-ken, Chu Tzu-hsün, Ho Tzu-shu, Hsia Hsi, Kuo Miao-ken, Li Chu-sheng, Meng Ch'ing-shu, Shen Tse-min, Sheng Ch'ung-liang, Sun Chi-min, Tu Tso-hsiang, Tu Yen, Wang Chia-hsiang, Wang Hsiu, Wang Pao-li, Wang Sheng-jung, Wang Sheng-ti, Wang Yün-ch'eng, Yang Shang-k'un, Yin Chien, Yüan Chia-yung, and Yün Yü-jung. Wang Chien-min, *Chungkuo kungch'antang shihkao* [A History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Taipei 1965), II, 100.

[10] Hsiao Tso-liang, *Power Relationships Within the Chinese Communist Movement, 1930-34: A Study of Documents* (Seattle 1961), I, 115; see also Wang, II, 99.

[11] According to Ch'en Shao-yü, as quoted by Kuo Hua-lun (Warren Kuo), in *Feich'ing Yüehpao* (hereafter called *FCYP*), April 1967, 95, and in *Issues and Studies* (hereafter called *IS*), July 1967, 41. See also Hsiao, I, 115.

[12] Kuomintang, Investigation Section, *Fenpeng lihsi chih kungch'antang* [The Disintegration of the Communist Party] (1931), as quoted by Kuo in *FCYP*, July 1966, 111-12, and in *IS*, October 1966, 46.

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took over the Central Committee's two most important departments, organization and propaganda.[13]

Mao ranked rather low in the Party leadership at that time. In 1927, he had been expelled from his position as an alternate member of the Provisional Political Bureau for having contravened the Party's strategic plans while serving on the Hunan Provincial Committee.[14] He may also have been removed from the Central Committee.[15] In the following year, however, when he was already ensconced in the mountains of Southern Kiangsi, the Sixth Party Congress, which met in Moscow, elected him (or re-elected, if he had in fact been removed in 1927) to the Central Committee but not to the Political Bureau. Mao had become sufficiently prominent in the rapidly expanding stronghold in Southern Kiangsi that in April of 1930, Li Li-san, still the general secretary of the Party, appointed him as secretary of the newly established General Front Committee (*tsung ch'ien wei*). The officially stated function of this committee was to prepare and execute uprisings in Hunan, Hupei, and Kiangsi.

The specific reason why Mao, and not someone else, was appointed as secretary of the General Front Committee was that he had attained a major position in the military. When in April of 1928 he merged the forces who had gone with him to Chingkangshan from central Hunan with those of Chu Te, the two men formed the Fourth Red Army, a force of about 10,000 men. Chu became its commander and Mao its political commissar. In November of 1928, a much smaller force, estimated at about 1,000 troops and called the Fifth Red Army, was formed by P'eng Te-huai near Chu's and Mao's Fourth Red Army in Southern Kiangsi. A reorganization at the end of 1929 saw the Fourth Red Army changed to the First Red Army Corps with Chu and Mao retaining their positions as commander and political commissar.[16] The last major military reorganization during the Kiangsi period took place in February of 1930, when all forces operating in Southern Kiangsi and Southern Hunan were combined into the First Front Army. Once again, Chu Te was the commander and Mao Tse-tung the political commissar.

Li Li-san ordered a general attack on the cities, but when the first

[13] Wang, II, 99.

[14] "Resolution of the Political Bureau on political discipline" (November 14, 1927), *Kuo-wen choupao*, V, 3 (January 15, 1928), 5-7, translated by Karl A. Wittfogel in his "The Legend of 'Maoism'," *China Quarterly*, II (April-June 1960), 32-33.

[15] Rue, 81.

[16] The Fifth Red Army was redesignated the Third Red Army Corps, with P'eng Te-huai remaining as commander.

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attack on Ch'angsha turned into a fiasco, Mao refused to obey Li's order for a second attack. Despite this blatant disobedience, Mao did not lose rank nor was he, as far as we know, punished in any other way.

It would be a mistake, however, to interpret these events as proof that Mao had attained a position in the Party that was close to being unchallengeable. As we have seen, Li Li-san was facing, in the Bolsheviks, far more powerful and far more immediate opposition than Mao could have hoped to muster. That Li did not discipline Mao was probably due to his attempt to ward off the Bolsheviks and to the great distance between the Central Committee in Shanghai and the mountain fastness of Kiangsi which would have made any censure ineffectual.

Moreover, Mao's struggle for supreme leadership within the Central Soviet Area was far from over. Toward the end of 1930, his position was threatened by some leaders of the newly established Southwestern Kiangsi Soviet Government, which was placed under the jurisdiction of the Central Soviet Area.[17] In late November or early December, Mao arrested several leaders who were suspected of being agents of the A-B (Anti-Bolshevik) League, including Tuan Liang-pi, Li Po-fang, and Chin Wang-pang.[18]

As soon as Mao had removed this challenge, a more serious challenge arose in Tungku in Southwestern Kiangsi, where on December 8, 1930, Liu Ti, the political commissar of the Twentieth Army, started the well-known Fut'ien Rebellion. He overthrew the Southwest Kiangsi Soviet government and arrested many of its leaders whom he suspected of being Mao's supporters. He also released Tuan Liang-pi and the others whom Mao had arrested a short time earlier. The rebels declared their support for Chu Te, P'eng Te-huai, and Huang Kung-lüeh but they opposed Mao. Fortunately for Mao, the three leaders issued a joint statement supporting Mao and censuring the rebels. Finally, the rebellion was crushed by P'eng's Third Red Army.[19]

The Third Plenum of the Central Committee of September of 1930, which ousted Li Li-san from his position as general secretary of the Party, also ordered the replacement of the General Front Committee

[17] It was established on February 7, 1930. "Chianghsi ti chungyang Su-ch'ü" [The Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi], *Hung-ch'i choupao*, XXIV (November 27, 1931), as quoted in Hsiao, I, 170.

[18] Hsiao, I, 98. The A-B League apparently was an underground organization of the Kuomintang in the Communist areas. It was not directed against the Communists who had returned from the Soviet Union and who are referred to in this study as the Bolsheviks. Rather, the A-B League was aimed against all Communists.

[19] See *ibid.*, I, 98-113 and II, 259-83 for the text of and commentary on several documents concerning the Fut'ien Rebellion.

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by a Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas (*Su-ch'ü chungyang chü*). Its nine members were: Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi-shih, Mao Tse-tung, Yü Fei, Tseng Shang, and two others. Although it appears at first sight that the leadership of this new organization was diluted compared to the one position, held by Mao, in the General Front Committee, his relative power was probably not greatly weakened by the reorganization. Hsiang Ying reportedly was a man with few organizational abilities. Moreover, he, Chou, Yü, and Jen might have been not even present in the Kiangsi Soviet Area but in Shanghai.[20] Thus, perhaps only Tseng Shan, Chu Te, and the two unidentified men actually shared power with Mao in Kiangsi. Indirect evidence of Mao's continued predominance in Kiangsi, if not in the Party as a whole, comes from an order issued on the day after the Central Bureau was established, which expelled from the Party the leaders of the Fut'ien rebellion.[21] By the beginning of 1931, therefore, Mao Tse-tung had attained positions in the Party, the government, and the military in the Central Soviet Area that, while not unchallengeable, were among the highest.

But he had yet to face his greatest challenge. Just as he was strengthening his influence in Kiangsi, the Bolsheviks had been consolidating their influence in the Central Committee in Shanghai. Now they were ready to turn their attention to the Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi. Because of increasing pressure by Chiang Kai-shek's central government on their activities in Shanghai, the Bolsheviks decided to transfer the Political Bureau to Kiangsi. Dominating the Central Committee and having the support of the Comintern, they appeared to have the ability to seize the reins of leadership in Kiangsi.

In September of 1931, either shortly before or shortly after the Political Bureau transferred from Shanghai to Kiangsi, the Party Center issued a lengthy "directive letter." Apparently dictated by Ch'in Pang-hsien, who had assumed the general secretaryship of the Party when Hsiang Chung-fa was executed by the central government in June of 1931, the letter seemed to attack the leadership of the Kiangsi Soviet area by listing several "grievous errors" allegedly committed by Mao and other leaders in Kiangsi.[22]

The letter also ordered the establishment of a so-called Chinese

[20] *Ibid.*, I, 150.

[21] See *ibid.*, I, 108, and II, 269-73 for "Chungyang chü t'ungkao ti-er-hao: tui Fut'ien shihpien ti chüehi" [Central Bureau Circular Note No. 2: Resolution on the Fut'ien incident].

[22] "Chungyang tui Su-ch'ü chihshih hsin" [Directive letter of the Party Central to the Soviet areas], in Hsiao, I, 159-62, and II, 382-89.

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Soviet Government (*Chunghua suweiai chengfu*) during a congress scheduled for November of 1931.[23] This congress, the First All-China Soviet Congress, opened at Juichin on November 7, 1931. Toward its close in December, the congress elected sixty-three persons to the Central Executive Committee. Mao became its chairman, and Hsiang Ying and Chang Kuo-t'ao its vice-chairmen. Directly under the Central Executive Committee was a Council of People's Commissars (*jenmin weiyüanhui*), also headed by Mao, charged with the day-to-day administration of the Central Soviet Area, i.e., the main base area in Kiangsi.[24]

Mao's appointment to the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee and to its Council of People's Commissars marked the high point of his influence during the Kiangsi period. He now held leading positions in all three hierarchies. He was the head of the government, he was the general political commissar of the armed forces, and he was a member of the Party's Central Committee. Very shortly thereafter, however, the recently arrived Bolsheviks began systematically to curtail his influence, directing first attack against his military position. With the onset in December of 1930 of the first concerted attempts by the central government to dislodge the Communists from their bases in Kiangsi, the Communist leaders' military posts grew more important than their government and even their Party posts.

In 1932, during the fifteen-month pause between the third and fourth encirclement campaigns against the Central Soviet Area, a dispute broke out between Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-Lai over the proper defensive strategy. Mao favored mobile guerrilla warfare by which he would lure the enemy deep into the Communist territory, where numerically vastly superior Communist troops could isolate and attack small contingents of government troops. This strategy had been used against the first three encirclement campaigns, but Chou En-lai, speaking as a secretary of the Bolshevik-dominated Political Bureau, had ordered it discontinued, possibly because of the growing disaffection among the civilian population in the Central Soviet Area. Mobile guerrilla warfare exposed the civilians not only to destruction of property but also to retaliation by government troops, and their sense

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] Hsiao, I, 173. There were nine commissariats, as follows:

Foreign Affairs: Wang Chia-hsiang	Military: Chu Te
Labor: Hsiang Ying	Finance: Teng Tse-hui
Land: Chang T'ing-ch'eng	Education: Ch'ü Ch'iu-pai
Internal Affairs: Chou I-li	Judicial: Chang Kuo-t'ao

Worker-Peasant Investigation: Ho Shu-heng. See Wang, II, 286.

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of insecurity, as well as dissatisfaction with other Communist policies, resulted in diminished cooperation and increased difficulty in recruiting. Possibly to restore the civilians' morale, Chou En-lai advocated positional warfare ("to keep the enemy beyond the gates") and a strategy of carrying the fight into enemy territory. In his view, guerrilla warfare still had its usefulness but it was to be waged only behind enemy lines.

The clash between these two strategies was brought to a head in August of 1932 when the Party Central called the Ningtu Conference, which was an enlarged meeting of the Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas. Chou En-lai's strategy, which the Bolsheviks advocated, won out, and Mao was removed from the Military Affairs Committee. After the conference, his influence began to wane rapidly. Both Hsiao and Ch'en cite sources saying that Mao became inactive due to actual or political illness and that Chou En-lai became the *de facto* political leader in the armed forces.[25] Chou's new position was confirmed on May 8, 1933, when he was formally appointed to Mao's two posts as general political commissar of all armed forces and as political commissar of the First Front Army.[26] Mao's guerrilla strategy and, by implication, Mao himself, were further attacked in February of 1933 when Lo Ming, the acting secretary of the Party's Provincial Committee in Fukien, was severely criticized by Ch'in Pang-hsien, the Party's new general secretary, for applying Mao's strategy. Closer to home, Mao was indirectly attacked when the campaign against the so-called Lo Ming line was waged against his brother, Mao Tse-t'an and Teng Hsiao-p'ing, the secretary of the Party's Kiangsi committee.[27]

When the central government's Nineteenth Route Army, under Ch'en Ming-shu, prepared to rebel in Fukien, the Communists in

[25] *Ch'ihfei fantung wenchien huipien* [Collection of Communist Reactionary Documents], II, 449-50, in Hsiao, I, 210-11; and Ku Kuan-chiao, *Sanshih-nien lai ti Chungkung* [Thirty Years of the Chinese Communists], 76, in Jerome Ch'en, *Mao and the Chinese Revolution* (New York 1967), 176. Ch'en also cites pages 220-21 in Hsiao, but this is incorrect. He may have meant pages 210-11, in which case it would have been more helpful to cite, as Hsiao does, the original source. It should be noted, however, that during the fifth encirclement campaign in 1934, the leadership had second thoughts about the strategy of positional warfare, but it was too late for any change because the initiative had already shifted to the central government troops.

[26] Hsiao, I, 220; Hatano Ken'ichi, *Chūgoku kyōsantō shi* [History of the Chinese Communist Party] (Tokyo 1961), IV, 271 and chart at end of volume.

[27] "Mao Tse-t'an t'ungchih ti *San-kuo* chihje" [Comrade Mao Tse-t'an's enthusiasm for the *Romance of Three Kingdoms*], *Hung-se Chunghua*, XCII (July 8, 1933) and Ch'en Shou-ch'ang, "Wei chiach'iang tang tui koming chancheng ti lingtao erh toucheng" [Fight for strengthening the Party's leadership in the revolutionary war], *Toucheng*, XVI (July 15, 1933), cited by Kuo in *FCYP*, April 1967, 98-99, and *IS*, July 1967, 48-49.

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Kiangsi concluded an agreement with Ch'en on October 26, 1933. On December 5, however, the Party's Central Committee, under the domination of the Bolsheviks, denounced the rebels in Fukien.[28] Although Mao Tse-tung and Chu Te allegedly wanted to maintain relations with the rebels, Mao's influence in the Party had already reached such a low level that his pleas went unheeded.[29]

Mao Tse-tung's influence also waned in the Party after the Ningtu Conference. Until November of 1927 an alternate member of the Political Bureau, and later appointed as secretary of the General Front Committee, Mao was unable to find a place on the nine-man Secretariat that was elected at the Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee at Juichin in January of 1934. The Bolsheviks continued to dominate the Secretariat, whose members were Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Liang Pai-t'ai, Liu Shao-ch'i, Wang Chia-hsiang, and Wu Liang-p'ing. Ch'in Pang-hsien remained the general secretary of the Party.[30]

Even more important, Mao was excluded from the Political Bureau and hence from the leadership of the Party as defined in this study. The Political Bureau, as elected at the Fifth Plenum, is reported to have consisted of these fourteen members and alternate members: Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'en Yün, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'üan, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi-shih, K'ang Sheng, Ku Tso-lin, Kuan Hsiang-ying, and Wang Chia-hsiang.[31]

[28] "Chungkuo kungch'antang chungyang weiyüanhui wei Fuchien shihpien kao ch'üan-kuo minchung" [Statement of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party to the people of the entire country on the Fukien incident], cited in Hsiao, I, 249 and II, 676. A photocopy of the eleven-point agreement, entitled "Fan-Jih fan-Chiang ti ch'upu hsiehting" [Preliminary Agreement Against Japan and Chiang] is in Hsiao, II, 676. In a recent article, Jerome Ch'en erroneously lists *November* 26 as the date of the agreement. See Jerome Ch'en, "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," *The China Quarterly*, XL (October-December 1969), 28. I received this article two days before submitting my manuscript for publication and, therefore, did not have sufficient time to comment more fully on Ch'en's article. A few remarks here and in other footnotes must suffice.

[29] Many years later, Mao blamed the Bolsheviks for breaking off relations with the rebels in Fukien. He explicitly blamed the action for the collapse of the Central Soviet Area in an interview with Edgar Snow in 1936. See Edgar Snow, *Red Star Over China* (New York 1938), 186. He implied the same in "Kuanyü jokan lishih went'i ti chüehi" [Resolution on some historical problems] in *Mao Tse-tung hsüanchi* (Peking 1964), III, 955-1002, and in *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* (Peking 1965), III, 177-225.

[30] Wang, II, 520. Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank (p. 38), and Robert North (p. 164) quoting Chang Kuo-t'ao, say that Chang Wen-t'ien replaced Ch'in Pang-hsien at this plenum. See Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, *A Documentary History of Chinese Communism* (Cambridge, Mass. 1952) and Robert C. North, *Moscow and Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 2nd ed. 1963). The evidence available to me convinces me that this did not occur until the Tsunyi Conference a year later.

[31] Kuo, in *FCYP*, July 1967, 106, and *IS*, October 1967, 38. The Standing Committee

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Mao lost influence even in the government, the least important of the three hierarchies. On February 3, 1934, during the Second All-China Soviet Congress, held in Juichin, he was re-elected as chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, but he was replaced by Chang Wen-t'ien, a Bolshevik, as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.[32] Moreover, when Mao had been elected as chairman of the Central Executive Committee at the First All-China Soviet Congress, he had had to share his governmental powers only with his two vice-chairmen, Chang Kuo-t'ao and Hsiang Ying. Now, in addition to the same two men, fourteen other men, composing a so-called Presidium (*chuhsi-t'uan*), were elected as "the supreme organ of political power."[33]

During the fateful months of summer and early fall of 1934, when the central government's fifth encirclement campaign inexorably tightened the noose around the Central Soviet Area, Mao Tse-tung appeared to be removed from positions where the decision had to be made to try to escape the closing trap. According to Kung Ch'u, the chief of staff of the Central Military District, and Chang Kuo-t'ao, in consequence of Mao's alleged opposition to the Party's denunciation of the rebellion in Fukien, he was put on probation as a Party member by an order from Moscow. Kung says that Mao was denied access to all Party meetings and that he did not take part in the decision on October 2 to abandon the Central Soviet Area and to begin what became known as the Long March. Chang believes that Mao had been deprived of virtually all authority on the eve of the Long March.[34]

We do not have conclusive proof that Kung's and Chang's assertions are correct, but there is indirect evidence that they might be. It is known that for some time during that summer, Mao was not even in Juichin, where all important organizations were located and where all top decisions were made. Ch'uan Lien-chang says in his article "Mao chuhsi tsai Yütu" [Chairman Mao in Yütu] that Mao suffered from malaria and spent some time in September in Yütu, a town some fifty miles west of Juichin.[35] Another Communist source says that Mao was in Yütu during the summer of 1934, that he left for Kaopinao

of the Political Bureau consisted of Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yün, ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, and Hsiang Ying. Kuo, *ibid.*

[32] "Chung-hua suweiai kunghokuo chungyang chihhsing weiyüanhui pukao, ti-i-hao" [Proclamation of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, No. 1], cited in Hsiao, I, 280-81 and II, 762.

[33] *Hung-se Chunghua*, No. 148 (February 12, 1934), cited by Kuo in *FCYP*, July 1967, 114 and *IS*, October 1967, 52.

[34] Hsiao, I, 296-97.

[35] *Hung-ch'i p'iao-p'iao* [The Red Flag Flutters] (Peking 1959), x, 3.

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near Juichin, "where he was very busy, calling meetings of the responsible cadres in the localities he visited or making investigations in the villages," that he returned to Yütu at the end of September, and that he then departed from there on the Long March on October 10.[36]

A different version was told to Nym Wales in 1937 by Hsü Meng-ch'iu, who said that Mao went briefly, presumably in late September, to Juichin, where he participated in the decision to evacuate the Central Soviet Area. According to Hsü, the decision was reached by some military council composed of Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Mao Tse-tung, Wang Chia-hsiang, and the Comintern military adviser Li Te.[37] This council, probably constituted *ad hoc*, was not the same as the Party's Revolutionary Military Committee, sometimes translated as Council.

In the light of the failure of two publications that unreservedly praise Mao to mention his alleged role in the decision of October 2, 1934, I find Hsü's assertion unconvincing.[38] At any rate, even if we assume that Mao had attended that meeting, his influence within the leadership would have been small. Had Mao actually been permitted to attend the meeting, it would have been solely by virtue of his titular chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic. On the eve of the Long March, all decisive political military positions were occupied by other leaders. They were:

Chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Committee:	Chou En-lai
Director of the National Political Protection Office:	Teng Fa
First Front Army:	
Commander	Chu Te
Political Commissar	Chou En-lai
Chief of Staff	Liu Po-ch'eng (formerly Yeh Chien-ying)
Director of Political Department	Wang Chia-hsiang
Central Military District:	
Commander	Hsiang Ying

[36] Ch'en Chang-feng, *On The Long March With Chairman Mao* (Peking 1959), 19.
[37] Nym Wales, *Red Dust: Autobiographies of Chinese Communists* (Stanford 1952), 67.
[38] Hsü Meng-ch'iu was one of the Bolsheviks who by 1937 had lost much of their former influence. By telling an unsuspecting interviewer that Mao took part in the decision, he may have been trying to ingratiate himself with Mao.

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Political Commissar	Hsiang Ying
Chief of Staff	Kung Ch'u
Director of Political Department	Ch'en I
Director of Branch Office of the National Political Protection Office	T'an Chen-lin[39]

In sum, Mao was not a member of the political leadership, which was in the hands of the Bolsheviks, nor of the military leadership. Moreover, although he nominally retained the chairmanship of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, that post actually ceased to exist when the Communists abandoned the Central Soviet Area. As far as we know, no change in the political and military leadership took place until the Tsunyi Conference in January of 1935.

The Long Marches

After the First Front Army occupied Tsunyi on January 5, 1935, the Central Committee convened an enlarged conference of the Political Bureau on January 6 through 8. The standard post-1949 Communist interpretation of the Tsunyi Conference, as expressed by Ho Kan-chih, has been that "the 'Left' opportunists were removed from their leading positions and a new Party leadership headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was established." Like many China specialists, the Communists see the Tsunyi Conference as the turning point in the history of the Communist Party, or, as Ho put it, "the beginning of a new leadership in the Central Committee headed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung was a change of paramount historical importance in the Party."[40]

The known facts do not support such a sweeping assertion. Two cardinal points must be considered: the participants and the decisions of the conference. Perhaps twenty leaders participated, of whom seventeen have been identified by Kuo Hua-lun. They are said to be Chang Wen-t'ien (Lo Fu), Ch'en Yün, general secretary Ch'in Pang-hsien (Po Ku), Chou En-lai, Chu Te, Ho K'o-ch'üan (K'ai Feng) Li Fu-ch'un, Li Wei-han (Lo Mai), Lin Piao, Liu Po-ch'eng, Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao Tse-tung, Nieh Jung-chen, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Fa, Wang Shou-tao, and Yang Shang-k'un.[41] Although this is the most extensive avail-

[39] Wang, II, 622; Hsüeh Yüeh, *Chiao-fei chishih* [Record of Encircling the Communists] (Taipei 1962), table between pages 14 and 15; Kung Ch'u, *Wo yü Hung-chün* [The Red Army and I] (Hong Kong 1954), 405-6.

[40] Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking 1959), 265.

[41] Kuo, in *FCYP*, September 1967, 99, and in *IS*, January 1968, 44. Also present at the conference was the Comintern adviser Li Te (Otto Braun, alias Albert and Wagner)

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able list of the participants at the Tsunyi Conference, it is admittedly not complete, and possibly not free from error. A second difficulty is created by the absence of any complete roster of members of the Political Bureau.[42] To the best of my knowledge, there were about thirteen members.

Of those whom Kuo identified as participants at Tsunyi, seven were probably Political Bureau members: Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Yün, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Li Wei-han, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Li Fu-ch'un.[43] Nine of the other ten identified men were important leaders in the Party and the military, and the only participant who held no leading posts in the Party or the military was Mao Tse-tung.[44] It may be speculated, therefore, that his inclusion in the deliberations at Tsunyi was based on his by then purely nominal chairmanship of the defunct Chinese Soviet Republic and, possibly, on an invitation by one or more Political Bureau members.

What is of equal significance, however, is that fourteen other leaders, equal in importance to those cited above and including five probable members of the Political Bureau, did not participate in that conference, whose purpose was to discuss strategy and other military subjects.[45] There is no evidence to suggest that the general political line was placed on the agenda. Ch'in Pang-hsien presided over the conference,

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and Wu Hsiu-ch'üan, his interpreter. See "Irrefutable evidence of crime of Wu Hsiu-ch'üan's betrayal of the Party and the country," *Hung-wei Chan-pao*, April 13, 1967; translated in U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, *Survey of China Mainland Press*, No. 4007 (August 23, 1967), 4.

[42] Although Hatano lists eleven members in one of his charts, I am inclined to think that membership in the Political Bureau at that time is not precisely known. See Hatano, v, chart at end of volume.

[43] Kuo may be in error when he lists the last three men as either members or alternate members of the Central Committee. Kuo, *ibid.* Ch'en, in "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," 19, says that "Liu Shao-ch'i *by all accounts* did not take part in the Long March." (Italics added.) I can think offhand of one source that states that Liu did take part: Chingkangshan Fighting Corps of the Fourth Hospital, Peking, "A Chronicle of Events in the Life of Liu Shao-ch'i" (May 1967), translated in U.S. Consulate-General, Hong Kong, *Current Background*, No. 834 (August 17, 1967), 3. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence, we must assume that this source is as reliable or unreliable as other sources. The crux of my argument rests with the highly unstable situation at Tsunyi. Leaders came and went throughout their stay in the Tsunyi area; hence it is probable that different lists of participants may all be partly right, depending on when the various eyewitnesses were at or near the conference site.

[44] They were: Chu Te, Liu Po-ch'eng, Ho K'o-ch'üan, P'eng Te-huai, Yank Shang-k'un, Lin Piao, Nieh Jung-chen, Wang Shou-t'ao, Li Wei-han, and Teng Fa.

[45] The Political Bureau members were Ch'en Shao-yü (Wang Ming), Chang Kuo-t'ao, Jen Pi-shih, Hsiang Ying, and Wang Chia-hsiang. Three important leaders who were with the First Front Army but are not known to have attended the conference were Yeh Chien-ying, Tung Chen-t'ang, and Lo P'ing-hui; and six who unquestionably did not participate were Ho Lung, Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, Hsiao K'o, Wang Chen, Ch'en I, and Kung Ch'u.

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and Chou En-lai, P'eng Te-huai, Mao Tse-tung, and Liu Shao-ch'i and perhaps other leaders presented reports. Chou, in his capacity as chairman of the Military Affairs Committee, read the military report and three other speakers criticized various aspects of past military strategy. P'eng, commander of the Third Army Corps, denounced wholesale evacuation, desertion, and slow movement, which he blamed for the heavy casualties suffered by the Communists since their exodus from the Central Soviet Area in October of 1934. Mao criticized the defensive strategy during the fifth encirclement campaign against the Central Soviet Area. Liu, the director of the Party's trade union department, complained about "Left adventurism," which he said emerged after the fourth plenum of the Political Bureau in January of 1931 and caused the virtual disintegration of Party organizations in the "White" areas, i.e., anywhere except in the few Communist base areas.[46] It is important to note that Liu Shao-ch'i did not support Mao's argument but rather seemed to speak his mind as an individual leader about what he considered had been serious errors in the Party's policies.

In the ensuing debate, the Party's political line apparently also came under attack. It was, however, ably defended by general secretary Ch'in Pang-hsien and its resolutions were reaffirmed by the conference. There is insufficient evidence for a well-defined and cohesive faction commanded by Mao, and it is therefore misleading to speak, as Professor Rue does, of a Maoist group. Individual leaders seemed to be attempting to induce their co-equal comrades to support them in the formal vote at the end of the conference. They did not succeed, as is evidenced by the compromise offered by Chang Wen-t'ien. He supported general secretary Ch'in by approving of the Party's general political line, but he blamed him, Chou En-lai, and Li Te for the defensive strategy during the fifth encirclement campaign and thus implicitly agreed with the criticisms raised by P'eng and Mao.

Chang Wen-t'ien's middle position won out. The conference adopted a document entitled "Chungyang chengchih chü k'uangta huiyi chüehyi: chient'ao Po Ku, Chou En-lai, Li Te t'ungchih chünshih luhsien ti ts'owu" ["Resolutions of the Enlarged Conference of the Central Political Bureau: A review of the errors in the military line of Comrades Po Ku, Chou En-lai, and Li Te"]. I summarize the major resolutions, as recollected by one of the conferees.[47]

[46] Wei K'o-wei (Carl Wei), "Tsunyi huiyi lishih chenhsiang (hsia)," [The truth about the Tsunyi Conference (Part II)], in *FCYP*, November 1968, 113, and *IS*, February 1969, 24.

[47] Kuo, in *FCYP*, September 1967, 100-01, and *IS*, January 1968, 45-47. Kuo's inform-

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The danger of China's becoming a Japanese colony was increasing because the Kuomintang prevented the Communists from moving northward to fight the Japanese. Proof of this was the fifth encirclement campaign against the Communists and their ouster from the Central Soviet Area. Since the Fourth Plenum of the Political Bureau in January of 1931, the Party had, with Comintern help, steered a correct path and had avoided factional splits within its ranks. On the other hand, the military line during the fifth encirclement campaign contained serious errors. The principle of not yielding territory placed the Communist troops in a conservative and passive attitude. This attitude expressed itself in unwillingness to abandon certain Soviet pockets, to lure the central government troops deep into Soviet territories, and to launch counterattacks into territories held by the central government. The Communists suffered heavy casualties because of this erroneous military strategy. During the evacuation of the Central Soviet Area, political mobilization was given up under the pretext of preserving military secrets and this lowered the morale of the troops. Moreover, the transport of heavy equipment, printing presses, and the like, slowed down the troops and led to further heavy losses at the hands of the pursuing central government troops. After reviewing and correcting the erroneous military line of "simple defense and desertionism," the Party should be able to display its fine tradition in mobile warfare in order to fight for achieving tasks currently confronting it.

The conference decided to continue the northward march across the Yangtze River for the purpose of joining with the Fourth Front Army commanded by Chang Kuo-t'ao. Divisions were abolished, and officers were sent down to regiments and companies to strengthen their combat efficiency.

The conference also decided to reorganize the Party's Central Committee and Military Affairs Committee. Chang Wen-t'ien, who had induced the conferees to adopt his compromise resolutions, emerged as the leader of the Party by replacing Ch'in Pang-hsien as the general secretary. Ch'in was appointed as director of the General Political Department of the Red Army, with Li Wei-han (Lo Mai) as director of its organization section and Ho K'o-ch'üan as director of its propaganda section. Ch'en Yün, the director of the White Areas work committee who had defended Li Te, was ordered to go to Moscow to inform the Com-

ant, Ch'en Jan, was the director of the central personnel corps for local work in P'eng Te-huai's Third Corps during the Tsunyi Conference. He went under the pseudonym of Kuo Chien.

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intern of the Tsunyi Conference and to obtain its approval of the resolutions. His place was taken by P'an Han-nien, who was instructed to establish liaison centers in Hong Kong and Shanghai.

Most important for this study's objective, Mao Tse-tung replaced Chou En-lai as chairman of the Party's Military Affairs Committee. Mao also became a member of the Political Bureau and of its Standing Committee, where he replaced Hsiang Ying, who had been left behind in the abandoned Central Soviet Area.[48] These two appointments were major gains for Mao, but they were the only gains that we can safely say he had actually won at Tsunyi. The information is based on recollections by Ch'en Jan, one of the participants of the conference and, in my judgment, is more reliable than the interpretations given by many China specialists because, as shown below, they are based either on no sources at all or on exceedingly vague sources. It is possible, of course, that Ch'en's recollections are faulty or that the information given by him and presented by Kuo Hua-lun is wrong in any number of respects. But only total fabrication, which in my opinion is improbable, would make Ch'en's information less useful and reliable than the sources relied upon by some China specialists.

A few representative samples of interpretations of the Tsunyi Conference must suffice. John Rue and Stuart Schram assert, without offering any evidence, that Mao became the chairman of the Political Bureau. Schram adds that this post was newly created at the Tsunyi Conference.[49] Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank go still farther and say that "Mao formally assumes Party leadership as Chairman of [Central Committee] and Politburo."[50] Like Rue and Schram, they offer no evidence to back up their interpretation. Hsiao, Lewis, and Swarup make only some vague and uncorroborated remarks, such as "Mao got the upper hand of Ch'in [Pang-hsien] and achieved control of the Party" (Hsiao), "Mao became party leader" (Lewis), and "the decision of the Tsunyi Conference [elevated] Mao to top leadership" (Swarup).[51] As noted earlier, John Lindbeck says that Mao became the "undisputed leader" and Samuel Griffith says that he attained an "unchallengeable position."[52] Griffith also demonstrates conclusively that the image of a quasi-collective leadership is not weakened by the absence of supporting evidence, for he remarks in the very next sen-

[48] Kuo, in *FCYP*, September 1967, 101, and *IS*, January 1968, 47-48.
[49] Rue, 270; Stuart Schram, *Mao Tse-tung* (Baltimore 1966), 182.
[50] Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 38.
[51] Hsiao, 159; Shanti Swarup, *A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-1934* (Oxford 1966), 257; Lewis, 22.
[52] Treadgold, 78; Griffith, 51.

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tence that "to this day, no one outside the tight circle at the top of the Party knows precisely what went on behind closed doors at Tsunyi."[53]

The only China specialist who makes an effort to back up his statement that Mao became the chairman of the Political Bureau is Jerome Ch'en,[54] who cites five sources for supporting evidence. Unfortunately, one of his sources is not available to me at present, but the other four do not support his assertion. One is Mrs. Helen Foster Snow, who remarks *en passant* that "Mao achieved power."[55] A second source Ch'en relies heavily on in his work is Ku Kuan-chiao's polemic against the Chinese Communists, in which Ku remarks that Mao made Chang Wen-t'ien his "puppet" (*k'uei lei*).[56] These two sources require no further consideration. A third, Ho Kan-chih, merely says that the conference "established Comrade Mao Tse-tung's position as leader of the whole Party."[57] The fourth source, Liu Po-ch'eng, declares that "this conference . . . began a new leadership with Comrade Mao Tse-tung as the head of the [Party] Central."[58] As in the case of the decision to evacuate the Central Soviet Area, the available sources lend no credibility to the opinion, presented as a statement of fact, that Mao Tse-tung became the chairman of the Political Bureau. Ho Kan-chih's book and Liu Po-ch'eng's reminiscences fully reflect the intense exaltation of Mao that characterized the period during which they were published. They could therefore be expected to mention Mao's promotion to the chairmanship of the Political Bureau, had he indeed been promoted at Tsunyi. But they do not; instead they indulge in what appears to be deliberately vague language such as "leader of the whole Party" and "head of the Central," neither of which terms, needless to say, refers to an actual position in the Party.

In sum, two men clearly gained strength during the Tsunyi Conference: Chang Wen-t'ien and Mao Tse-tung. Both men had their views adopted by their peers and both men were promoted in their Party positions. For Chang, it was to the highest post in the Party; for Mao,

[53] Griffith, 51.
[54] Ch'en, 189.
[55] Nym Wales, 14.
[56] Ku Kuan-chiao, *San-shih nien lai ti Chungkung* [Thirty Years of the Chinese Communists] (Hong Kong 1955), 77-78. In his "Resolutions of the Tsunyi Conference," 20, Ch'en repudiates Ku's remark but does not mention his earlier heavy reliance on Ku. But if Ch'en drops Ku as supporting evidence, he is not inclined to reconsider his basic claim, for on p. 36 he refers matter-of-factly to "the election of Mao to the chairmanship of the Politburo" at Tsunyi.
[57] Ho Kan-chih, *A History of the Modern Chinese Revolution* (Peking 1960), 265. Ch'en incorrectly cites pages 260-70.
[58] Liu Po-ch'eng, "Huiku ch'ang-cheng" [Reminiscing about the Long March], *Hsing-huo liao-yüan* [A Single Spark Starts a Prairie Fire] (Peking 1960), 5.

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a return to the Political Bureau from which he had been removed in 1927. Of the two positions to which Mao was elected, the chairmanship of the Military Affairs Committee was probably the more important for the duration of the Long March. It gave him a vantage point from which he could decisively influence the strategic and tactical decisions of at least one body of Communist troops, the First Front Army.

In the broadest sense, the principal outcome of the Tsunyi Conference does not seem to have been the personal victory of Mao over his rivals. Rather, the chief significance of that conference was the ascendancy of a military frame of mind within the Party leadership. The great hardships of the Long March demanded of the Chinese Communists a degree of attention to military matters to which the old leadership, ensconced in the cities of China until 1931, had never been obligated. Mao had always had a penchant for military matters. The man whose lifelong motto has been "Power grows out of the barrel of a gun" was in many respects the most appropriate agent for the victory of the military frame of mind at Tsunyi. This view does not imply, of course, that Mao was somehow the passive tool of impersonal historical forces: he had, after all, made patient and persistent preparations for his comeback to the higher levels of Party leadership. This view, however, does stress the conjunction at the time of the Tsunyi Conference of Mao's own efforts and of the environmental forces that impinged upon a party fighting for survival.

If the military exigencies of the Long March enabled Mao Tse-tung to rise once again to the higher levels of the Party leadership, they also placed sharp limitations on his ability to attain an undisputed and unchallengeable position in the entire Party. Latter-day statements to this effect seem to overlook Chang Wen-t'ien, the new general secretary of the Party, who was with the First Front Army. Even if Mao had been able, thanks to his position of chairman of the Military Affairs Committee and to the military nature of the Long March, to assert his authority on military matters, Chang's influence in political matters was not likely to have vanished overnight.[59]

Moreover, Mao could not have acquired supreme political power over the entire Party for the basic reason that many wielders of politico-military power in the Party were not with the First Front Army but elsewhere. The Central Soviet Area, which the central government

[59] In their efforts to discount Chang Wen-t'ien's importance, some China specialists resort to imprecise language. Stuart Schram, for example, says that although Chang became the new general secretary of the Party, "henceforth *the real power* belonged to Mao." Schram, 182. (Italics added).

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had forced the First Front Army under Chu, Mao, Chou, and others to abandon, was one of about fifteen Communist base areas. Two of them, the Western Hunan-Hupei (Hsiang-O-Hsi) and Hupei-Honan-Anhui (O-Yü-Wan), were especially important. Their large military forces were second only to those in the Central Soviet Area.

The Western Hunan-Hupei base area was controlled by the Second Front Army under the command of Ho Lung. It started its own Long March on November 19, 1935, more than a year later than the First Front Army, which it never met until most Communist troops concentrated in Northern Shensi in early 1937. Composed of five divisions, the Second Front Army consisted of some 20,000 troops in November of 1935. After much hard fighting, the Second Front Army met with the Fourth Front Army near Kantze in Sikang in June of 1936.[60]

The Fourth Front Army, under Chang Kuo-t'ao, was extremely important both for its much larger size and for its leader's opposition to Mao Tse-tung. Originally stationed in the Hupei-Honan-Anhui base area, where its troop strength was said to be around 20,000,[61] it started out on its Long March in December of 1932 and moved to the border between Szechuan and Shensi, where it rested and greatly enlarged its troop strength. By early spring of 1934, Chang Kuo-t'ao's Fourth Front Army had firm control over a sufficiently large area, with an estimated population of nine million, to establish a "Szechuan-Shensi Soviet Area" with Chang Kuo-t'ao as Chairman. He also presided over a newly created Northwest Revolutionary Military Committee (*Hsipei koming chünshih weiyüanhui*). In order to facilitate the First Front Army's northward march from Tsunyi, the Fourth Front Army left its Szechuan-Shensi base in March of 1935 and moved westward. It is said to have had about 80,000 troops at that time.[62]

Reduced to about 70,000 troops as a result of heavy fighting but again fully rested and well-armed, the Fourth Front Army met the First Front Army at Moukung in Northern Szechuan on June 16, 1935.[63] The First Front Army had lost much of its strength, its original

[60] *Chungkuo kung-nung hung-chün ti-i fangmien chün ch'ang-cheng chi* [A Record of the Long March of the First Front Army of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] (Peking 1958), 464-65 (hereafter cited as *Chungkuo kung-nung*). Ch'en's unsubstantiated claim that the two armies met in May is probably incorrect (p. 386).

[61] "Ch'uan-Shen Su-ch'ü yü hung-ssu fangmien chün ti chingjen shengli" [The Szechuan-Shensi Soviet area and the Red Fourth Front Army's smashing victories], *Toucheng*, LXIV (February 21, 1934), cited by Kuo in *FCYP*, November 1967, 108, and in *IS*, March 1968, 38.

[62] *Chungkuo kung-nung*, 461.

[63] *Ibid.*, 435. Ch'en, quoting Agnes Smedley and Edgar Snow, says that the Fourth Front Army had only 50,000 troops at the time of juncture (Ch'en, 193).

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90,000 troops having been reduced to about 35,000 exhausted, starved, ill-clad, and poorly armed troops.

The leaders of the two front armies convened a Political Bureau conference at nearby Lianghok'ou on June 25. Mao and others argued for joining in a "Long March" northward to Northern Shensi, where Hsü Hai-tung and Kao Kang had established a base area, for the ostensible purpose of fighting against the Japanese. Chang Kuo-t'ao, on the other hand, thought that this strategy was unrealistic in view of the greatly weakened strength of the Communists. He suggested instead that the Communists should remain in Sikang and Szechuan and later establish contact, for possible aid, with the Soviet Union through Sinkiang. Chang may have felt that whatever influence Mao had achieved in the First Front Army as a result of the Tsunyi Conference must not spread to his own army. After all, Chang had been Mao's senior in the Party before the Tsunyi Conference, which he, Chang, had not attended; and, most important, his 70,000 troops were superior to Mao's in both numerical and physical strength. Neither Chang nor, in all probability, any of the participants except Mao thought that Mao was, in Jerome Ch'en's words, "the leader of the party whom Chang had to obey."[64]

The conference ended in a stalemate and, upon the suggestion of Chu Te, who acted as mediator, the two armies decided to rest. They moved on to Maoerhkai and rested there from July 10 through 29.[65] During this time, the Party leadership held another conference to resolve the deadlock reached earlier at Lianghok'ou.

The conferees at Maoerhkai once again failed to agree on a common strategy but they did effect a compromise of sorts. The two front armies were divided so that two columns, east and west, might be formed out of elements of both armies. Mao Tse-tung was to command the eastern column, composed of his own First and Third Army Corps and of the Fourth Front Army's Fourth and Thirtieth Armies. Chang Kuo-t'ao was to command the western column composed of his own Thirty-first and Thirty-second Armies and of the First Front Army's Fifth and Ninth Corps. The two columns were roughly equal in numerical strength, but Chang had a clear edge over Mao. First, virtually the entire Red Army headquarters, including commander in chief Chu Te, was attached to his column. Second, soon after Mao's column resumed its northern march, one of its units, the Thirtieth Army, under Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien, lost its way and had to return to Maoerhkai where it added to the strength of Chang Kuo-t'ao's column. How deep the divi-

[64] Ch'en, 193.

[65] *Chungkuo kung-nung*, 436.

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sion between Chang and Mao had become was shown by the creation by Chang of a rival Central Committee with himself as its head.[66]

It is incontrovertible, therefore, that as long as he was on the Long March, Mao Tse-tung had not been able to assume the position of supreme leadership of the Party that latter-day Chinese and Western interpretations give him. It is also true, however, that Chang Kuo-t'ao, his most serious rival, was soon to see his military power decimated by central government troops. After moving southward from Maoerh-kai, his column suffered heavy casualties in its attempt to establish a viable base in Sikang. After they joined at Kantze, the Second and Fourth Front Armies decided to move northward in the direction of Shensi, where Mao's First Front Army had arrived in November of 1935. But when they met with elements of that army at Huining in October of 1936, Chang Kuo-t'ao decided not to proceed to Northern Shensi but to move westward in the direction of the Kansu Corridor and Sinkiang.[67] For this purpose, he regrouped most of his troops into a so-called Western Route Army (*Hsi-lu chün*) comprising about 22,500 men.[68] Only 700 survivors actually reached Urumchi.[69] Along with a handful of them, he went to the Northern Shensi base area. His chief bargaining power thus lost, Chang was brought to trial in January of 1937 and ordered to "study" until he had purged himself of his "incorrect" ideas. In plain operational terms, the trial meant the end of Chang Kuo-t'ao as an active member of the Party leadership. A short time later, on April 4, 1938, he left Yenan, and while in Wuhan he went over to the Kuomintang on April 17. He was then formally stripped of his Party positions and of his Party membership.[70] One small consequence of Chang's trial deserves mention. In early April of 1937, about one hundred of Chang's officers who had been attending K'ang Ta (*K'ang-Jih chün-cheng tahsüeh*—Anti-Japanese Military-Political College) in Yenan, were said to be attempting a revolt. They were arrested but released soon after the war against Japan broke out.[71] Although difficult to verify, the report rings true because it is similar to other, verifiable incidents that demonstrate that personal loyalty to one's commander is sometimes stronger than loyalty to more distant superiors. As re-

[66] Liu Po-ch'eng, "Huiku ch'ang-cheng" [Reminiscing about the Long March], *Hsing-huo liao-yüan*, III, 12.

[67] *Chungkuo kung-nung*, 466.

[68] Kuo, in *FCYP*, March 1968, 115, and *IS*, July 1968, 46.

[69] See Li T'ien-huan, "Tsou-ch'u Ch'ilien shan" [Marching out of the Ch'ilien mountains], *Hsing-huo liao-yüan*, III, 442.

[70] *Hsin-Hua Jihpao*, April 20, 1938; cited by Kuo, in *FCYP*, November 1968, 101, and *IS*, February 1969, 32.

[71] Kuo, in *FCYP*, April 1968, 108, and *IS*, August 1968, 46-47.

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cently as 1967, during the cultural revolution, this characteristic feature of a traditional society could still be observed.

Respite in Northern Shensi

Soon after Mao eliminated Chang Kuo-t'ao, another potential rival returned to China on a Soviet plane from Moscow. Ch'en Shao-yü, one of the Bolsheviks, had been in Moscow since the early thirties as the representative of the Chinese Communist Party and as a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.[72] Given his high positions and his obviously close relations with leaders of the Soviet Communist Party, Ch'en might have been able to wrest supreme leadership of the Party in the Northern Shensi area from Mao. But he did not.

The Political Bureau held a conference on December 9 through 13, 1937, said to have been the largest since the Fifth Plenum in January of 1934, for the purpose of working out a strategy against the Japanese and of making preparations for the Seventh Party Congress.[73] The conference also elected a new leadership. Mao's growing influence was evident. As the position of general secretary was abolished, Chang Wen-t'ien was reduced to being one of nine members of the newly formed Central Secretariat. The other eight members were Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'en Yün, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chu Te, K'ang Sheng, and Mao Tse-tung.

In July of 1938, the central government sponsored a People's Political Council in Hankow to which the Communists were invited to send delegates. Ch'en Shao-yü was one of the seven leaders who went to Hankow.[74] The other six leaders were Ch'in Pang-hsien, Tung Pi-wu, Chou En-lai, Lin Po-ch'ü, Teng Ying-ch'ao (Mrs. Chou En-lai), and Wu Yü-chang. The six were concurrently the leaders of the Party's newly-established Yangtze Bureau.[75] Ch'en later returned to Yenan when Hankow was abandoned to the Japanese.

Thus, during several crucial months, Mao's attempt to enhance his own influence within the Party leadership was aided by the temporary absence of Ch'en Shao-yü, potentially his most dangerous rival, and

[72] Kuo, in *FCYP*, August 1968, 86, and *IS*, November 1968, 35. Ch'en arrived in Yenan during the last days of October, 1937.

[73] The congress would not be held until more than seven years later.

[74] *Who's Who*, 79.

[75] *The China Weekly Review*, Vol. 75 (July 16, 1938), 238. This source was brought to my attention by Donald Klein. See also *Who's Who*, 139, 553-54, 587, and 653. Unlike the other six delegates, Chou En-lai was already in Hankow as the CCP representative with the central government. Kuo appears to be in error when, in *FCYP*, September 1968, 119, and *IS*, December 1968, 40-41, he lists Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Ho K'o-ch'üan, Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Teng Ying-ch'ao, and Li K'o-nung.

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two others, Chou En-lai, and Ch'in Pang-hsien, from the Central Secretariat. Of the five remaining members, Chang Wen-t'ien had just been reduced in standing, and Chang Kuo-t'ao had been reprimanded.

The historical accident by which Mao was the first of the Long Marchers to reach the Northern Shensi base area and Chang Kuo-t'ao's armies were decimated also helped bolster his prestige in Northern Shensi. He also had now the advantage of having the largest number of troops under him. Perhaps of most help to Mao was the fairly peaceful and compact nature of the Northern Shensi base area. Shortly after the Sian Incident in December of 1936, the central government ended its harassment campaigns against the Communists, and one of the consequences of this shift in policy was the lessening in importance of military matters, and hence of military officers, and the corresponding importance of primarily political matters. Put differently, within the Communist movement, the Party and Party affairs once again were of primary importance. This allowed Mao to apply his very considerable powers of persuasion to other members of the Party leadership without having to defer to the wishes of military commanders. The compactness of the Northern Shensi base area provided for frequent face-to-face contacts among the leaders, an opportunity that had not existed since at least the days of Kiangsi.

The record shows that through astute personal diplomacy and an acute sense of the politically feasible, Mao managed to have his ideas translated into policy. The most crucial question for the Communists in this relatively peaceful period was their relationship with the Kuomintang. Even before the Sian Incident, which gave the Communists the much-sought-after national attention and apparently a promise from the kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek of cooperation against the Japanese, Mao Tse-tung began to counsel a second United Front with the Kuomintang. Considering the harrowing ordeal the Long March veterans had just gone through, it was remarkable that Mao was able to enlist the support of most Party leaders for his policy suggestion. Those who did not agree, principally Ch'en Shao-yü, argued that the "bloc-within" policy of the first United Front should be adopted, on the grounds that the Kuomintang was incomparably stronger than the Communists and that it should, therefore, be given supreme command over all forces fighting the Japanese. Mao's proposed policy of a "bloc without" prevailed, and the majority of Party leadership agreed with Mao that the Communists should retain sole control over their troops while cooperating with the Kuomintang in a loose alliance. Ch'en Shao-yü was

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reprimanded and apparently lost whatever hopes he may have had of dislodging Mao from the supreme position within the Northern Shensi base area.

A final factor in Mao's rise that needs to be mentioned was his growing reputation as a writer of policy papers. In the same month in which the Sian Incident broke out, Mao wrote his "Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War," which was the first extensive program for resisting Japanese encroachments in Northern China. When full-fledged hostilities broke out in July of 1937, Mao redoubled his literary efforts. Safely ensconced in his cave apartment in Yenan, Mao devoted much of his time during the eight years of war to writing. Much of his published work provided the Communists with a broad perspective in which their efforts were convincingly related to the total setting of the war against Japan. This major contribution to the war effort was undoubtedly appreciated by many Communists and helped raise Mao's influence within the party leadership.

It may well be argued, therefore, that Mao's influence, which, as we have seen, had risen appreciably during the interlude between the Long March and the war against Japan, continued to rise during the war to a degree comparable to that enjoyed by Stalin within the Soviet Communist Party. The available evidence does not support this assumption; on the contrary, it encourages an opposite thesis.

The War Against Japan

The renewed entente with the central government and the war against Japan helped the Party to regain national prominence and may also have averted, as some Chinese specialists contend, the destruction of the Northern Shensi base area by government troops. But the war also imposed tremendous strains on Party unity and, more important for this study, molded relationships within the leadership that remained basically intact until the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late sixties.

Both conditions were brought about by the Communist leadership's decision to send most of its troops behind Japanese lines to establish base areas, to engage the people in the war, and to conduct guerrilla operations. Toward the end of the war, there were fourteen major base areas besides the Northern Shensi base area where Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central remained throughout the war. They were Shansi-Chahar-Hopei, Shansi-Suiyüan, Shansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung, Shantung, North Kiangsi, Central Kiangsu, South Kiangsu, North Huai,

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South Huai, Central Anhui, East Chekiang, Hupei-Honan-Anhui, Tung Chiang (the East River in Kwangtung), and Ch'iung Yai (the mountainous area on Hainan Island).[76]

The rapid proliferation of these base areas, each having its own government and mass organizations, demanded an equally rapid increase in the size of Party membership, which had become wholly insufficient for the task of supervising the Party's vastly expanded activities. This need as well as the strong demand for membership by people of all walks of life in these base areas resulted in the relaxation of standards of admission. With a nod to Marxist class analysis, the Party decreed that the probation period for workers and hired farm hands be completely eliminated, that for poor peasants and handicraftsmen it be one month, for revolutionary students, intellectuals, minor civil servants and white-collar workers, middle peasants, revolutionary soldiers three months, and for all others six months.[77] As a result, the Party grew from about 40,000 at the beginning of the war to several hundreds of thousands in the first few years of the forties and continued to climb to 1,200,000 at the end of the war. Lacking sufficient discipline, many of the new Party members engaged in activities that threatened to tear the Party apart. Liu Shao-ch'i, in his essay *Lun tang-nei toucheng* [*On the Intra-Party Struggle*] of 1941, complained that Party members tended "to engage in the intra-Party struggle unscrupulously or without observing organizational procedures, to befriend or attack comrades in an unprincipled way, provoking dissension, betraying or secretly scheming against comrades, or not speaking to a man's face, but speaking wildly behind his back, irresponsibly criticizing the Party, spreading unfounded opinions, circulating rumors, telling lies, and calumniating others."[78] The problem was compounded by the increasing isolation of base areas from one another. Although individuals could and did come and go from base areas, the Japanese blockades became increasingly effective.

The danger of ill-disciplined members' undermining Party cohesiveness was viewed with alarm by all members of the leadership. During the two-year *cheng-feng* campaign, formally started in February of 1942, intensive training was introduced in all base areas, and unsuitable members were dismissed. In the headquarters base area in Northern Shensi, Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central established several schools

[76] Jenmin ch'upanshe, *K'ang-Jih chancheng shihch'i chiehfang ch'ü kaik'uang* [A Sketch of Liberated Areas During the War Against Japan] (Peking 1953), Map 1.

[77] Ch'en Yün, "How to be a good Communist Party member" (May 30, 1939), in Boyd Compton, *Mao's China: Party Reform Documents, 1942-44* (Seattle 1952), 96-97.

[78] Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 367.

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designed to inculcate a common outlook and discipline among Party members and other cadres.[79]

The *cheng-feng* campaign, as carried out by Mao Tse-tung himself in the Party's headquarters base area in Northern Shensi, had a second purpose. Mao wanted, in Stuart Schram's words, "to give to the ideological consciousness of party members a special and characteristic quality directly inspired by Mao Tse-tung himself."[80] One result was the beginning of veneration for Mao in the North Shensi base area. I do not think that personal vanity played a role in it, as some specialists believe, but even if it did, it probably was secondary to Mao's concern with the problem of decentralization of decision-making within the Party leadership.

As the various base areas became increasingly isolated from one another, much decision-making power had to be exercised by their politico-military leaders. Although radio contact and, to a much lesser extent, courier contact were maintained with the Party Central in Northern Shensi, these regional Party leaders had necessarily assumed wide powers of discretion. One consequence was the shifting of the initiative from Northern Shensi to the outer base areas. Forced by a harsh situation that did not allow leaders of these base areas to wait for detailed instructions from the Party Central, the regional leaders continually experimented with new institutions and functions of political and social control in the outer base areas. These new programs determined general policy directives from the Party Central rather than the other way around. Time and again, the leaders of the outer base areas took the initiative, and Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central had little choice but to sanction the *faits accomplis*. For example, as early as March of 1938, Liu Shao-ch'i reported the formation in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei base area of a coalition leadership committee composed of army commanders, local government officials, heads of mass organizations, officials of the Communist Party and of other political parties and groupings. He also reported that occupational "national salvation associations" for businessmen, workers, farmers, and students had been formed several months earlier.[81] Afterward, Mao Tse-tung and the Party Central approved such unified leadership committees, as did Chiang Kai-shek's Military Affairs Committee.

In that same month, the Political Bureau held a three-day confer-

[79] These schools were the Central Party School, Yenan University, K'ang Ta, the Lu Hsün Academy, the Natural Science Academy, and the Central Research Institute.

[80] Schram, 220.

[81] In my *Liu Shao-ch'i and "People's War"* (Lawrence, Kansas, 1970).

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ence in Yenan that dealt with the war situation and possible measures to improve the Communists' chances of engaging the people in the war against Japan. One of the measures the Political Bureau "suggested" was the creation of precisely such occupational federations.[82] The Kuomintang's "Program for the War of Resistance and National Development," adopted at its extraordinary national congress at Wuch'ang on March 29 through April 1, 1938, made virtually identical "suggestions."[83]

The considerable degree of autonomous decision-making power of Party leaders in the outer base areas was, on the whole, strengthened by the rapid increase in Party membership. The rowdy and undisciplined nature of many novices, mentioned by Liu Shao-ch'i, was a threat to the interests of all leaders, whether in Yenan or in the outer base areas. Thus, as we have seen, all leaders sought to instill discipline by means of the *cheng-feng* campaign. But the very process of *cheng-feng* had also the inevitable consequence of strengthening the authority of Party leaders in the outer base areas, much as it strengthened Mao's authority in the Northern Shensi base area. The rapid expansion and turnover during the war resulted in the Party's being composed mainly of new members. Most of them did not join until after the outbreak of the war. Thus their personal commitments of loyalty, friendship, and trust to other Party members, and, most important, to the Party leaders, were shaped entirely by their experiences in the outer base areas.

The predominant character of life in the outer base areas was military, and it was the principal shaper not only of the relations of Party members to their leaders, but also of the nature of leadership itself. Because most of the outer base areas were less secure than the Party's headquarters base area in Northern Shensi, and because they were constantly obliged to ward off the encircling Japanese and puppet troops, their leaders were preoccupied with military affairs. If this preoccupation could be interpreted as a danger to Party unity, such danger surely did not stem from any potential challenge to Party supremacy within the Communist movement by a united military command nor from a Communist version of warlordism. Throughout the war, the Communist forces were widely dispersed. In Eastern China, the New Fourth Army was led by Yeh T'ing and, after the

[82] Ch'en Shao-yü, "San-yüeh chengchih chü huiyi ti tsungchieh" [Summary of the Political Bureau conference in March], cited by Kuo in *FCYP*, October 1968, 97, and *IS*, January 1969, 41.

[83] Kuo, in *FCYP*, October 1968, 100, and *IS*, January 1969, 45.

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Southern Anhui Incident of January of 1941, by Ch'en I, who had been left behind in 1934 when the First Front Army evacuated the Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi. In Northern China, the Eighth Route Army was divided into three divisions, each having its separate theater of operations: the 115th under Lin Piao, the 120th under Ho Lung, and the 129th under Liu Po-ch'eng and Hsü Hsiang-ch'ien.[84]

More important, as long-time Party members, the politico-military leaders of outer base areas were too firmly committed to the idea of Party supremacy. They also were not, with a few minor exceptions, the products of military academies and hence were not imbued with the *esprit de corps* characteristic of professional military officers. They were realistic enough to know that even if they had planned to carve out their personal warlord preserves after the war (a highly improbable contingency, in my opinion), their ultimate enemy, the central government, would have had little difficulty in defeating them one by one.

The potential obstacle in the path toward complete unity of the Party's leadership under Mao's unchallengeable control after the war was less dramatic and less tangible. During the war against Japan, the leaders of each base area formed small cohesive groups that changed little in membership during a long period (eight years) and shared extraordinary hardships. The cohesiveness and the length of time, if not the degree of hardship, were unprecedented in the history of Chinese Communism. They were the ingredients of clusters of friendship, trust, and loyalty that were to persist long after the war.

The effects of the war could be seen not only in the nature but also in the composition of the leadership. The Political Bureau had probably consisted of thirteen men in 1937. They were Chang Kuo-t'ao, Chang Wen-t'ien, Ch'en Shao-yü, Ch'en Yün, Ch'in Pang-hsien, Chou En-lai, Hsiang Ying, Jen Pi-shih, Li Fu-ch'un, Li Wei-han, Liu Shao-ch'i, Mao Tse-tung, and Wang Chia-hsiang. All but Hsiang Ying were assembled in the Northern Shensi base area at the end of 1937.[85] When the Communists convened their Seventh Party Congress in Yenan between April 23 and June 11, 1945, and elected thirteen members to a new Political Bureau, eight of its former thirteen members failed to be reelected. Hsiang Ying had been killed in the South Anhui

[84] Lin Piao was not in actual command of the 115th Division during most of the war. Because he had been wounded early in the war, he spent some time in the Soviet Union for treatment and appeared to have resided with Mao in Yenan until the end of the war.

[85] Hsiang Ying had been left behind in the former Central Soviet Area in Kiangsi (see above).

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Incident in January of 1941 and Chang Kuo-t'ao was ousted from the Party in 1938. But six other members of the Political Bureau who were alive and Party members in good standing also failed to be included in the new Political Bureau, for one reason or another. Ch'en Shao-yü and Ch'in Pang-hsien had been Bolsheviks and general secretaries of the Party. As such, they had been Mao's rivals and, at times, opponents, as shown earlier in this study. They spent most of the war under Mao's domination in the North Shensi base area. At election time during the Seventh Party Congress, they not only failed to remain in the Political Bureau, they just barely managed to get into the Central Committee. They ranked forty-third and forty-fourth out of forty-four members. Another Bolshevik, Wang Chia-hsiang, fared even worse; he was elected merely as an alternate member of the Central Committee.[86] Jen Pi-shih and Li Fu-ch'un were elected as fifth and fourteenth members of the Central Committee. The last man in this group, Li Wei-han, failed to be elected as member or alternate member of the Central Committee.[87]

The eight men who were added to the Political Bureau at the Seventh Party Congress were Chu Te, K'ang Sheng, Lin Po-ch'ü, Lin Piao, P'eng Chen, P'eng Te-huai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing, and Tung Pi-wu. If we look at their whereabouts during the war, we discover that the first four spent most of their time with Mao in the North Shensi base area, and the last four elsewhere. Almost all of them travelled for short periods away from their places of assignment, but this does not seriously detract from a remarkable balance between, as it were, Yenan and non-Yenan leaders. This balance cannot easily be dismissed as accidental, because the entire new Political Bureau was likewise evenly divided into Yenan and non-Yenan leaders as follows (numbers denote rankings):[88]

Yenan	*Non-Yenan*
1. Mao Tse-tung	2. Liu Shao-ch'i
4. Chu Te	3. Chou En-lai
5. Ch'en Yün	9. Tung Pi-wu
6. Chang Wen-t'ien	11. P'eng Te-huai
7. K'ang Sheng	12. P'eng Chen
8. Lin Po-ch'ü	13. Teng Hsiao-p'ing
10. Lin Piao	

[86] He became a full member in March of 1949.

[87] I have no adequate explanation for Li's sensationally precipitous decline in ranking.

[88] *Who's Who*, 705. The inclusion of Lin Piao and Teng Hsiao-p'ing may be erroneous because it is generally believed that they were elected to the Political Bureau not until the Fifth Plenum in April of 1955. However, this possible error does not alter the balance between "Yenan" and "non-Yenan" leaders.

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Moreover, a similar balance resulted in the five-man Central Secretariat, which was composed of the leaders with the top five rankings in the Political Bureau.

Liu's rise to his high ranking was exceptionally rapid and particularly significant. As we have seen, he had been a member of the Political Bureau since before the Long March, but his influence within the Party leadership on the eve of the war against Japan was undoubtedly less than that of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai, or even Chu Te. Liu had spent most of the war behind enemy lines in his capacity as leader of all Communists in "White" areas. He may, therefore, be looked upon as Mao's counterpart, with Mao in charge of the Party Central and Liu in charge of the Japanese-held areas. Inasmuch as most outer base areas were surrounded by the Japanese-held areas, they had close contact with Communist underground organizations there. It was Liu Shao-ch'i who supervised hundreds of such organizations and who appointed their leaders, many of whom would later rise to high positions in the Party. Because of the relations between outer base areas and Japanese-held areas and of Liu's work, he probably also had considerable influence in the outer base areas. Thus, by the time of the Seventh Party Congress, Liu had become the top spokesman for the outer base areas as well as for the Communist underground organizations in Japanese-held areas.

The composition of the new leadership, as expressed in the balance in the Political Bureau and the Central Secretariat, pointed to the paramount tasks of the Party in the postwar period, as these tasks were perceived by the leadership itself. The Party Constitution, adopted at the Seventh Party Congress, announced the beginning of an "anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, new-democratic revolution of the masses under the leadership of the proletariat" in which the Party's most urgent task was to "organize and unify the Chinese workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and all anti-imperialist and anti-feudal elements and national minorities on its side." This was a tall order. Although the Party had grown strong during the War and had an estimated ninety million people under control in its many base areas, the ultimate enemy—the central government—seemed to be incomparably stronger. The Party Constitution warned that there was little hope of getting back to the cities soon and that "it will be preeminently important to consolidate the villages as revolutionary bases and it will also be necessary for the Party to undergo a long period of patient work among the popular masses."[89] In other words, the preparations for the ultimate

[89] Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 422-23.

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struggle with the central government had to be made precisely in those areas and in those techniques of which the leaders of the outer base areas, and preeminently Liu Shao-ch'i, had accumulated an intimate knowledge. Liu Shao-ch'i and the other "non-Yenan" leaders also had the loyalty of thousands of Communist underground cadres in those areas. The Party needed these assets badly if it were to win out over the central government.

On the other hand, Mao Tse-tung possessed neither the knowledge of conditions in Northern and Eastern China nor the personal ties with the Communist cadres there. But he supplied another most important ingredient for victory, namely, himself as the symbol of a purposeful, united, and invincible party. By calling him a symbol, I do not wish to imply that Mao had no influence. He did not have his own military units, as the leaders of outer base areas had, but he did enjoy unrivaled prestige in the headquarters area of Northern Shensi. His contribution as symbol lay in the fact that in the relative tranquility of his cave apartment in Yenan, Mao had written several major essays, such as *Maotun lun* [*On Contradiction*] in 1937, *Chungkuo koming ho Chungkuo kungch'antang* [*The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*] in 1939, and *Hsin minchu-chuyi lun* [*On The New Democracy*] in 1940.[90]

These writings helped to support the claim made by the Party Constitution adopted by the Seventh Party Congress that "the Chinese Communist Party takes the theories of Marxism-Leninism and the unified thought of the practice of the Chinese revolution, the thought of Mao Tse-tung, as the guideline for all of its actions."[91] This bold statement putting Mao on a par with Marx and Lenin grew not from the leaders' acknowledgment of Mao as a great theoretician or as the unchallengeable leader of the Party, but from their belief that such elevation of Mao would help the Communist cause in the impending struggle with the central government. The primary purpose of exalting Mao at this critical juncture in the history of Chinese Communism was to convince the Chinese people that in the contest between the Communists and the nationalists, Mao was a more deserving leader than was Chiang Kai-shek. To the small but politically highly important urban intellectual, political, and commercial elites, Mao was presented as the shaper of a by now thoroughly Chinese ideology that promised

[90] Mao was a most prolific writer during the war. Two entire volumes of the four-volume *Mao Tse-tung hsüanchi* [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung] (Peking 1964) contain sixty-six selections said to have been written between July of 1937 and the Seventh Party Congress in April of 1945.

[91] Brandt, Schwartz, and Fairbank, 422.

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both the comfort of a well-ordered society and the hope of a dynamic future. To the common people, especially to the more tradition-bound older people, Mao was presented as a man worthy of becoming the new "king" who had the ability to create harmony between heaven and earth.

In sum, the chief significance of the Seventh Party Congress was the coalition nature of the Party leadership. It was an alliance between Mao, the symbol of the "wave of the future," and the leaders of the outer base areas, and especially Liu Shao-ch'i, who with their military forces and their political and organizational know-how were to make this "wave" a reality.

Conclusions

This study has attempted to show that the principal characteristic of the Chinese Communist movement between 1930 and 1945 was the lack of centralized control in the Party and the military. Only from the end of 1936 to about September of 1937 was there indisputably unified control over these two organizations. Before 1936, Party leaders were commanding their own troops and their own base areas. The troops were subsumed under the so-called Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, and the base areas were theoretically commanded by the Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas. Both organizations, however, were largely illusory in the sense that they had no actual control over all troops and all base areas. As we have seen, the Central Bureau for the Soviet Areas had sufficient control over the Central Soviet Area in Southern Kiangsi to expel from the Party the leaders of the Fut'ien rebellion. There is no evidence, however, that this bureau influenced other base areas beyond the point the leaders of those base areas deemed appropriate. Likewise, the headquarters of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army had actual command over the First Front Army so long as it was attached to that army. This command derived wholly from the fact that the army's commander and political commissar were concurrently holding the same posts in the First Front Army. The sphere of the headquarters' actual authority did not extend to the two other front armies nor perhaps even to the smaller military units scattered throughout Southern China. When after the Maoerhkai Conference the headquarters was transferred to the Fourth Front Army, its influence probably ceased altogether, because Chang Kuo-t'ao, as the leader of the largest military unit, was unlikely to accept orders from anyone.

Two major immediate factors probably accounted for the lack of

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centralized control in both the Party and the military. One was the geographical dispersal of leaders and the other was the lack of consensus among them on several political and military issues. A more fundamental factor strengthening the effects of geographical dispersal and sharpening the divisions of opinion was what I call the traditionalistic syndrome.

Its main components were a particularistic world-view, personalized organizational transactions, and ascriptive personnel criteria. As in many other traditional societies, in rural China of the thirties and forties a man's world-view was restricted to a fairly small geographical sphere where he came into frequent face-to-face contacts with those to whom he was bound by friendship, loyalty, responsibility, obligation, love, or some other relation. These relations were typically focused on organizations like the village, the local district, the family (conjugal and extended), the school, or some local peasant or handicraft association.

This particularistic world-view had been very much weakened in the cities but even there it always remained strong enough to influence organizational transactions. The more personalized an organization was, the more efficient its transactions were. To put it concretely, in national organizations such as the central government, political parties, trade unions, and the like, it was particularistic relations more than the impersonal codes of bureaucratic hierarchy or a common allegiance to some abstract principles that determined the degree of cohesion of these organizations.

The Kuomintang, its government, and its armed forces, like other national organizations, exemplified this phenomenon. Throughout the period under consideration, factions that were determined by particularistic factors operated within the larger, impersonal national organizations. The so-called C. C. clique, the Kwangsi generals, and the Whampoa graduates are three out of innumerable examples. Likewise, people were hired, fired, promoted, and demoted not so much according to the formal criteria of merit but on the basis of membership in one or several particularistic groups. The presence and influence of the traditionalistic syndrome in the thirties and forties are too well known to be seriously called into question.

The crucial question is whether the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party, born, raised, and operating in this society, could have entirely escaped from the influences of the traditionalistic syndrome. The answer must be, I think, an emphatic no. The Chinese Communists could not have willed a total divorce from the societal influences that

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had been continuously shaping their thoughts and actions. They also could not have wished to cut themselves off from these influences because the chances for their success and ultimate victory intimately depended on an almost symbiotic relation with the society at large. In other words, the "fish-in-water" guerrilla principle was not merely a military tactic but a sociopolitical stratagem.

Yet the image of a quasi-collective leadership, as espoused by many China specialists, in effect denies such a natural and necessary relation. It posits that while the traditionalistic syndrome continued to influence all other political organizations in the country, it played no significant part in the nature of the Party's leadership. On the contrary, the image portrays a leadership remarkably similar to those of highly bureaucratized countries. Here is the perfectly pyramidal hierarchy, so familiar to us in North America, Japan, and Europe, and the delight of every student of public administration, governing a party fighting for survival in the backwoods of China. We are told, without any hard evidence, that some time between 1930 and 1945, one man, Mao Tse-tung, was actually the sole and unchallengeable leader of the entire Communist Party. The word of this leader of the Party since Tsunyi allegedly was accepted by everyone. Hard evidence and possibly correct suggestions to the contrary have not altered this image. To cite only two examples, Mao's inability at Maoerhkai to prevail over Chang Kuo-t'ao and his ratifying rather than initiating of major policies during the war have had no remedial effect on the idea that Mao has been the leader since Tsunyi.

I hope that this brief study has demonstrated that the image of a quasi-collective leadership is seriously flawed. First, it rests heavily on an interpretation of the Tsunyi Conference that is not backed up by evidence. As I have shown, an examination of the sources used by Jerome Ch'en, the only person who has sought to support his interpretation of that conference, reveals nothing of substance. Second, it appears to be influenced by our knowledge of the nature of leaderships in societal contexts sharply different from those surrounding the Chinese Communists between 1930 and 1945. Third, it ignores the strong probability that the leaders were significantly influenced by the traditionalistic syndrome of the society in which they operated.

Of course, no one is apt to argue seriously that the Party's leaders were as strongly influenced by this syndrome as were the rustic denizens of Southern Kiangsi or Northern Shensi. The leaders professed hostility to tradition and saw themselves as the most modernized political elite in China. They may have been right, but this is not the same as say-

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ing that they had in fact escaped completely from their traditional background and environment.

This study has viewed the Party leadership as genuinely collective in the sense that several of its members had roughly equal influence in the entire Party. This view of a collective leadership is based on the conviction that the traditionalistic syndrome had been an important determinant of the nature of the Party leadership between 1930 and 1945. I believe that a brief recapitulation of the material presented in this study will confirm this interpretation.

The Bolsheviks had formed close ties as schoolmates in Moscow. This particularistic bond was reinforced by their personal ties to Pavel Mif, their mentor in Moscow and guardian on their return trip to China, and sustained by the mandate placed upon them by the Comintern to seize control of the party. This exceedingly difficult task had to be undertaken in a piecemeal manner because the Party was geographically dispersed. The Bolsheviks, therefore, first concentrated on taking over the central organizations such as the Central Committee, the Political Bureau, and the Secretariat, all of which were located in Shanghai at the time. Essentially, they accomplished this task by 1931. The Bolsheviks could have captured the *de facto* control of the entire Party at the same time *if* the Party had been a modern organization, since leadership of a modern organization can generally expect to have its policies and orders accepted and carried out in a routine fashion by all members regardless of geographical dispersal. Because the Chinese Communist Party was not a modern organization, geographical dispersal did prevent the Bolsheviks from automatically extending their authority from the Party Central to the various base areas.

A second obstacle was the growth of particularistic relationships in the base area themselves. The leaders of the Central Soviet Area and of the Western Hunan-Hupei and Hupei-Honan-Anhui base areas had formed their own groups all of whom, Bolsheviks and base area leaders, shared an ideology and a commitment to their revolution. In other words, their world-view contained a commitment to abstractions that bridged geographical distances. But all of them were, to various degrees, still products of a traditional society. Their particularistic bonds of loyalty, trust, and friendship, forged under conditions of extreme danger and hardships in close groups of leaders in each base area, proved too strong to allow a common commitment to extend from abstractions to centralized control. As we have seen, the sphere of actual control of smaller organizations, such as the headquarters of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army and the Central Bureau

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for the Soviet Areas, likewise did not extend beyond the groups to which they were attached.

If the traditionalistic syndrome was responsible, as I think it was, for the lack of centralized control during the Kiangsi period, it was even more so during the Long Marches because more than ever the several Communist groups were isolated from one another and each was facing on its own grave dangers and hardships. As the agenda of the Tsunyi Conference shows, the leaders of the First Front Army did not discuss abstract ideals nor Party-wide problems but only concrete political and military problems facing them alone.

The clearest manifestation of the power of the traditionalistic syndrome occurred at the Lianghok'ou and Maoerhkai Conferences. Had the Party been a modern organization in which, *inter alia*, one man had, by virtue of his formal rank, undisputed and unchallengeable control, the two front armies would have marched under Mao towards Northern Shensi. They did not because two groups faced each other whose particularistic bonds within each group proved stronger than the common commitment to abstract ideals.

The brief respite between the Long Marches and the war against Japan was the only time between 1930 and 1945 when most Party leaders were assembled in one place under relatively peaceful conditions. It was during this time that we can for the first time speak confidently of Mao's pre-eminence in the base area in Northern Shensi. Various contemporaneous journalistic accounts, of which Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China* has been by far the most influential, projected an image of a quasi-collective leadership. I think that, on the whole, such a term is an accurate description of the leadership in 1936 and 1937.

With the onset of the war, however, the leadership became collective once again. As this study has shown, within the widely dispersed collective leadership, a rough division of labor slowly emerged. As the war wore on, this division of labor was more and more directed toward the postwar period and the ultimate struggle against the central government. In the Party's headquarters in Northern Shensi, Mao Tse-tung formulated a series of policy papers and theoretical essays that formed the basis for the statement, made by the entire Party leadership at the Seventh Party Congress in 1945, that the Communists were better qualified than the Nationalists to lead China toward internal unity and external sovereignty. This does not mean, however, that Mao had in fact become the single unchallengeable leader of the Party. The leaders of the outer base areas and Liu Shao-ch'i, who had been in charge of creating an underground Party infrastructure in

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the "White" areas, had both the military power and the politico-organizational skill in Northern and Eastern China without which the Party could not hope to replace the central government as supreme ruler of China. It is unlikely that Mao had actually ascended to a pre-eminent position of influence in the Party during the war because of the essential interdependence of Mao, Liu, and the leaders of the outer bases. It is also unlikely because, as this study has suggested, Liu and the outer-base leaders had become the nuclei of strong particularistic bonds. The result was a fine balance, firmly grounded in a common ideology and directed against a common enemy, between Mao Tse-tung and his group in Yenan, on one hand, and Liu Shao-ch'i and the leaders in outer base areas and elsewhere, on the other hand.

Some Western scholars, accustomed to dealing with perfectly pyramidal hierarchies, may find the indeterminate nature of a truly collective leadership unnatural or uncomfortable. But if this study has achieved its purpose, it has demonstrated that during the formative period from 1930 to 1945, the Party's leadership was in fact collective.

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GOVERNMENT-SPONSORED RESEARCH IN INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

By CYRIL E. BLACK

I. Introduction

THE purpose of this paper is to make a preliminary evaluation of the pattern of support of research in international studies in the United States by federal agencies, with a view to identifying critical issues in research policy deserving of more detailed study.

The security and welfare of the people of the United States depend to a significant degree on the quality of the system of knowledge available to their leaders and to the community of scholars on whose advice regarding the international system in all of its aspects their leaders depend.

The greatly enlarged role of the United States in international affairs since 1945 has presented a formidable challenge to those responsible for the advancement of knowledge in international studies. The community of educated citizens, within which the federal government is the largest and most important institutional subgroup, must learn all it can about the international environment in which its policies have effect. At the same time, secondary and higher education should be equipped to train people to seek and evaluate this knowledge as specialists, and also to understand it well enough as citizens so that they can appraise the policies of their government in a mature fashion. The responsibility for meeting this challenge falls ultimately on scholars who do the research and educate the coming generation of specialists.

The development of a body of knowledge appropriate to this challenge involves a number of elements: frameworks for interpretation both broad enough to include a wide range of viewpoints and at the same time sufficiently operational to provide usable answers to key questions at various levels of generality; libraries and other collections of data sufficiently rich to provide access to the necessary factual material; a system of education that will select good students and provide adequate training; and conditions of research for trained specialists, in terms of both freedom and incentives, that will enable them to make the most of their capabilities.

The question of the proper relation between the government and the private sectors of research in international studies, as in other fields,

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has been an issue ever since the government began to play a larger role in such research, and is the subject of a number of appraisals.[1] The matter reached a critical stage in 1969 when the Senate sought to restrict the research role of the Department of Defense, the largest governmental sponsor of research in international studies. Section 203 of the Military Procurement Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1970 provides that "none of the funds authorized to be appropriated by this Act may be used to carry out any research project or study, unless the project or study has a direct and apparent relationship to a specific military function or operation." In response to this Congressional directive, the Office of the Secretary of Defense has requested its various research agencies to terminate "in an orderly way as soon as possible" any project that does not comply with the intent of Congress.[2] In theory, not much is changed, since all research supported by the Department of Defense was considered to be related to long-range defense problems. In practice, however, there has been a very substantial reduction of support of the basic research at universities as distinguished from research that meets the more or less immediate needs of defense.

This restriction of the role of the Department of Defense as a major sponsor of research in international studies is the result of a growing concern that has focused on two interrelated issues: how federal support for social and behavioral science research in general should be administered, and the particular problems of international studies as a special aspect of such research. As it concerns international studies in particular, this issue was brought to a head by the Camelot affair in 1965, which led to the establishment of a Foreign Affairs Research Council within the Department of State, with the responsibility for reviewing government-sponsored research projects that might "adversely affect United States foreign relations."[3]

[1] The most recent of these are *The Behavioral Sciences and the Federal Government* [Report of the Advisory Committee on Government Programs in the Behavioral Sciences. Publication 1680, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council] (Washington 1968), *Knowledge Into Action: Improving the Nation's Use of Social Sciences* [Report of the Special Commission on the Social Sciences of the National Science Board, National Science Foundation] (Washington 1969), *The Behavioral and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs* [Report of the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey Committee, National Academy of Sciences and Social Science Research Council] (Washington 1969), and Gene M. Lyons, *The Uneasy Partnership: Social Science and the Federal Government in the Twentieth Century* (New York 1969), sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation.

[2] *Congressional Record* (December 6, 1969), S15927-S15929.

[3] "Research Council Activities: A Summary," *Far Horizons*, 1 (May 1968), 6-9. *Far Horizons* is the bimonthly newsletter of the interagency Foreign Area Research Coordination Group (FAR), established in 1964, whose objective is the coordination of government-sponsored foreign area research. FAR represents twenty-one government

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The immediate background of the concern in Congress regarding the channels through which the federal government provides support for international studies may be traced to the hearings held by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on May 9 and 28, 1968. The principal contention of the Department of Defense, represented by John S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was that it had a specific responsibility for the security of the United States and that the research it supported should have a close relation to the fulfilment of this responsibility. The main questions raised by Senator Fulbright and his colleagues were whether the Department of Defense did not interpret its mission so broadly as to include virtually any subject, and whether much of the research could not be more appropriately sponsored by other government agencies.[4] Senator Fulbright introduced further materials in support of his case in the *Congressional Record* on August 11 and 12, 1969, with reference to an amendment to a pending authorization bill designed to reduce funds for Department of Defense research.[5]

One of the difficulties confronting an evaluation of government-sponsored research in international studies is that there is no single comprehensive listing of the projects sponsored by the various interested agencies over the years. The present introductory exploration of the subject is based on two sources, compiled by the Office of External Research of the Department of State. The principal source is a classified inventory of government-sponsored research completed and in progress in the fiscal year 1968.[6] This is the last of a series that includes both classified and unclassified projects. The second and supplementary source is *Government-Sponsored Research: International Affairs: Research Completed and in Progress, July 1968-June 1969*. The classified inventory for 1967-68 includes 668 projects, but if cross-listing is taken into account the actual number is 507. These titles are selected by the staffs of the contributing agencies on the basis of criteria suggested by the Office of External Research, and vary considerably in completeness. At least one major sponsor, the Social Science Division of the Na-

departments and agencies, and is administered by the Office of External Research, Department of State.

[4] *Defense Department Sponsored Foreign Affairs Research* [Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninetieth Congress, Second Session, May 9, 1968, and Part 2, May 28, 1968].

[5] *Congressional Record* (August 11, 1969), S9608-S9631; and (August 12, 1969), S9725-9750, S9767-S9773.

[6] The author used this classified inventory in his capacity as a consultant to the Department of State for this purpose for a period of five days. The author is solely responsible for the content of this paper, including the accuracy of both statements of fact and interpretative comments. Partial support of this research by the Department of State does not imply official endorsement of the conclusions expressed.

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tional Science Foundation, is not included in this inventory. Both inventories include the title, sponsor, and contractor of each project and the names of the individuals responsible for conducting the research, and this information is indexed. Frequently the size of the contract in dollars is also given.

The unclassified inventory for 1968-69 is more widely representative of government sponsoring agencies than is its predecessor. The research descriptions are arranged by subject matter in categories somewhat different from those used in the previous year, but there are cross-references at the end of each section so that duplication is avoided. The convenience of this inventory is enhanced by a geographic index, a list of contributing agencies and monitoring officers, and an index of titles, contractors, and researchers.

These two inventories are sufficiently different in organization and content, however, that they cannot simply be added together to provide combined data for the two-year period. Not only does the 1968-69 inventory not include classified projects, but about half of the titles refer to continuing projects carried over from the inventory for the preceding year. Since the purpose of this report is not to make a detailed substantive analysis of this research but rather to seek certain general patterns in the relation between government sponsorship and the private research community, we have used the 1967-68 inventory as the primary source and the 1968-69 inventory as a check on these findings.

"Project" is the principal descriptive term in both inventories. Users should be aware, however, that this term includes both grants-in-aid of a few thousand dollars to perform simple tasks or to complete research already in progress, and large and complex operations each involving many people and sometimes several million dollars. Some large research projects are undertaken by a single contractor, while others are shared by several contractors and subcontractors. The dollar dimensions of contracts would often be a better gauge than titles, but the information in the sources is not sufficiently detailed so that we can relate dollars to projects systematically. The Office of External Research also publishes separate annual reports of government agency obligations for research in international studies, whose figures serve to supplement the information provided in the inventories.

General support by government agencies for research is provided both through direct grants and in the form of contracts. Support may be initiated by a government sponsor or by a scholar seeking assistance for his own research, and there are many cases of a mixture of these two sources of initiative. The issue is made more complex because ad-

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ministrators of government research may be scholars from private institutions on temporary assignment to the government. The term "contract" should therefore be understood to reflect a considerable range of initiatives and roles as between government sponsors and contractors.

The term "international studies" will be used here to include both of the main components of the subject under discussion: research on foreign areas, and research on international affairs or relations. From a geographical standpoint, this field of study thus includes the domestic affairs of all countries except the United States, and relations among all countries including the United States. It also includes comparisons of countries and topics, and the study of international organizations and activities. From a chronological standpoint, the field is normally limited to a modern era that may include the nineteenth century but is primarily concerned with the twentieth. The range of disciplines involved in international studies is covered by the term "social and behavioral sciences," as employed by the Office of External Research to include "political science, economics, psychology, sociology, anthropology, history, law, social statistics, demography, geography, linguistics, intercultural communications, and international relations."[7] This particular term seems to have become a subject of controversy between various academic schools of thought. The older term "social sciences" is still employed by Defense and the National Science Foundation as distinct from "psychological sciences," whereas "behavioral sciences" has been adopted by the National Academy of Sciences to embrace both areas of knowledge. When this body and the Social Science Research Council work jointly in this field, they have agreed to refer to it as "the behavioral and social sciences." The State Department, however, prefers the usage "social and behavioral sciences," which we have adopted since the reports of federal research support are channeled through its Office of External Research.

II. Evaluation

The government-sponsored research completed and in progress in the fiscal years 1968 and 1969 is evaluated here in terms of the government sponsors, the contractors, the subject matter, and the extent to which the research is basic or applied.

GOVERNMENT SPONSORS

The two inventories provide information not only as to which agencies sponsor research in international studies, but also about the types

[7] *Far Horizons*, II (January 1969), 2.

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of research sponsored by each agency and, in the case of the 1967-68 inventory, the extent to which such research is classified. As noted above, the inventory for 1968-69 includes a somewhat larger number of reporting agencies, but is restricted to unclassified projects. Although the two lists are not fully comparable, they supplement each other to a considerable extent and together provide a basis for answering most of the questions we should wish to ask about the patterns of the relation between government support and the research community.

In terms of distribution among government agencies, the Department of Defense sponsored about 37 percent (190 out of 507) of the projects in the 1967-68 inventory, but only 12 percent (67 out of 521) in the 1968-69 inventory. Presumably, this difference is because the latter inventory included a larger number of agencies and excluded the classified projects of which Defense is the principal sponsor. It should be noted that the figures reported by the Office of External Research for government-agency obligations for research in international studies show that Defense's share in the total obligations was about 33 percent in both 1967-68 ($11.4 out of $34.2 million) and 1968-69 ($11.1 out of $33.3 million).[8] These figures may exaggerate the role of Defense in sponsored research, however, because of differences in the components used by the various agencies of the government in making their estimates.

This level of federal obligations for basic and applied research of $34.2 million in 1967-68 and $33.3 million in 1968-69 is the share devoted to international studies in estimated federal obligations of all agencies of $321 million and $381 million for all social and behavioral research for these two fiscal years. Total estimated federal obligations for basic and applied research in all fields was $5.4 billion for 1967-68 and $5.9 billion for 1968-69.[9]

The principal sponsors within the Department of Defense, with their share of the Department's research obligations for 1967-68 and 1968-69, are the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), $2.8 and $1.3 million, and the Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, $1.8 and $1.7 million. The three service departments also have their own sponsoring agencies. The most important of these are: for the Air Force, with obligations of $1.7 and

[8] "Federal Funding of Foreign Affairs Research," *Far Horizons*, III (January 1970), 1-5, includes a four-year table for fiscal years 1966-1969 from which these figures and those subsequently cited are taken.

[9] These figures are derived from National Science Foundation, *Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities. Fiscal Years 1967, 1968, and 1969* (Washington 1969), XVII, 14, 19. Hereafter cited as NSF, *Federal Funds*.

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$2.2 million, the Office of Scientific Research and the Office of the Director of Doctrine, Concepts, and Objectives; for the Army, with obligations of $4.4 and $4.9 million, the Office of the Chief of Research and Development and the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations; and for the Navy, with obligations of $0.48 and $0.82 millions, the Office of Naval Research (ONR) with its two subdivisions, the Group Psychology Branch and the Earth Sciences Division.

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is the second largest sponsor of research in international studies, with obligations of $8.9 million for 1967-68 and $9.5 million for 1968-69. Within this department, the Health Services and Mental Health Administration is the largest sponsor, with obligations of $4.1 and $4.7 million, granted principally by the National Institute for Mental Health and the National Center for Health Statistics. The Office of Education has obligations of $4.5 and $3.9 million, administered by the Institute of International Studies and the Bureau of Research. The Social and Rehabilitation Service is also an active sponsor, with obligations of $0.29 and $0.79 million.

Of the other major federal sponsors of research in international studies, the National Science Foundation has obligations of $5.2 and $5.3 million, granted principally by the Social Science Division; the Agency for International Development has obligations of $3.5 and $2.4 million; and those of the Smithsonian Institution are $1.1 million for each of the two fiscal years. The agencies with annual research obligations of less than $1 million include the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the Peace Corps, the United States Information Agency, the Departments of State, Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the National Council on Marine Resources and Engineering Development.

About one third of all the projects sponsored by the Department of Defense in the 1967-68 inventory are classified. The projects sponsored by the civilian departments and agencies are generally not classified, although there are some exceptions, especially those involving projects sponsored by the Department of State and the United States Information Agency. Although a very few Defense-sponsored projects are Top Secret or Secret, the problem is generally not one of protecting vital national interests but rather of preventing the disclosure of information or material that might prejudice the conduct of United States foreign relations. Indeed, many of the restricted projects fall into the non-

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classified category of Limited Official Use, an administrative control designation providing protection comparable to that given by the lowest classified designation of Confidential. The reason for such restrictions is that a number of projects are concerned with sensitive conditions of political unrest in foreign countries, or with current attitudes or conjecture about possible future behavior in the United States and in foreign countries bearing on issues the disclosure of which might cause embarrassment. While we might in some cases question the need for restricting projects in this way, it is significant that such classification is rather narrowly limited to applied rather than to basic research. These classified projects are normally awarded to federal contract research centers, or to one of the private research and consulting organizations that specialize in defense research.

CONTRACTORS

The contractors of government-sponsored research in international studies may be grouped into four main categories, three of which are restricted to the United States: individual scholars and centers at universities; federal contract research centers; and private research and consulting organizations. The fourth category consists of foreign research organizations.

The university contractors include 42 institutions in the United States in 1967-68 and 93 in 1968-69. Most of these institutions had one to four contracts in the two-year period, including both individual grants to faculty members of institutions and more formal contracts with university research organizations. Universities with five to ten contracts include U.C.L.A., Cornell, Hawaii, Michigan State, North Carolina, Ohio State, Pennsylvania, Princeton, Stanford, State University of New York, Texas, and Wisconsin. Universities with over ten contracts include California (Berkeley), Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Illinois, Johns Hopkins, M.I.T., Michigan, and Yale. As we have already noted, numbers of contracts are deceptive since they vary so much in size, but in general the universities with the largest number of contracts are also the ones most heavily funded. Some half-dozen university contracts started before 1967 were classified, but these have since been either completed or declassified. All other contracts listed are unclassified.

The federal contract research centers represent a distinctive group of contractors, because they work exclusively or primarily for a specific federal sponsor on whom they depend for most of their income.[10] Most

[10] Dean C. Coddington and J. Gordon Milliken, "Future of Federal Contract Research Centers," *Harvard Business Review*, XLVII (March-April 1970), 103-16.

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of the forty federal contract research centers are concerned with the natural sciences and engineering rather than with the behavioral sciences, but five of them are important contractors for research in international studies: the Institute for Defense Analyses (Office of the Secretary of Defense); RAND Corporation (Department of the Air Force and Office of the Secretary of Defense); and the Center for Research in Social Systems, the Human Relations Research Office, and the Research Analysis Corporation (Department of the Army). The contracts of these research centers tend to be few in number and large in size, supporting continuing research for their primary sponsors. Much of the work is classified; applied rather than basic; and involves not only political and military studies but also country handbooks, training manuals, and other descriptive materials relating to foreign countries of strategic concern to the armed forces.

In addition, a rather large category of private research centers, other than those located at universities, includes organizations with broad research and educational programs, such as the American Museum of Natural History, the Asia Society, Brookings Institution, the Center for Applied Linguistics, the Educational Testing Service, and the Social Science Research Council; professional research and consulting organizations such as Abt Associates, the American Institute for Research in the Behavioral Sciences, Arthur D. Little, Inc., Browne and Shaw Research Corporation, the Hudson Institute, Mathematica, Inc., Simulmatics Corporation, and the Stanford Research Institute; and industrial research organizations associated with Aerojet-General, Bendix, Burroughs, General Electric, McDonnell-Douglas, and Westinghouse Electric. A few of these organizations have rather substantial contracts, but in most cases they each have one or two rather small ones. Most of these contracts involve applied research, and a number of them are classified.

This evaluation is concerned primarily with the domestic American scene rather than with government-sponsored research abroad. It should be noted in passing, however, that a very considerable number of small and medium-sized grants financed by excess U.S.-owned foreign currencies are allocated to foreign research institutions. The principal countries receiving such grants are the United Kingdom, France, Poland, and Yugoslavia in Europe; India, Israel, Pakistan, and the Philippines in Asia; and Egypt, among the countries in Africa. This research is generally centered on two problems: the provision of general information about economic and social change in these countries, and basic research on specific social problems in cases where foreign research organizations are particularly well qualified.

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SUBJECT MATTER

The range of topics covered by these projects may be judged from the table of contents of the more comprehensive unclassified 1968-69 inventory, which lists 132 projects concerned with economics, 5 with geography and natural resources, 9 with science and technology, 35 with demography, 33 with health and welfare, 121 with social structures and problems, 19 with linguistics and communication, 65 with education, 95 with political processes, 4 with law, and 3 with documentation. Most of the projects have to do with specific countries or groups of countries, and are reasonably well distributed among the major regions of the world.

Of the 99 projects concerned with political processes and law, somewhat less than half are devoted to general, methodological, and comparative topics; of these about 20 deal with international law and world order. In the 1967-68 inventory, only 7 projects address themselves to international law and world order.

Since most of the federal agencies support research that is closely related in subject matter to their administrative concerns, economic, social, educational, health, and military topics have the support of the most affluent sponsors and appear to be adequately funded. Of the agencies concerned exclusively with research support, the Smithsonian Institution supports only anthropology, and the National Endowment for the Humanities supports economic, social, and political projects only if they have a particularly humanistic aspect in content or method. The National Science Foundation, on the other hand, supports work in all the social and behavioral sciences. Of the 58 NSF grants reported in the 1968-69 inventory, 17 are political (of which 5 are international), 16 economic, 15 social, 8 demographic, and 1 each linguistic and educational.[11]

It is significant that, among the major aspects of international studies, history and political science, including international relations, have the most meager sources of support. The Department of State, which is primarily concerned with political issues, has only a very modest research program, and the National Science Foundation gives most of its support to other disciplines that can also draw on the large research budgets of Health, Education, and Welfare, and of the Agency for International Development. Until recently the Department of Defense

[11] Another study of NSF grants presents the picture more sharply by showing that political science received $761,785 in actual allocations for fiscal year 1968 as compared with $3,503,408 for anthropology and $3,734,496 for sociology and social psychology. Heinz Eulau and James G. March, eds., *Political Science* (Englewood Cliffs 1969), 103.

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has provided the principal support for international political studies, primarily through the Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Office of Naval Research, but this source of support is being sharply reduced as a result of a change in Defense research policies. The new Department of Defense program for social and behavioral research for the fiscal year 1970 will be concerned with human performance, manpower selection and training, human factors engineering, foreign military security environments, and policy planning studies. This last category includes an interest in changing patterns of political and power alignments, but tends to be limited to policy-oriented studies, so far as we can judge.[12]

BASIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH

Closely related to the question of subject matter is the distinction between basic and applied research. We may accept as a starting point the definitions adopted by the National Science Foundation, to the effect that "Basic research is concerned with exploration of the unknown. It is primarily motivated by the desire to pursue knowledge for its own sake. As such, it is free from the need to meet immediate objectives, but is undertaken to increase the understanding of natural laws. The kind of knowledge discovered through basic research forms a groundwork for subsequent applications, which produce economic growth and material progress and can lead to improvement in social conditions."[13]

Applied research, by contrast, "is directed to finding the means by which a recognized need may be met. It draws upon the existing knowledge created by basic research and in its own turn creates additional knowledge. It differs from basic research in that it is pointed toward practical applications rather than toward investigations for its own sake. In the course of applied research activity the first pilot steps may be taken to reduce an abstract idea to a useful purpose, frequently as a forerunner to development."[14] As related to international studies, basic research is devoted primarily to the advancement of knowledge, whereas applied research is designed primarily to assist a particular branch of the government in fulfilling its mission.

According to the reports received by the Office of External Research from federal agencies for 1967-68, about one-third of all support goes to basic research and two-thirds to applied research, and about the same proportions seem to have obtained in 1968-69. Only the National Sci-

[12] "Changes in Defense Department Support of Social Science Research," *Far Horizons*, II (September 1969), 1-3.
[13] NSF, *Federal Funds*, XVII, 10.
[14] NSF, *Federal Funds*, XVII, 15.

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ence Foundation, the Smithsonian Institution, and the National Endowment for the Humanities devote their resources entirely to basic research. A portion of the research funds of Defense, HEW, and State are also devoted to basic research, but the other federal agencies support only applied research.

Of the 166 projects supported by the Department of Defense in 1967-68, 24 were designated as basic research. These were concerned with general problems of modernization and with theoretical and methodological projects, and were funded by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, the Advanced Research Projects Agency, and the Office of Naval Research. Under the new Defense research policies for 1969-70, support for new projects of this type will for the most part be discontinued. Of the 256 projects supported by HEW in 1967-68, 57 involved basic research. Of these, 51 were funded by the National Institute of Mental Health and 6 by the Office of Education. State Department support for basic research is administered by the International Exchange Program of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. This program supported 82 scholars abroad and 11 research and study centers abroad in 1967-68, and 11 scholars and 7 centers in 1968-69, the lower figures for the latter year reflecting a cut of approximately two-thirds of its appropriations.[15]

As seen from the standpoint of the contractors, scholars and centers at universities receive federal support primarily for basic research. A certain amount of basic research is also undertaken by the federal contract research centers, although their principal concern is with policy-oriented research. The various private consulting and research organizations are also primarily concerned with applied research. The small handful of federal grants received by such independent academic bodies as the American Museum of Natural History, the Brookings Institution, and the Social Science Research Council are normally concerned with basic research.

III. Critical Issues

From this brief evaluation emerge two issues that are critical for the academic community: the administration of federal support for international studies, and the relatively meager support received by political science and multidisciplinary research despite their great importance for international studies.

The question of whether the Department of Defense should play

[15] "Federal Funding of Foreign Affairs Research," *Far Horizons*, II (January 1969), 1-4.

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such a large role in sponsoring social and behavioral research, and especially in international studies, for which it provides one-third of the support, has been extensively discussed, as we have already noted. It has been partly resolved for the time being by the adoption of the new fiscal 1970 Defense research program, which appears to focus support more narrowly on policy-oriented studies, but it remains a critical issue.

The related difficulties resulting from the sensitivity of foreign countries to Defense-supported research abroad have also been significantly relieved by the clearance procedures established by the State Department's Foreign Affairs Research Council. In addition, the Department of Defense is restricting its own support of overseas research to projects that are directly related to the needs of United States forces abroad and are accepted by the host governments. There are other serious problems confronting overseas research, but at least this one is well on the way to solution.

Both of these changes in Defense research policy, made at least in part to meet the criticism of the research community, have the immediate effect of reducing the funds available to international studies and particularly to the political and interdisciplinary aspects to which Defense Department support has made a substantial contribution. In recent years it has backed a major effort to achieve new results with quantitative and inductive methods, while at the same time supporting theoretical and deductive work.

Discussion of the positive aspects of the issue of support, namely, of which agency or agencies should provide the research support that Defense is relinquishing, has narrowed down to two alternatives: to increase the funds available to the National Science Foundation and other existing agencies whose primary purpose is research support, or to establish a new agency devoted solely to the support of social and behavioral research. The National Academy of Sciences and the Social Science Research Council have recently made a report on the outlook and needs in this field, whose recommendations on this issue seem quite sensible. The report recommends that Congress appropriate funds to enable the NSF to strengthen its role in support of applied as well as basic research in all the social sciences, with a special emphasis on "multidisciplinary problem-solving research centering on the behavioral and social sciences in collaboration with scientists from other disciplines." The report favors the establishment of a separate agency for these purposes only if the NSF is for any reason unable to do the job.[16]

[16] *The Behavioral and Social Sciences: Outlook and Needs*, 238-242.

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There is in any event no shortage of civilian agencies through which to administer research funds, and the problem lies rather in the general reduction of federal research budgets, which currently represents a serious threat to all scholarship.

One of the principal impressions made by an examination of inventories of government-supported research in international studies is that there seems to have been no government-wide effort to establish research priorities based on what is already known, what is already being done by privately supported research, and what the needs of the nation and of scholarship are. Instead, ideas originate in individual government agencies based on their own needs, and in many parts of the research community based on the interests of many individual scholars. These many projects are then examined by one or another of 30 or 40 review boards using different criteria, and some are accepted and others rejected. Concern here is not so much with the multiplicity of review boards, which is useful up to a point in avoiding harmful monopolies, but rather with the apparently haphazard fashion in which the allocation of funds is related to substantive priorities. We would not wish to see the entire international studies enterprise centered in one great effort like the Manhattan Project or NASA, but we could imagine great benefits resulting from a more concerted effort to define objectives and, at least in a general way, to relate the allocation of resources to such objectives. The Foreign Area Research Coordination Group has performed a useful service in drawing up lists of specific government research needs with respect to Africa, China, and Latin America, but these naturally deal more with applied rather than with basic research problems.[17] Similarly, the very comprehensive NAS-SSRC Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey is concerned with making recommendations for public policy rather than with substantive problems.

The relative neglect of political science among the priorities for federal support is an instructive special case of this general problem. The political science panel of the Behavioral and Social Sciences Survey is eloquent in setting forth the needs of the discipline and in documenting the relatively small share in federal outlays that it has received in comparison with the other social sciences. It seems almost by chance, however, that in discussing NSF support the report of the panel finally comes to the point: "The critical point to be made is this: when stronger proposals are received from a field, more grants are made to that

[17] "African Research Needs," *Far Horizons*, I (November 1968), 5-6; "Communist China-Latin America: Government Research Needs," *Far Horizons*, II (July 1969), 4-6; and "Near East and South Asia: Research Needs," *Far Horizons*, III (March 1970), 5.

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field. This clearly is the key to the situation that faces political scientists. Only if political scientists increase their interest in research and improve their research proposals can it be expected that NSF allocations to political science will approximate the allocations now made, for instance, to anthropology or sociology and social psychology."[18]

This is indeed the critical point. The panel report itself has no interesting new ideas on matters of substance, and this was probably not its task. It missed a valuable opportunity, however, to stress the fact that an emphasis on "needs" is of little appeal if it is not tied to substantive objectives for basic and applied research. In fact, the report goes right on after the statement quoted above to recommend bloc grants by the NSF to political science departments without making any mention of research objectives. How much money would NASA have obtained from Congress if it had submitted a long disquisition on "needs" without mentioning the moon landing or the exploration of outer space as objectives? More specifically, what are the big questions that need to be worked on by political scientists in the field of international studies?

[18] Eulau and March, *Political Science*, 103.

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Review Articles

ETHNICITY AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION

By DONALD ROTHCHILD

Obafemi Awolowo, *The People's Republic*, Oxford University Press, Ibadan, 1968, 356 pp. $7.35.
Leo A. Despres, *Cultural Pluralism and Nationalist Politics in British Guiana*, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1967, 310 pp. $4.50.
Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, *Pluralism in Africa*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1969, 546 pp. $12.75.
David Steel, *No Entry: The Background and Implications of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968*, C. Hurst & Co., London (Distributed by Humanities Press), 1969, 263 pp. $6.00.
Pierre L. van den Berghe, *South Africa, A Study in Conflict*, Wesleyan University Press, Middletown, 1965, 371 pp. $8.95.

BECAUSE the social and cultural cleavages within new states are often so fundamental in nature, their domestic intergroup relations bear some resemblance to the type of political process appearing in the international order. Ethnic and racial groups that are widely embracing in their identities are more nearly comparable to nation-states than to other domestic groupings based on class, profession, partisanship, or religious affiliation. As Clifford Geertz remarks, these communally structured collectivities can be considered "as possible self-standing, maximal social units, as candidates for nationhood."[1] Their involvement in a struggle for power is apparent. Like their national counterparts on the world scene, they seek to maximize symbolic and substantive rewards as well as to prevent the strengthening of adversaries. They employ similar techniques of persuasion, boycott, bargaining, threat—even force.

The consequences of this struggle for power at the domestic level are far-reaching. First, in spite of the oft-used distinction between a fairly coercive domestic order and a fairly noncoercive international order, the jockeying for power of ethnic groups within states corresponds markedly to that of nation and nation. In theory, bureaucratic,

[1] "The Integrative Revolution," in Clifford Geertz, ed., *Old Societies and New States* (New York 1963), 111; also referred to in Kuper and Smith, 460, and Sidney Verba, "Organizational Membership and Democratic Consensus," *Journal of Politics*, XXVII (August 1965), 470.

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governmental, party, and military authorities in third-world countries exercise great control over political, social, and economic matters within the state; in practice, this institutional authority is sometimes more apparent than real. By displaying the inability of these structural mechanisms to deal with the crisis of political integration, interethnic conflict exposes the fragility and limited nature of the government's capacity for control. Second, the interethnic confrontation raises questions about the unifying potential of nationalism. Although nationalism has effectually repulsed the claims of metropolitan hegemony in a number of crucial confrontations, it has still to demonstrate the ability to overcome "primordial sentiments" and to foster a sense of common purpose.[2] Under these circumstances, what consensus does exist as to goals and values is often as superficial and limited as it is at the international level. And finally, interethnic conflict can lead to a serious imbalance between order and development. Whether at the state or global level, tensions between "total identities" (Kuper and Smith, p. 347) compel statesmen at the center to rivet their attention on the problem of order. But if the crisis of political integration necessitates a high priority on order, the crisis of legitimacy requires an emphasis upon political and economic modernization. To the extent that interethnic conflict presses security demands on a brittle political structure, it undermines the system's capacity to deal creatively with other problems that have a direct bearing upon stability. New and more productive "decades of development," with their presumed attempts at re-allocation, may be as indispensable to the comity among ethnic groups within the state as they are among the nations of the world.

I

Before examining the bargaining dimension in interethnic relations, it is first necessary to establish that there are boundaries among such groups. The existence of self-conscious collectivities is clearly a precondition for intercommunal reciprocity. Once the foundation is set for such interaction between self-conscious collectivities, these boundaries may acquire a tenuous, self-sustaining quality. Nevertheless such boundaries can endure only if no major change in the configuration of intergroup power relations occurs. In a dynamic and fluctuating arena of group encounters, boundaries will never remain fixed; the maintenance—even survival—of these boundaries is dependent upon

[2] Rupert Emerson, "The Problem of Identity, Selfhood, and Image in the New Nations: The Situation in Africa," *Comparative Politics*, 1 (April 1969), 306.

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the ability of the various actors to retain sufficient power to encourage a continuing bargaining process.

The existence of such self-conscious collectivities within the states of the third world is underscored by what can be described as a school of "conflict pluralism." Building upon J. S. Furnivall's earlier characterization of plural societies as comprising "two or more elements or social orders which live side by side, yet without mingling, in one political unit,"[3] M. G. Smith and others have developed a more broadly encompassing theory of societal relations. In *Pluralism in Africa*, Smith criticizes the Furnivall model as being deficient in its restriction to tropical, colonial, capitalist, and multiracial situations (p. 429) and describes pluralism as follows:

> Pluralism is a condition in which members of a common society are internally distinguished by fundamental differences in their institutional practice. Where present, such differences are not distributed at random; they normally cluster, and by their clusters they simultaneously identify institutionally distinct aggregates or groups, and establish deep social divisions between them. The prevalence of such systematic disassociation between the members of institutionally distinct collectivities within a single society constitutes pluralism. Thus pluralism simultaneously connotes a social structure characterized by fundamental discontinuities and cleavages, and a cultural complex based on systematic institutional diversity. (p. 27)

Unlike "heterogeneous" polities (Holland, the Scandinavian countries), where ethnic divergencies have limited significance for the majority's participation in the basic institutions of the society, the plural society, as portrayed by Smith, involves the domination by a culturally distinct and institutionally differentiated minority over a majority of the population (colonial East Africa, South Africa). Possessing superior skills and resources, the dominant minority imposes its will upon the subordinate social aggregates of a common political society, using either coercive or noncoercive means as necessary in order to maintain the status quo. Of course, the stability inhering in plural societies depends upon the continued inability of subordinate aggregates to challenge the controlling group on its own terms; once these social sectors can be organized for effective political action, the dominance of the minority element becomes untenable.

The sharply defined lines of Smith's plural-society model bring it

[3] J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India* (Cambridge 1939), 446.

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easily, and dramatically, into focus; yet its very distinctness makes it a natural target for wide-ranging criticism. At least four major objections have been raised against Smith's analytical model. First, the model does not take adequate account of process. Although it offers insights into both externally imposed colonial relationships and the "domestic colonialism" of such racially stratified societies as South Africa,[4] it is essentially static in nature, failing to offer a sufficient assessment of events and situations in flux (Despres, p. 27). "We are not told how or why plural society comes into existence, how it is maintained, why it changes into heterogeneous society, or by what steps."[5]

Second, some regard Smith's use of the concept of pluralism as too narrow in scope. Pierre L. van den Berghe, for example, considers pluralism as a dimension rather than "an all-or-none phenomenon" (van den Berghe, p. 270). Although a degree of structural and functional duplication must be present, pluralism can exist without having institutional incompatibility based on unrelated cultural traditions. Thus, for him, a society is pluralistic "insofar as it is compartmentalized into quasi-independent subsystems, each of which has a set of homologous institutions, and only specific points of contact with the others . . ." (p. 270). Such compartmentalization is not restricted to culturally distinct collectivities but is expanded to include cleavages founded on class, caste, or estate.

Third, doubts are expressed over the high correlation given to minority domination and the plural society (Kuper and Smith, pp. 68, 467). Is it in fact essential to regard minority domination as a necessary condition that marks the plural model off from heterogeneous societies as well as from societies with plural enclaves? With the movement from colonialism to independence, many third-world states have championed such principles as "undiluted democracy" and "one-man, one-vote" representative government. Majoritarianism—or elite rule in the name of the majority—has materialized in a great number of cases. Therefore, if the plural-society concept is restricted to instances of minority domination, its applicability may well be limited to various types of residual colonial situations.

Fourth, a number of observers contend that Smith's plural-society model distorts reality by exaggerating the depth and intensity of social

[4] Gwendolen M. Carter, Thomas Karis, and Newell M. Stultz, *South Africa's Transkei: The Politics of Domestic Colonialism* (Evanston 1967). See also Stokely Carmichael and Charles V. Hamilton, *Black Power: The Politics of Liberation in America* (New York 1967), 5-6.

[5] Floyd Dotson and Lillian O. Dotson, *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia, and Malawi* (New Haven 1968), 394.

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cleavages, thereby minimizing the unifying nature of the cross-cutting ties within the polities under observation.[6] Not only does convergence occur at the marketplace but transsectional activities are often evident in such areas as sports, religion, and social interaction. Daniel J. Crowley notes that in West Indian societies, schools, libraries, motion pictures, sports, newspapers, and the radio have all contributed to a process he describes as "unconscious assimilation."[7] H. S. Morris uses examples drawn from East African experience to deny the prevalence of fundamental discontinuities and cleavages between racial collectivities. "All sections of the society," he notes,

> shared ideas of correct and desirable behaviour more widely than appeared. In addition to being included in a common, imposed political and legal system, everybody also participated in a common economic system and therefore shared many of the demands and values embodied in it. Agreement went further than that needed only for economic cooperation. Nobody seriously questioned the value of Western education and everybody who acquired it also took over a wide range of beliefs which were expressed in political, legal, commercial, educational and other social practices. By and large everybody wanted certain types of town, public services and housing. The "upper classes" in each section set the fashions and among themselves shared similar manners and etiquette that were essential if they were to meet effectively and so perform their proper functions.[8]

Leo Kuper has noted that, even in the case of rigidly stratified South Africa, the racial sections do not confront one another "as solid antagonistic blocs."[9] None of these authors denies the existence of discrepancies between sectional goals and values; they all diverge from Smith, however, in their emphasis upon the wide number of links also evident in these societies.

If Smith may have overstated the width of the cleavages among collectivities "differentially incorporated" in the same political unit, his analysis of intersectoral boundaries is nonetheless helpful. Such an

[6] As Ralf Dahrendorf shows with regard to class structure, increased mobility within the groups has the effect of diminishing the intensity of intergroup conflict. *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* (Stanford 1959), 60.

[7] "Cultural Assimilation in a Multiracial Society," *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, LXXXIII (January 1960), 852.

[8] *The Indians in Uganda* (Chicago 1968), 168-69. See also Kuper and Smith, 385-87, and Burton Benedict, *Indians in a Plural Society: A Report on Mauritius*, Colonial Research Studies, XXXIV (London 1961), 32, 45.

[9] *An African Bourgeoisie: Race, Class, and Politics in South Africa* (New Haven 1965), 5-6.

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analytical framework has heightened scholarly awareness of intersectional disjunction and dissensus, facilitating a probing of the power relations among self-conscious ethnic groups.[10]

II

A focus upon bargaining may offer a means of building upon the insights of the school of "conflict pluralism." From the outset it is necessary to distinguish between situations conducive to bargaining and the actual bargaining process. Where, for example, unorganized aggregates offer labor indispensable to the operation of European-owned mines and farms, distinct collectivities carry on what amount to unacknowledged transactions. The dominant minority must accede to certain minimal demands or face the possibility of disrupting the economic or political status quo. On the other hand, the actual bargaining process involves acknowledged transactions, each party consciously seeking to maximize its interests within the framework of the transsectional society. Although this essay will devote primary attention to acknowledged interethnic transactions, we must recognize that experiences with unacknowledged interrelations are a fruitful area for further study.

The elements that enter into the shaping of acknowledged intergroup bargaining differ somewhat between colonial and post-colonial situations. In the former, intersectional negotiations occurred within an externally imposed imperial order that tolerated, at times even encouraged, interethnic power struggles. The case of Nigeria is instructive. Boundaries between the different population groups in the north and the south, as elsewhere, resulted from a combination of historical inheritance and the policies pursued by successive British administrations. Thus, Chief Obafemi Awolowo asserts, the British bear a heavy responsibility for the existence of Nigeria's north-south cleavage at the time of decolonization. He advances four reasons for this contention: the closing of the north to Christian missionary influences, the "fossilization" of the political institutions of the north, the treatment of the two areas as distinct units for political and administrative purposes, and the manipulation of the political situation just before independence in such a way as to facilitate northern leadership at the center (p. 62). Recognizing the reality of these intersectional boundaries, the colonial power, committed to a rapid departure from the Nigerian scene,

[10] For a discussion of the variations in the closeness of intercommunity connections, see Donald Rothchild, "Ethnic Inequalities in Kenya," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, VII (December 1969), 689-711.

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spurred the major collectivities to negotiate a *modus vivendi*. The upshot was a temporary institutional arrangement that brought powerful corporate divisions together in a loose federal system, linked at the center by a coalition of regionally based parties. Not surprisingly, such a disjunctive structure proved unequal to the tasks of political integration, and was shaken to its roots by the military coups of 1966-67 and the subsequent secession of Biafra. A last-minute effort on the part of the Supreme Military Council to stave off the country's fragmentation through a bargaining over differences was attempted at Aburi, Ghana, in January 1967.[11] Although the military commanders did reach a measure of agreement on the need to decentralize governmental authority, their slender gains were effectively resisted by the federal permanent secretaries soon afterward. With reciprocity broken, positions became polarized; as men on each side became committed to antagonistic world views, the scope for negotiation dwindled and violent conflict became well-nigh inescapable.

Decolonization marked an important turning point in interethnic relations. The departure of the colonial third force meant that as the remaining ethnic collectivities struggled for power they no longer operated within the same limitations as they had in previous times. Now the external restraining and cushioning force had disappeared, and such new countervailing factors as central strength, sense of common history, and transnational identities and aspirations were all too often incapable of dealing with the new strains. The Nigerian experience points up the significance of this change. Whereas the metropolitan power could act to overcome the 1953 north-south split in the federal Council of Ministers by calling for a redrafting of the constitution, no comparable external force was in a position to intervene in the crisis of 1967. Nigeria needed more time for the growth of an effective third force with its roots firmly planted in the local scene.

The tendency on the part of governments in developing countries to seek to cover over evidences of interethnic confrontations is in part a recognition of the destructibility of their political structures. Yet post-independence manifestations of intergroup power struggles are readily at hand. In Cyprus, Iraq, Malaysia, Zanzibar, Guyana, Zambia, Uganda, the Congo (Kinshasa), Sudan, and others, the advent of

[11] At the first session of the Aburi conference, the parties agreed to a resolution presented by Lt. Col. Odumegwu Ojukwu, the Military Governor of Eastern Nigeria, reaffirming their "faith in discussions and negotiations as the only peaceable way of resolving the Nigerian crisis," *The Verbatim Report of the Proceedings of the Supreme Military Council Meeting*, Aburi, Accra, Ghana, January 4-5, 1967 (Enugu 1967), 13-14. See also Walter Schwarz, *Nigeria* (New York 1968), 225.

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nationalist politics has brought increased interethnic tensions into the open (Despres, p. 263). At the very time that modern technology is creating great new opportunities for communication among peoples, the developing countries are experiencing what Ali A. Mazrui describes as "the *retribalization of politics*, the resurgence of ethnic loyalties in situations of rivalry in the arena of resource allocation and domestic power politics."[12]

Thus, a large number of new bargaining situations emerged upon the termination of colonialism. If a "diplomatic gap" occurred between the frequency of interethnic bargaining situations and the actual resort to the bargaining process, it can in large measure be attributed to the weak linkages among corporate groups making up the larger society. Even so, signs of interchange are apparent. In his dealings with subnational groups, Uganda's A. Milton Obote sought to minimize intergroup tensions through a variety of bargaining arrangements. For example, he accepted a federal relationship with Buganda and subsequently with the western kingdoms and Busoga as well; concurred on indirect Buganda *Lukiiko* (parliament) elections of its representatives to the central legislature; agreed to form a coalition between his predominantly northern- and western-supported Uganda People's Congress and Buganda-based *Kabaka Yekka*; and worked among his cabinet colleagues to secure the appointment of his rival, Kabaka (King) Edward Mutesa II, as president of the country. Obote realistically carried on negotiations with parochial groups as long as they remained unified and powerful and as long as they were prepared to resolve conflicts through diplomatic means. The scope for reciprocity was greatly reduced by the military confrontation with Buganda in 1966; yet even here, as shown by the 1969 elections for district secretary-generals, Obote continued his policy of handling local interests with extreme tact and sensitivity.[13]

In neighboring Kenya, something in the nature of a two-dimensional bargaining situation prevails. At one level, the leaders of the politically powerful Kikuyu people must be careful not to threaten local notables

[12] "Violent Contiguity and the Politics of the Retribalization in Africa," *Journal of International Affairs*, XXIII (No. 1, 1969), 89. Italics as in text. According to an editorial in the *Target* of Kenya, Mboya's death brought to public attention what many knew in their hearts—"that all, with perhaps very few exceptions, still ardently regard their own tribes as little nations within the nation, and their national loyalty only comes second to their tribal loyalty." *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 28, 1969, 5.

[13] *Uganda Argus* (Kampala), May 19, 1969, 1. A more extensive discussion of Obote's negotiations with local nationalist interests appears in Donald Rothchild and Michael Rogin, "Uganda" in Gwendolen Carter, ed., *National Unity and Regionalism in Eight African States* (Ithaca 1966), 344-51, 359-60, 370-79.

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in other areas; a repetition of the kind of power struggle that caused Paul Ngei to lead his Kamba people temporarily from the ranks of the Kenya African National Union in 1963 could well undermine the stability of the political system. KANU's recognition of the soundness of this principle found expression in a renewed emphasis on the party's decentralized organizational structure; such decentralization has centripetal consequences, for it relieves local notables of the menace of discipline by a central bureaucratic body. Political stability is also encouraged by the practice of "ethnic arithmetic" in appointments to public offices. President Kenyatta's announcement of three ministerial appointments from Nyanza province in July 1969 was clearly calculated to appease the aggrieved feelings of the Luo people following the assassination of Tom Mboya earlier that month.[14] In addition, political stability requires a policy of re-allocative equity regarding elite recruitment and resource allocation. Until the less favored groups are encouraged by substantial expenditures in their areas and by determined efforts to recruit a high proportion of the public- or private-sector elite from among their educated and experienced members, the inherited imbalances of the past may become a source of grave tension in the future.

At another level, a partly conscious, partly unconscious bargaining process is perceptible. In contrast with that of the colonial situation, where unacknowledged transactions took place between the dominant white minority and the indigenous aggregates, the political economy of present-day race relations involves reciprocity between a dominant black majority and privileged European and Asian minorities. In something of a trade-off between short-term developmental gains and short-term political losses, the government has given the non-African communities a broad range of inducements to continue to help the nation achieve its economic goals and to make genuine efforts toward Africanizing expatriate-held positions. Outsiders are welcome as long as they remain functional to African needs and aspirations. When their usefulness declines their "contract" expires, and they are—as Minister for Commerce and Industry Mwai Kibaki said of 3,000 shopkeepers scheduled to lose their trading licenses in 1969—expected to return to their countries of origin or to move into other sectors of the economy where their contributions are required.[15] The non-African elite, aware of their declining capacity to influence this course of events, are retreating steadily in the face of growing African political and, to some extent,

[14] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 25, 1969, 1, 6.
[15] *Ibid.*, January 1, 1969, 1, 6.

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economic power. Thus the boundaries of interracial relations are constantly shifting in order to reflect the changing configuration of group power on the Kenya scene.

In these and other societies, then, interethnic bargaining has been attempted with varying results. Ethnic leaders have agreed to compromise over constitutional guarantees for individual and group rights and areal divisions of power, or have employed such political instruments as patronage, corruption, ethnic quotas, co-optation, and coalition to reduce intergroup tensions to tolerable levels. That a spirit of reciprocity has emerged in such cases gives grounds for assuming that, at least in some instances, a progressive development from conflict to consensual pluralism will be possible.

III

To note that there is no certainty about movement toward some form of accommodation is to suggest that there are limits to the interethnic bargaining process. If this is so, it is necessary to examine some of the elements militating against effective bargaining in order to make more meaningful a discussion of the political institutions facilitating the negotiation of interethnic conflict.

Clearly marked boundaries between collectivities are the springboards for interethnic diplomacy; yet they also serve as an indication of the lack of interconnectedness prevailing in many polities. Again, we see the struggle for power within a state corresponding at times to the anarchy of the international order. Interests, even values, diverge noticeably between rivals; on the whole this divergence restricts their cooperative endeavors to utilitarian activities involving well-defined and minimal commitments.[16] Some economic, social, and political ties do unite the members of different groups. But if these linkages come into competition with those of local or state-wide sentiment, the solidaristic nature of intimate group loyalties is likely to take precedence over other claims. Emphasizing the prominence and ubiquity of such primary affinities, Edward Shils comments, "The need for connections or relationships of a primordial character will be endemic in human existence as long as biological existence has a value to the individual organism. Ethnic identification . . . is a manifestation of this need. Traces of the sense of affinity and of shared primordial properties occur also in

[16] See my "From Federalism to Neo-Federalism," in Donald Rothchild, ed., *Politics of Integration: An East African Documentary* (Nairobi 1968), 9-12.

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the phenomenon of nationality."[17] In view of the depth of these attachments, it is not surprising that some interethnic relations within countries are likely to retain an essentially conflictive character for a long time to come. Such conflicts are not necessarily the consequence of group differences as such but arise from competition over interests, principles, and priorities. Although conflicts among total identities do not by any means exclude the possibility of meaningful negotiations, the scope for negotiation narrows as differences move along the scale from interests to principles.

In non-negotiating situations, dissensus often prevails and reciprocity among collectives is strictly limited in scope. Such a situation obviously is present where violence is resorted to and at least one of the parties to the dispute refuses to engage in a genuine process of give-and-take. Statements to the effect that the Sudanese government has no intention of entering into negotiations with the southern-based provisional government underscore the extent of disjunction in the land. These refusals to talk indicate just how enormous a task is involved in securing progress toward a resolution of this long and bitter struggle.[18]

The non-negotiating situation that receives the greatest attention in the volumes under discussion is forcible domination by one sector over another—M. G. Smith's "differential incorporation." If ever a society fits this description, South Africa would be the logical candidate. As Pierre L. van den Berghe's careful analysis of this country shows, the society is riddled with dissensus, contradiction, and conflict. Its Afrikaner-dominated government maintains a structure of white domination through a policy of overt repression. The monopoly of repressive force in their hands enables governmental authorities to keep the African opposition disorganized, and therefore relatively ineffective. But the achievement of an equilibrium-situation satisfactory to Nationalist Party theoreticians is complicated by mounting internal strains and external pressures. Of particular importance in this regard is the vital role now played by skilled and semi-skilled African workers in the industrial sector; such an African contribution creates a discrepancy between the integrated nature of the urban economy and the rigid segregation of other areas. For van den Berghe, the prospects of revo-

[17] "Color, the Universal Intellectual Community, and the Afro-Asian Intellectual," in *Daedalus*, XCVI (Spring 1967), 282.

[18] *East African Standard* (Nairobi), July 30, 1969, 9. When a point is reached in this and analogous cases where both sides to a violent encounter perceive the costs of continued warfare to be excessive, reciprocity between collectives may again become a meaningful possibility.

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lution are great. "Once the colonial territories to the north of South Africa will have become independent . . . , the collapse of White supremacy will be imminent" (van den Berghe, p. 262). Such a prophecy would seem to underrate the capacity of determined rulers to make up for their lack of support among the majority of the population with a combination of material rewards and politically inspired ruthlessness. Such determination is clearly not lacking. Leo Kuper's remark that it is "probable that, but for the hostile reaction of outside powers to the Sharpeville massacre, the government would have sought a solution by holocausts of violence," is a chilling reminder of the lengths South Africa's leaders are willing to go in order to maintain their policy of white domination (p. 162).

In addition to the refusal to negotiate and the forcible domination of one sector by another, various situational transformations such as extermination, assimilation, and exodus also work against the achievement of interethnic bargaining. These situational transformations involve a refashioning of the context in which such relations take place. Cleavages between groups may remain as wide as ever; however, a basic change occurs in the nature and immediacy of linkages between groups.

Extermination, or genocide, involves an attempt to solve conflict through the elimination of a contending collectivity. No new forms of linkage or adjustment are required since the out-group is bodily removed from the scene. The physical destruction of many Hottentots and Bushmen in South Africa and many Arabs in Zanzibar brought the need for continued intergroup reciprocity to an end.

Physical and cultural assimilation also eliminate interethnic bargaining by blurring the sharp boundary lines between collectivities. Physical assimilation has in fact taken place in South Africa, with the consequence that a substantial Cape Coloured population has evolved over the years. It seems likely that prolonged miscegenation could have led to the emergence of a Latin American type of mixed society had the process not been impeded by the appearance of excessive racial prejudice among the Europeans (van den Berghe, p. 41). Cultural assimilation in its more extreme form—not simply the tasting of foreign foods but the conscious effort to minimize the use of out-group symbols, languages, associations, and so forth—can result in the forging of uniform identities, practices, and values for all citizens in the country. This process has the virtue of enlarging the scope of opportunities of many outsiders, particularly those in the second generation, but it is nonetheless inherently destructive of formerly prized life pat-

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terns. "Cultural assimilation," asserts Hilda Kuper, "is largely a reciprocal of political dominance, and those who are supposed to assimilate the culture of others are in fact expected to subordinate the culture that was their own" (p. 251). Over the long term either type of assimilation may prove to be the most satisfactory answer to the problem of interethnic cleavage; however, what is important to note for the purposes of this discussion is that they involve a non-negotiating approach to the management of tension. Physical assimilation overcomes interethnic cleavages by smashing primordial identities. As Malcolm X pointed out: " 'Integration,' ultimately, would destroy the white race . . . and destroy the black race."[19] And cultural assimilation sacrifices cultural distinctness to the demands of social interaction in the country as a whole. Implicit in such far-reaching processes, then, is situational transformation, not a bargaining approach to interethnic differences.

In countries such as post-independence Kenya, where minorities are "unassimilable" and remain as culturally distinct strangers on the periphery of the host community, their members are highly vulnerable to competition in all walks of life.[20] It was to be anticipated that with independence the peoples of the third world would seek control over their economic as well as their political sectors. The replacement of expatriates with one's own citizens follows logically from the nationalist demand for self-determination; and where such a policy seeks to favor the indigenous inhabitants over other citizen groups, it attempts to compensate for the racial imbalances of colonial times by a principle that can be designated as corrective equity.

But as justified as the re-allocative principle may be in the abstract, it works a definite hardship on the many non-indigenous members of the population caught up in the transition to genuine self-rule. These out-groups are forced, soon after the transfer of power, to make a fundamental choice between full identification with their new country of residence, including a change of citizenship, or face the likelihood of being turned out of a job once a capable member of the majority group becomes available.[21] The various land-control acts, trade-licensing acts, and immigration acts passed following the majority's accession to power are an indication of the governments' determination to insure

[19] *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York 1964), 276.

[20] For the distinction between "assimilable" and "unassimilable" minorities, see Kuper and Smith, 250, and Alexander J. Groth, "The Legacy of Three Crises: Parliament and Ethnic Issues in Prewar Poland," *Slavic Review*, XXVII (December 1968), 578.

[21] A fuller treatment of this subject appears in Donald Rothchild, "Kenya's Minorities and the African Crisis over Citizenship," *Race*, IX (April 1968), 421-37.

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a rapid changeover and of the out-groups' vulnerability in the face of growing political and economic pressures.

In Kenya, European and Asian domination of the public and private sectors has led to a sharp conflict of interracial interests. Once power was securely in African hands, political leaders were able to exert increasing influence over recruitment and investment policies. At first the non-African communities complied by making minimal concessions (locally referred to as "window-dressing"); yet half-hearted cooperation soon yielded to substantial efforts to strike a better racial balance in the area of employment. Moreover, the Africans emerged as successful competitors in their own right more quickly than many had expected. As a consequence, the non-Africans, most of whom had failed to apply for citizenship during the two-year period of grace, in greater and greater numbers found themselves to be redundant. Once they came to recognize the extent of their expendability, a shock reaction set in. The most marginal of the non-Africans, typically the Asians with middle-level skills and little investment capital, panicked and looked to emigration as an escape from a seemingly desperate circumstance. Since interracial bargaining appeared unavailing, they viewed a non-negotiating response—departure from the scene of the conflict—as the most desirable course of action.

But this already delicate ongoing process was complicated by external factors. Instead of allowing new interracial adjustments to work themselves out through an unimpeded process of population transfer, forces within the receiving countries, particularly the United Kingdom, acted to heighten an already tense and emotional affair. According to David Steel, two factors account for the increasing rate of the Asian exodus: the reaction of certain individuals in the United Kingdom who used the influx as a political weapon, and the Kenyan government's determination to press on with the rapid Africanization of the economy. "What had been a relatively orderly process of withdrawal was converted into a rush that added to the pressure being put on the British Government to stop it" (p. 131). Thus the British decision to limit immigration, prompted by a desire to avoid internal crises through the preservation of the country's overwhelming white majority, set off a chain reaction of fear in both Britain and Africa. It is paradoxical that many of the Asians who sought to avoid negotiating with the Africans of Kenya found themselves ultimately dependent upon this majority's goodwill, at least until such time as their British passports were to be honored abroad.

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IV

Such non-negotiating situations as violence, forcible domination, assimilation, and exodus reflect the existence of profound interethnic cleavages in the societies affected. In these cases, the fundamental nature of primordial identities are such as to preclude sufficient common ground for bargaining. As Emile Durkheim stresses, the existence of some moral links is a condition for competition in a society. "The individuals among whom the struggle is waged," he writes, "must already be solidary and feel so. That is to say, they must belong to the same society. That is why, where this feeling of solidarity is too feeble to resist the dispersive influence of competition, the latter engenders altogether different effects from the division of labor. In countries where existence is too difficult because of the extreme density of the population, the inhabitants, instead of specializing, retire from society, either permanently or temporarily and leave for other countries."[22]

Some minimal consensus is necessary, then, for interethnic bargaining to be present. Unless collectivities are aware of their interdependence as well as of their distinctiveness, an acknowledged negotiating situation seems out of the question. What Despres describes as *apan-jaht* politics (vote for your kind) can, if carried to extreme lengths, undermine the sense of mutuality necessary for constructive intergroup reciprocity.

Since political structures provide the framework in which these essential moral links can develop, it is necessary to examine some of the institutions fostering coherence in societies. These political institutions are a reflection of the momentary bargaining process as well as a means of managing interethnic tensions. A study of the nature and composition of such institutions as political parties, bureaucracies, legislatures, electoral systems, and trade unions shows them to be a political-cultural response to the particular social cleavages within a state. At the same time such institutions can have the capacity to influence the course of a conflict situation. Ethnic balancing in party or trade-union selections, the apportionment of constituencies, the nature of "representativeness" in civil service recruitment, and the operation of an electoral system all may mirror particular bargaining compromises worked out over the years. But these institutions in turn have an influence on the ongoing process. They can be dysfunctional with interethnic harmony (the pre-revolution election system in Zanzibar) or

[22] *The Division of Labor in Society* (New York 1966), 276.

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they can become the basis, in instances of minimal dissensus, for new settlements between groups. Proportional representation, as adopted in Guyana, can act to reduce interethnic tensions if it affords a regular means of adjusting to divergent demographic trends, provided, of course, that such a political institution secures legitimacy over time in all sections of the population. If these "broker institutions" can facilitate such an adjustment, they will be performing what Despres describes as "their primary function [of] the integration of the social system" (p. 160).

Although these volumes tend to devote little attention to the crucial mechanisms of ethnic balancing, they give some insight into several important brokerage institutions: federalism, proportional representation, and, mostly by implication, coalition government. The tendency to overlook the politics of ethnic balancing may well be the weakest aspect of these works taken as a whole. It represents an all-too-general preoccupation with the nature of past cleavages and conflicts instead of with the evolving dimensions of the process of political integration.

As noted above, Nigeria's federal structure was fashioned by the representatives of various group interests acting within the context of an imposed colonial framework. If it turned out to be a satisfactory image of the power configurations among major collectivities on the scene, it failed to give adequate attention to the interests of minority peoples in all regions. Moreover, the formation of post-independence coalitions at the center was done in such a way as to exclude active participation by one of the three main peoples, the Yoruba. This resulted in a lack of their commitment to the federal arrangement that had destructive implications. As a consequence, federalism, which Ali A. Mazrui describes as "an institutionalization of compromise relationships" (Kuper and Smith, p. 338), proved incapable of performing the very reconciliational role expected of such an asymmetrical system.

In accounting for the structural weaknesses inherent in federal or, more broadly, consociational, systems, M. G. Smith perceptively points to a main problem, that of complementary equivalence. His analysis is pertinent to Nigerian experience. "Structurally," he says, "although consociations prescribe equivalence or complementarity among their components, they can rarely avoid de facto disparities in distributions of power, influence, and public preference, though such disparities exacerbate segmental fears and tensions among the privileged and unprivileged alike" (p. 443). Thus he views instability as inhering in "the combination of equally autonomous segments differentiated by

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structure, size, ethnic and institutional background, interest, need, and power" (p. 443).

Despite these limitations, Chief Awolowo perseveres in his faith in a federal arrangement. For Awolowo, "the Constitution of Nigeria must be federal"; "any other constitution will be unsuitable and will generate ever-recurring instability which may eventually lead to the complete disappearance of the Nigerian composite State as we know it today" (Awolowo, pp. 239, 246). Rejecting the old federal structure as a "monstrosity" (p. 70), he sees in the 1967 restructuring of the country an approach toward constitutional viability. But he would go much further in the reorganizing process. In his chapter on a suitable constitution, he calls for the adoption of a federal system based on national and linguistic differences. To this end, he proposes ten states based on the major "nations" of the country and another seven states composed of the remaining linguistic groupings, with various constitutional protections for the rights of minority elements within these states. But could such a formula be expected to reflect the reality of group power in the Nigeria of the future? If so, is there likely to be sufficient agreement on the new federal arrangement to insure stability and development? Unless a consensus emerges over the particular institutional mechanism adopted under these circumstances, it is unlikely to carry the loads involved in accommodating ever-shifting group interests and power. Federalism requires a sense of mutuality and self-restraint for long-term success. Since these are the very qualities that are subverted by the fundamental nature of interethnic cleavages, it may still prove impractical in multinational Nigeria.

Although many exponents of another brokerage system, proportional representation, have urged its adoption in pluralistic societies, few third-world countries have actually shown themselves to be willing to experiment with such a voting system.[23] This reluctance stems from their concentration upon the building of a national consensus rather than from the achievement of an accurate representation of minority elements in the policy-making organs of state. As a result, Guyana's unique experience with proportional representation is of considerable interest to students of interethnic relations.

The instability surrounding Guyana's experiment with proportional representation stems from the circumscribed nature of the pre-independence bargaining process. During the 1962-63 period, the opposi-

[23] Some appeals for the adoption of proportional representation appear in Enid Lakeman and James D. Lambert, *Voting in Democracies* (London 1959), 148, 172; W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London 1965), 72-74; *Kenya Calling*, August 8, 1959, 7; and *West Africa*, March 27, 1965, 334, and October 23, 1965, 1177.

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tion parties (the predominantly African Peoples National Congress [PNC] under the leadership of L. F. S. Burnham, and the European-led United Force [UF] of Peter D'Aguiar) pressed the British Colonial Office for various constitutional reforms, including proportional representation. Over the bitter criticism of Cheddi Jagan and his largely East Indian Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), the Colonial Office decided to accede to these demands. Since the East Indian community comprised less than a majority of the country's total population, the decision to sponsor proportional representation had the effect of transforming the political system. The decisiveness of this change was shown by the 1964 election, which resulted in the PNC-UF coalition's coming into power.

Under these circumstances, the implementation of proportional representation in Guyana is less a reflection of interethnic bargaining than a colonial response to the combined pressures of various minority elements. Clearly, the legitimacy of this institution is clouded by these origins. Even so, proportional representation continues to exercise a noticeable influence upon interethnic relations. The PNC-UF coalition remains firmly entrenched in power, maintaining a situation of uneasy calm that is temporarily favorable to African-European interests. However, proportional representation's long-term survival may well rest on an altering of mass perceptions regarding the purpose and operations of such an institution. But can a system founded for essentially manipulative purposes become widely accepted in a pluralistic society as offering rewards to all major elements at one and the same time? To a large extent this depends upon the growth of a spirit of reciprocity in the society as a whole. As in the case of federalism, group competition presupposes moral links; if no sense of mutual interest develops, it seems likely that such fragile institutional arrangements as Guyana's proportional representation will not survive the emergence of profound interethnic conflict.

Coalition government is inextricably bound up with both the Nigerian and Guyanese brokerage institutions discussed above. These ruling coalitions are in and of themselves unmistakable signs of the operation of the political bargaining process. In their formative stages, the parties proposing common action must negotiate ministerial appointments and joint domestic and foreign policy positions. The number and importance of governmental positions assigned to each party is an indication of its momentary bargaining power. Then, as the coalition government takes hold, continuing interparty politics make realignments inevitable. When *Kabaka Yekka's* strength declined in

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Uganda, a revision of its role in the UPC-KY coalition government was not long in following. Coalitions are sensitive, therefore, to changing intergroup power relations, reacting more quickly to group power considerations than do such legally formalized institutions as federalism and proportional representation.

For some observers, such as W. Arthur Lewis, "the coalition idea is obvious to anybody who thinks about a plural society. . . ."[24] Lewis questions the capacity of the all-encompassing single-party system to achieve political integration and urges developing countries to turn instead to such "solutions" as federalism and coalition government. Certainly coalition structures are well conceived in their ability to encourage interethnic reciprocity. Nevertheless, this solution still suffers from many of the same limitations that marked the other brokerage institutions of federalism and proportional representation. Moral linkage is as vital to a lasting competitive process among coalition partners as to intergovernmental relations and election systems. Consequently, unless the coalition partners come to share a minimal consensus on goals and values, the political negotiating process implicit in coalition government is likely to foster intense conflict or debilitating *immobilisme* rather than fruitful cooperation.

In conclusion, these volumes make a substantial contribution to our understanding of the depth of cleavages among collectivities in pluralistic societies. Taken as a whole, they reveal much about the boundaries between sections and the inescapable struggle for group power. Such an emphasis upon cleavages is an accurate image of the dissensus and discontinuity prevailing in these fundamentally divided societies. Yet for all their insight into the drama of conflict, these works fail to be equally effective in probing into the dynamic processes of interethnic relations. They tell us more about cleavages than about links, more about conflict than about cooperation and reciprocity. Their details are sharply delineated; however, the complete picture requires somewhat greater attention to adjustment, interrelatedness, adaptation, and exchange.

No doubt the fundamental nature of primordial identities precludes a large dimension for interethnic bargaining. The totality attaching to these identities gives rise to something approximating a "Gresham's Law of Conflict," where "the harmful and dangerous elements drive out those which would keep the conflict within bounds."[25] Hence, in

[24] Lewis, 70. See also Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," *World Politics*, XXI (January 1969), 212.

[25] James S. Coleman, *Community Conflict* (New York 1957), 14.

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pluralistic societies bargaining is severely restricted by the weakness of moral links tying all groups together. The very consensus that is crucial for healthy interethnic competition is in short supply in these disjunctive societies.

Even under such unpromising circumstances, a negotiating sphere can sometimes exist. Evidences of ethnic balancing in elite recruitment and allocation of resources, or of brokerage institutions such as federalism, proportional representation, and coalition government, are indications that bargaining politics, hesitant and transitory, is nonetheless operative in pluralistic polities. Consequently, a concern for the diplomatic dimension in interethnic relations may afford some insight into the ongoing process. Political integration in pluralistic situations involves a steadily expanding area of reciprocity; to play down the extent of the reciprocity actually in evidence is to miss whatever potential does exist for conflict resolution in such situations.

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THE PROMISE OF GEOCENTRIC POLITICS

By GEORGE MODELSKI

Herbert J. Spiro *World Politics: The Global System*, The Dorsey Press, Homewood, Illinois, 1966, 345 pp. $6.75

I

THE study of international relations, as now practiced, is basically ethnocentric. That is to say, its focus of inquiry is the nation-state and its principal working model the nation-state system. The premises of this orientation, which it shares with political science, may briefly be set out as follows.

States (or nations, or countries) are political systems possessing community, consensus, and a monopoly of the means of violence; by contrast, international systems lack these characteristics. Hence the basic difference between domestic and international politics is most strikingly manifested in the fact that while peace is the rule in domestic politics, war is the distinguishing feature of international relations. The state of war is the direct result and the unavoidable consequence of the lack of community, consensus, and monopoly of the means of violence in the world at large. Thus war, the expectation of war, and the diplomatic and strategic behavior consequent upon it become the *explicanda* of international relations.

These premises were recently given their clearest and most persuasive exposition by Raymond Aron,[1] but this classic view has a long intellectual pedigree. E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau were its most influential exponents two or three decades ago, and in its essence it can be traced all the way back to Thomas Hobbes.

Not only has this classical statement defined the problems of international relations for past generations of students, it is also the ruling paradigm for methodologically innovative contemporary research in this field. Thus, for example, the Dimensions of Nations project is based on the assumptions that the international system is the product of the "coupling" of "national sub-systems," that the world is divided

[1] *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York 1966); see also Stanley Hoffmann, *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics* (New York 1965), Chap. 1; Robert W. Tucker, "Peace and War," *World Politics*, XVII (January 1965), 310-33.

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into a number of discrete nations (each having distinct attributes) and that the significant explanations are those that tell us about the "behavior" of these nations (being the resultant of such attributes). According to Rudolph Rummel, what the newer approaches have done is to give quantitative dimensions to old, familiar concepts: as he puts it, "quantitative research [is] channelled by traditional insight and knowledge," and it is in this context that he cites Hans Morgenthau's *Politics among Nations* as a classic work tying together older concepts in a theoretical nexus.[2] For others, too, the international system consists of a flow of transactions between "nations," and, for some, international regions are no more than clusters of national attributes and national behavior.

The classical statement does not, of course, exhaust all the past and present approaches to international relations. Yet it is true that for the past few decades the dominant paradigm has been one of nation-state behavior, and it has not been significantly contested. Even a so-called "Great Debate" such as that initiated by the Bull-Kaplan exchange in the pages of this journal[3] has proved disappointing because the issues it raised turned out to be barren of new ideas, amounting most of the time to no more than a contention over whether or not, in the study of international relations, it is appropriate to use statistical methods and techniques: in essence, whether or not international relations is part of the social sciences, an issue that surely was, or ought to have been, settled some time ago.

If the attention this debate attracted cannot be explained by the magnitude of the issues raised, it should be taken as evidence of the malaise pervading the subject and its practitioners and as an expression of the largely unarticulated but growing dissatisfaction with the present state of the discipline. It is strange that at a time of world-wide turmoil, growing disenchantment with the world's basic political institutions, and imperative need to reappraise fundamental notions of international relations and of political science, we should be trifling about the respective virtues of "classicism" and "scientism."

The poverty of contemporary international theory must be attributed to the fact that it functions as no more than the ideology of the nation-state system. The theory describes, explains, and justifies the system of

[2] Rudolph Rummel, "Indicators of Cross-National and International Patterns," *American Political Science Review*, LXIII (March 1969), 128.

[3] And reported in Klaus Knorr and James N. Rosenau, eds., *Contending Approaches to International Politics* (Princeton 1969).

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nation-states that it asserts exists in the present-day world.[4] It rarely asks whether or to what degree today's global system does in fact approximate the model of the nation-state system underlying international relations theory, or to what degree the lack of community and consensus required by its premises is in fact found to exist in that system. Elementary questions as to whether or in what sense nations may be said to behave at all are never raised. War is another part of the theory's unquestioned premises. Even speculative efforts of the futurological type fail to stimulate fundamental inquiry.

"Ideology is no substitute for flying," Chinese air force commanders reportedly complained when asked to train their pilots on the basis of the Little Red Book. And so it is in international relations theory, still grounded for lack of ideas free and powerful enough to move it to the take-off stage, let alone to permit sustained flight. As long as the model of the nation-state system remains unchallenged within international relations, its theory will continue to be grounded.

Some students of international relations have recognized this dilemma. Martin Wight argued some time ago that "international theory is marked not only by paucity but also by intellectual and moral poverty," and he rightly attributed this principally to the "intellectual prejudice imposed by the sovereign state." Yet, in effect, he refused to abandon this intellectual prejudice and came to the conclusion not only that there is no international theory worthy of the name but that there cannot be any.[5] So much for intellectual and moral poverty.

But this conclusion can be only a counsel of despair. There is no valid *a priori* reason why one aspect of social existence is any more resistant to theorizing than any other. The ruling model of the nation-state system must be challenged and recognized for what it is, one of the several possible ways of thinking about world politics and world order. The traditional prejudices of ethnocentricity need to be attenuated by a geocentric approach to political science.

II

Herbert Spiro's *World Politics: The Global System* is a recent textbook for introductory courses in international relations; it deserves to be noticed because it approaches the field in a fresh and unconventional

[4] See also George Modelski, "Simulations, 'Realities,' and International Relations Theory," *Simulation and Games* (June 1970).

[5] Martin Wight, "Why Is there no International Theory?" *International Relations*, XI (April 1960), 35-48, 62.

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spirit. Even its title is, as the author points out, novel and deliberately chosen to replace the more customary descriptions of the field as "international relations." In a radical departure from the nation-centered classical prescription, Spiro introduces the global level of politics as the major focus of interest and thus opens up to constructive speculation and inquiry the traditionally strait-jacketed view of the subject.

The global outlook on politics is basic to the author's argument. "The main reason for taking a global perspective upon what used to be called international relations is that, today for the first time in history, a global community of mankind exists or, at any rate, is coming into existence in the consciousness of human beings" (p. 2). Its causes are the expanding technology of transport and communications, and the growing destructiveness of weapons.

Complementing this global outlook is a deliberate decision to ignore the separation between international relations and the study of internal politics, a distinction that leads to the artificial separation between domestic and international affairs. "Today there is one global political system of which all national and other smaller political systems are component parts. No qualitative or essential difference can be found between lower political systems and the all-encompassing global systems to warrant the study of the two different levels of politics by different methods" (p. 5).

Spiro also rejects a crude emphasis on power, in recognition that "there is more to politics" than the management of power. Regarding world politics, moreover, he develops an interesting argument based upon the contemporary "overabundance of power" of the nuclear variety, in contrast to earlier situations of scarcity, and the inability of the Great Powers to use it (pp. 37-40). This "radically novel" element, he says, has made obsolete the one-dimensional approach commonly associated with the study of "power politics."

In a general way, *The Global System* belongs to the contemporary school of systems theorizing. The work's governing concept is a political system as a "community processing its issues." Such a community need not exhibit consensus, have a monopoly of force, or be free from conflict or violence; the realization that some problems need to be attended to in common suffices to hold it together. The major model utilized throughout the book envisages this processing of issues (or the political process) as passing through four distinct stages: formulation, deliberation, solution, and resolution. Related to these phases are the requirements of every political system for stability, flexibility, efficiency, and effectiveness.

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According to Spiro, issues in the global community are processed in much the same way as they are in every other community. Thus, the central point of the global community is the United Nations Organization, essentially a global parliamentary institution (Chapter 5). Significant roles in that community are played by international law, now changing into global law (Chapter 6), by developments in strategy and the emergence of the military intellectuals (Chapter 7), and by the developing countries (Chapter 8).

Spiro's consistent emphasis on the value and importance of procedural and formal aspects of behavior in all matters pertaining to politics is a source of strength in his analysis. He has much of interest to say about the function of law and the importance of procedural (as distinct from substantive) consensus for the operation of political communities.[6] He gives a timely reminder of the earlier wisdom of the legal and constitutional approaches to politics, which may have been too long ignored by forward-looking scholars in our field.

Spiro is, however, on more uncertain ground when it comes to distinguishing the global system and its politics from the totality of the field of politics, for he gives neither a definition of the global community and its political system, nor any empirical referents for those concepts. While he does refer to various "levels" of politics, he never clearly explains or empirically validates their nature. Indeed, seeing politics primarily in procedural terms, Spiro must have difficulty in differentiating among levels of politics, for what distinguishes them consists in large part of the type of problems they process. Thus, he discusses at some length the new breed of strategic intellectuals but ignores conflict and pays scant attention to wars because "the distinction between war and peace can no longer be made" (p. 230).

Yet another characteristic of Spiro's approach is his view of politics as "the highest value" (p. 320), and as "the queen of the sciences" (p. 316). There seems to be no *a priori* reason why politics is any more important than, say, economics, law, religion, or science. Indeed, because of the inevitable yet ominous links between politics and force, the stable society, arguably, must be one that keeps politics "in its proper place," that, in fact, depreciates politics.

Spiro, to a greater extent than many professional students of international relations, focuses attention upon the threat to human survival posed by nuclear weapons and describes the need to devise procedures

[6] Spiro's procedural politics brings to mind Confucianism, the political philosophy of the Chinese world state, with its emphasis upon ritual, manners, and correct behavior—the philosophy that grew out of revulsion from the chaos, disorder, and confusion of the period of the Warring States.

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for dealing with that threat as "the most serious problem for men living in the two great hostile camps today" (p. 320). But does this condition alone make politics the highest value or "the most encompassing of human concerns and activities"? The threat to survival may become a part of the human condition, and the means of its containment remain permanently among the vital concerns of mankind; but politics is only one of the processes at work in society, and little advantage is gained in cloaking it in ideological notions of supremacy.

Although Spiro's book contains a number of valuable ideas, we must also record a series of obvious, indeed glaring, deficiencies. The quality of the writing and the material is uneven; sections of the book are taken from earlier articles and have been insufficiently integrated. Some well-thought-out chapters, such as that on the United Nations, are followed by others showing incomplete preparation and weak factual foundation, such as the chapter on strategy with its excessive emphasis on issues prominent during the Kennedy years.

The book is free from much of the conventional ballast of an ordinary text on international relations, yet that freedom sometimes also verges on flimsiness. Although writing in the tradition of political and philosophical theory, the author has from time to time had to make empirical statements about world politics, and it is on such occasions that his arguments become particularly vulnerable. Contrary to what we would expect from a text, it is often casual and sometimes arbitrary in its use of empirical evidence and shows no systematic effort to assemble factual data. Thus the only table in the entire book is a list of members of the League of Nations (pp. 122-23); yet nowhere do we find a comparable (and much more obviously relevant) list of members of the United Nations. Indeed, had such a list been compiled, the author might have avoided such simple errors as the assertions that "most" of the members of the United Nations in 1965 were not states when the United Nations was founded (roughly one half were), that "most" of the population now represented in the United Nations was not directly represented at the first session of the General Assembly (incorrect, because both China and India were Charter Members), or that Laos is not a member of the Organization.[7]

While in certain respects a *tour de force*, the whole work gives the

[7] Spiro, 249, 121; the only document in the appendix to the book is the 1963 treaty to ban nuclear tests; why this particular document and not, say, the United Nations Charter, the Antarctic Treaty, the Austrian State Treaty, the Laotian Neutralization Agreements, or a dozen other equally significant items?

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impression of lack of care in preparation.[8] It would have benefited greatly by patience and greater thoroughness in the analysis of the demanding field it was undertaking.

III

Both in international relations theory and in political science in general, the ruling paradigm of the nineteen-sixties has been the systems approach.

Far from being a recent discovery, the notion of "system" has, of course, a long history.[9] As Spiro reminds us, Thomas Hobbes had a chapter on political systems, and we know that European historians of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries customarily discussed the affairs of the continent as occurring within one political system. The classical statements of the Balance of Power also usually presupposed such a framework. Thus the reintroduction of "systems" into contemporary discourse was hardly an example of exceptional innovation.

Whatever the reasons for the recent and wide currency of such notions, of which Spiro's book is one example, the systems approach of the last decade may be credited with two lasting and positive contributions to the study of politics.

In intellectual history the systems idea has expanded the range of scholarly inquiry, led to the discovery of new and hitherto neglected phenomena, generally had a broadening effect upon scholarly horizons. In international relations the result of the systems approach has been to shift the center of gravity from the earlier and nearly exclusive concern with foreign policy toward more balanced views. The positive contribution of the systems approach to international relations was to direct attention to global interdependence.

The habit of thinking about the world as an international system has helped students of international relations to view it as one interdependent whole that exhibits the qualities of coherence and persistence; the habit became a prime antidote to the characteristics of anarchy and even chaos frequently if uninformedly attributed to the world. While international systems have most often been conceived of as being made up of states (and have therefore labored under the disabilities of an ethnocentric approach) the conception itself did pave the way toward a more global outlook upon human affairs. Spiro's work, although expansive in design, has not completely surmounted

[8] See correspondence in the *American Political Science Review*, LXII (December 1968), 1268, and LXIII (March 1969), 170-71.

[9] It was in opposition to the Hegelian "system" that Kierkegaard formulated his existential philosophy.

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the nation-state orientation of the conventional systems approach; this failure is particularly evident in his inability to integrate successfully into his analysis actors of world politics other than states and international organizations.

Second, systems analysis has exerted a generalizing and hence also a social-scientific influence upon a subject that has traditionally emphasized and valued historical particularities and intuitive and impressionistic analyses. A systems approach requires the development both of theoretical concepts and generalizations and of empirical procedures for relating such concepts to observable phenomena. Although Spiro is not really concerned with procedures, and is in no sense a quantifier, he does make contributions to the former enterprise and particularly to the formation of concepts. His approach to world politics, his concepts of community and the stages of the political process, and his typologies of political styles will all prove stimulating to social scientists.

The systems approach, however, has also produced problems of its own and in recent years has tended to be devoid of significant insights. One problem has been the inclination of students of international systems to focus their analytical efforts upon the "system" at the expense of the "international" part of their theories. "System" is a concept of high generality and what is true of all systems, while relevant to world politics, is usually not specific enough to add greatly to our appreciation of that narrowly circumscribed field. What is more, for some practitioners of what has come to be known as systems theory, the mere utterance and frequent repetition of the magic term "system" has become a ritual act of special potency, expected to confer upon the utterer instant admission not only to the circle of the initiated but also to a "sesame" of political wisdom. The most damaging criticism of some international systems approaches might well be that they lend themselves to a good deal of avoidable mystification—doubly damaging in a field that is already suffering from such mind-beclouding concepts as power, sovereignty, and statehood.

Spiro rightly points out that "not all systems theories are equally useful" (p. 43), even if he himself from time to time excessively indulges in that powerful addiction of systems theorists, the endless construction of two-by-two boxes into which dimly observed reality then has to be stuffed, in one way or another, and rarely with complete success.

Besides classificatory formalism, the other failing of systems analysis, particularly of the political science variety, has been the typically ethnocentric tendency to identify the political system with national society

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and, in regard to the world in general, to see the international system as no more than "the environment" of the political system. By this device the global system is summarily relegated to a subordinate, contextual category, important for some explanatory purposes but most of the time taken for granted.

Spiro aptly criticizes the "focus upon the state as *the* political system" (p. 149) but does not really spell out the various implications of conceiving the world as a complex and rapidly changing system. His argument, indeed, is built upon the notion of the post-1945 emergence of a global society (a notion that must be questioned by those adopting a truly global, historical view of the affairs of mankind), hence upon the phenomenon of a developing system. But the process and direction of the change he describes seem schematic, and rely too much upon the somewhat simple analogy between the development process in the new nations and the growth of a global political system. His policy-process models also yield a classification of types of world order, but there is little in his analysis that can cope with the task of explaining truly large-scale transformation processes of world societies, especially in a historical context. In brief, although systems analysis has, in part, prepared the ground for a geocentric approach, the question may legitimately be put whether its usefulness is not now at an end. The study of the politics of world societies is moving into a phase in which the simple "systems" label no longer carries meaningful connotations.

IV

Spiro's *Global System* is an early instance of what might be described as a significant trend to come: the geocentric approach to the study of political science.

Webster's Third International Dictionary defines "geocentric" as, *inter alia*, "taking or based on the earth as the center of perspective and valuation." The original use of the term was bound up with the Copernican revolution, when a geocentric conception of the cosmos was abandoned in favor of the heliocentric.

More recently, Howard Perlmutter has brought the notion of "geocentricity" into his taxonomy of world corporations.[10] He distinguishes among three types of international corporations—ethnocentric, polycentric, and geocentric—and argues that enterprises of global scope need to be geocentric if they are to cope successfully with the demands

[10] "The Tortuous Evolution of the Multinational Corporation," *Columbia Journal of World Business*, IV (January-February 1969), 9-18.

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of the present-day world. He specifies in particular that geocentric organizations are those that take as their center of reference the world market and global standards of quality and skill, and those that are particularly responsive to the universalistic requirements of modern science. We might add that geocentric corporations also need to adopt a positive orientation toward world order and toward global political processes.

The strictures of ethnocentricity may also be laid at the door of the social sciences. The rapidly mounting problems of the earth as a whole no longer are amenable to attack with the ethnocentric conceptual equipment inherited from the nineteenth century. Although this holds true for all the social sciences and although they all need a reorientation in the direction of geocentricity, nowhere is the need more compelling than it is in political science, still basically the science of the state, and in international relations, still under the spell of the conventional diplomatic wisdom of Metternich and Bismarck.

To respond creatively to new conditions, a geocentric political science of the next decade must abandon the nation-state as the dominant mode and model of political organization; promote the rethinking of basic political questions in the perspective of the requirements of a large, complex, and globalized social system; and regard world politics as the foundation for the study of political science.

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